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ABSTRACT 
This research makes a comprehensive review of insolvency laws and reforms in the selected 
jurisdictions namely Kenya, the UK and Mauritius with a view of understanding how Kenya 
can benefit from the experience of others. The main aim is to evaluate whether Kenyan in-
solvency laws supports modern businesses and to consider what, if any, legal reforms might 
be desirable to better achieve this end. The study commences from a conceptual approach to 
the legal concepts of corporate insolvency laws then attempts to understand the justification 
for the existence and role of insolvency law from a theoretical perspective. It then under-
takes an in-depth evaluation of the current Kenyan corporate insolvency framework using 
international benchmarks; in particular by reference to the UNCITRAL Insolvency legisla-
tive guide. The exploration of the Kenyan insolvency framework reveals the underlying 
weaknesses and underscores the need for reforms. It also investigates whether there are any 
recognizable informal mechanisms that may enable the weaknesses in the formal mecha-
nisms to be overcome. Subsequently, the thesis explores whether Kenya can benefit from the 
experiences of the UK and Mauritius, who may be regarded as successful reformers. It ex-
amines the historical evolution of UK corporate insolvency laws and identifies the driving 
forces behind the successful reform engagements.  This exploration of the wellspring of le-
gal traditions and fundamental principles that underpin corporate insolvency provides great 
insights.  The study attempts to understand the potential problems that frustrate reform ef-
forts in Kenya by identifying the insolvency law reform drivers in Kenya and contrasting the 
influence of the same drivers in Mauritius. Such a comparison offers a perspective that has 
been lacking in the current scholarship and reform engagements in Kenya and provides theo-
retical insights and understanding on how best Kenya can undertake successful reforms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reforming insolvency laws has increasingly become a subject of global interest and it will 
predictably remain so, as part of the processes under which the jurisdictions of the world are 
becoming more integrated. In essence, the intensity of integration and interdependence 
among the jurisdictions of the world, much as it comes with significant benefits, inevitably 
makes many jurisdictions susceptible to financial crisis. This reality has made the considera-
tion of insolvency reforms imperative in many jurisdictions.  In fact, reforms to domestic 
corporate insolvency laws have been scheduled into the legislative agendas of many coun-
tries as part of efforts that are aimed at building an efficient insolvency system. These efforts 
commonly consist of jurisdictions summarizing the experiences and lessons from other 
countries and taking full consideration of their own unique domestic situations.
1
 The big 
question then is how are the Sub-Saharan African (‘SSA’) countries, which are as vulnerable 
as any other jurisdictions, adjusting to these global developments? In particular, how can 
Kenya best realize a realistic programme of insolvency law reform? The main focus of this 
study is on answering this second question. 
This chapter sets out the context in which the study is conducted. The chapter starts with the 
background of the research, followed by the aims which guide the entire study. It then elabo-
                                                          
1
 Katarzyna Gromek Broc, and  Rebecca Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments 
from Selected Countries (2
nd 
edn, Kluwer Law International, 2006) pg.333 
 
 
2 
 
rates on fundamental concepts in corporate insolvency laws and concludes with an organiza-
tional structure of the thesis. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Recent years have witnessed a phenomenal increase in corporate failure prompting many 
jurisdictions to reconsider the adequacies of their insolvency laws. The need for efficient 
procedures becomes marked as the impact of bankruptcy is felt not only by the debtor com-
pany but also the people directly involved and associated with it, such as creditors and em-
ployees, or indirectly affected, such as the society, town or country. In the advent of crisis, 
companies inevitably consider employing corporate reorganization procedures, which in-
clude formal procedures provided by legislation and ‘informal’ activities, such as negotiat-
ing with creditors individually. In essence, legislative frameworks are vital in governing 
corporate failure, economic restructuring and firm rehabilitation. This reality poses a chal-
lenge to states and international organizations to set about forging institutions and laws that 
will enable future crisis to be forestalled or, at least, enable the duration of crisis to be lim-
ited. For instance, the 1997 East Asian crisis got the international community and the World 
Bank concerned over inefficiencies in the insolvency laws in many jurisdictions. Conse-
quently, a set of principles have been developed to provide benchmarks for evaluating the 
effectiveness and adequacies of bankruptcy laws.
2
 
However, while there have been many initiatives to develop and reform insolvency law to 
support businesses that have been undertaken in developed economies, less has been done in 
developing economies. Besides, the reform efforts that have been attempted in developing 
                                                          
2
 Barry Eichengreen, Towards a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post Asia Agenda (In-
stitute for International Economic, Washington D.C, 1999) pg. 28-30  
3 
 
economies have been very slow and some governments have even seemed to lack the will 
power to engage in tangible reforms. In fact an assessment of insolvency systems in some 
SSA countries within the context of the IMF’s Financial System Stability Assessment Pro-
grammes
3
 as well as periodic consultations with Bretton Wood institutions’ member coun-
tries
4
 reveals that much statutory law in SSA is obsolescent and in need of modernization. 
The inadequacies found in the laws were described as ‘symptoms of deeper structural im-
pediments to private lending.’5 In particular the 2008 IMF Report, while making reference to 
Kenya, was categorical that its insolvency laws needed to be modernized and the commer-
cial courts be strengthened.
6
 
In essence, Kenya’s existing Insolvency Law is archaic leaving much to be desired as to its 
ability to meet the needs of modern business. The key legislation, Companies Act (Cap 486 
Laws of Kenya) is based on the UK Companies Act 1948 and it may be noted that UK legis-
lation has moved on significantly from the 1948 statute. The UK enacted its own dedicated 
Insolvency Act as far as back as 1985-6, which it updated further on several occasions, no-
tably by the Enterprise Act 2002. Kenyan law has remained static during this time and it is 
therefore not in step with modern trends regionally and internationally, and no efforts have 
been made to study how best it can be reformed. There have been many attempts by the 
Kenyan legislature to enact a new insolvency law; however, at the time of writing this re-
                                                          
3
 PD’s Investment, Competition and Business Development Services Team, Approaching International Finan-
cial Standards and Codes ( December 2003) <http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/iarc/edais/word- 
files/HowtoApproachInternationalFinancialStandardsCodes.doc> accessed 20 January 2013 
4 
IMF, Uganda: Financial System Stability Assessment (April 2003) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0397.pdf> accessed 23 February 2013; World Bank, Invest-
ment Climate Assessment Kenya: Enhancing the Competitiveness of Kenya’s Manufacturing Sector: The Role 
of the Investment Climate ( November 2004) <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/attachmentsbytitle/ic-
kenya.pdf/$file/ic-kenya.pdf> accessed 23 February 2013 
5
 Ibid 
6
 IMF, Kenya, Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania: Selected Issues (October,2008)  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08353.pdf> accessed on 23 Feb 2013 
4 
 
search, none had yet borne fruit. In fact those attempts do not appear to have been informed 
by any substantial research.  Instead they have all been prompted by the daunting reality that 
virtually all businesses that plunge into crisis in Kenya end up being liquidated. This is det-
rimental to business because some of the commercial entities that encounter crisis are viable 
and can potentially be restructured for the benefit of their creditors, debtors and the economy 
at large. As pointed out by Flynn, a transparent and predictable system of law is important in 
dealing with financial failure and its consequences, and as part of the encouragement and 
attraction of those who invest and provide credit, both in the first place and on a continuing 
basis.
7
 
To emphasize, it is argued that inadequate legislation to properly balance and protect credi-
tors’ and debtors’ rights negatively affects inward investment and increases the cost of doing 
business. In fact, Kenya’s former President Mwai Kibaki in one of his speeches to the Par-
liament during the debates on the Insolvency Bill emphasized that there was a critical need 
for a new insolvency law, to enhance Kenya’s competitiveness for business and investment.8 
In a nutshell, there is recognition that Kenyan insolvency law needs reforming and this 
beckons an investigation as to why reforms have not yet been achieved? What are the barri-
ers to reforms? How inadequate is the existing Kenyan insolvency framework? Can Kenya 
learn from other jurisdictions that have successfully reformed? What factors might drive re-
form forwards? It is largely acknowledged that governments are very vital drivers of re-
forms. However, as elaborated in chapter six of this thesis, politics and the priorities of the 
                                                          
7 D Flynn, ‘Comparative Legal Analysis’ (2003) 32 European Media Law 86 
8
 Available in 
<http://www.parliament.go.ke/parliament/download/tenth_forth_sess/SPEECH/%20HIS%20EXCELLENCE%
20HON.pdf> accessed 15/2/2013 
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government in power influence the pace of reforms. Besides, international institutions and 
interest groups can influence the governments’ engagements. 
This research addresses the questions above by first assessing the present Kenyan insol-
vency framework in the light of international benchmarks and later by exploring the ap-
proaches taken in other jurisdictions in addressing similar problems. Generally, reforms in 
many jurisdictions over the world have borrowed ideas from others with varying levels of 
success and acceptance. In this respect, legal systems, policies and legal solutions are bor-
rowed from foreign jurisdictions as a means of advancing legislation quickly and effec-
tively.
9
 It is appreciated that bankruptcy laws in the respective jurisdictions have been 
shaped by different circumstances and therefore it would be naïve to seek to learn from their 
experiences without considering historical, cultural, economic and political realities. In fact, 
a popular view in insolvency reform is that the underlying realities and matters peculiar to 
each jurisdiction should be given due consideration as they are useful in understanding par-
ticular institutions and mechanisms of insolvency law as well as policies.
10
 In the same re-
spect, such realities have been expressed as the main reasons as to why it is not feasible to 
effect a wholesale legal transplantation of another country’s system.11 Notably, the interna-
tional players such as the World Bank could only provide guidelines on insolvency proceed-
ings because of the varying circumstances of jurisdictions, which must be taken into account 
in designing a system of insolvency laws.
12
 
 
                                                          
9
 Alan Watson  ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 335 
10
  Kingsley TW Ong, and Colin R Baxter ‘A Comparative Study of Fundamental Elements of Chinese and 
English Company Law’ (1996) 48 ICLQ 88, 89 
11
 Rebecca Parry, and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles’ 
(2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1 
12
 World Bank, UNCITRAL and INSOL, amongst others have developed  insolvency rules or  principles that 
can be tailored to fit the different circumstances a typical evidence of jurisdictional divergence 
6 
 
1.3 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether the present Kenyan insolvency 
law supports modern business and to consider what, if any, legal reforms might be desirable 
to better achieve this and to this end; international benchmarks are used to evaluate the law. 
The first aim is assessing current Kenyan law from the standpoint of encouragement of ex-
ternal and internal investment. In evaluating any legal framework, practitioners and scholars 
have become increasingly interested in finding better ways of assessing the performance of 
legal systems and the success of reform engagements.
13
 Once a mechanism of evaluating is 
developed, the extent to which it is used is generally an indication of its influence and the 
extent to which it has been accepted;
14
 and this is arguably true in the field of insolvency 
law.  For instance, UNCITRAL offers a Legislative Guide on Insolvency which assists in 
the establishment of an efficient and effective legal framework.
15
 In addition, the World 
Bank
16
 considers countries’ investment climates and ranks them according to their perform-
ances. The benchmarks of these international bodies provide an evaluative framework which 
is arguably acceptable and they are in common usage. The acceptability of the international 
benchmarks is because they are recommendations, guidelines championed by multilateral 
institutions in the form of the so-called ‘soft law approach’ rather than legally binding trea-
                                                          
13
 World Bank, ‘Performance Measures Topic Brief’ (2012) available in 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:20756997~m
enuPK:2036351~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062,00.html accessed on 14/11/2014 
14
 Ibid 
15
 See for example The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004, available in 
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf  >accessed  25/03/2011 
16
 Generally the World Bank is involved in many critical aspects of evaluating and reporting on countries’ in-
vestment climates. See for example World Bank,  Investment Climate Assessment Kenya: Enhancing the Com-
petitiveness of Kenya’s Manufacturing Sector: The Role of the Investment Climate ( November 2004) < 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/attachmentsbytitle/ic-kenya.pdf/$file/ic-kenya.pdf> accessed on 
6/3/2013; Also see World Bank, World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa: An IEG Review  
available in https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/agdevelopment_approach_paper.pdf (October 11, 
2007) accessed 3 June 2015 
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ties. This is important as national governments are not willing to relinquish sovereignty of 
their states to the world and besides, the national systems are diverse. A soft law therefore 
offers an interactive alternative to the formal, legally enforceable treaties at international 
level.
17
 
 
Second, the thesis also explores whether there are any informal approaches to corporate res-
cue in Kenya that may enable present weaknesses in the formal laws to be overcome. Such 
approaches may go some way to addressing defects in the formal laws which have given rise 
to concerns which have been documented in the literature. For example the World Bank 
(2004) in their assessment of the Kenyan investment climate found the insolvency regime to 
be costly and subject to lengthy delays.
18
 In addition, the system was found to suffer from 
infrastructural inadequacies, legally and institutionally, and to have a legislative regime that 
is fragmented, outmoded and incomplete.
19
 
Third, this research undertakes a comparative analysis between Kenya, the U.K and Mauri-
tius with an aim of reflecting upon the experiences and lessons from these jurisdictions with 
a hope of informing Kenya’s reform pathway. In particular, it focuses on the reform drivers. 
The trend under which the nations of the world exchange ideas on how best to organize an 
economy, how best to encourage investment and economic growth has grown significantly, 
with some jurisdictions converging to near uniformity in their laws. However, there is no 
research that has been done to explore how best the Kenyan insolvency institutions and pro-
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cedures could benefit from the experiences of other jurisdictions. The big question of how 
these aims will be achieved is detailed below. 
1.3.1 Research Methodology 
This thesis employs a doctrinal legal research methodology which is primarily library based. 
Therefore, it involves a comprehensive review of primary and secondary sources of law 
which are essentially pre-existing secondary sources of data. The primary sources used are 
legislation, case law, policy and government reports. The secondary sources range from text 
books, journal articles and magazines from law societies, and reports from respected and 
recognized international organizations like the World Bank. The research is a comparative 
study raising important methodological questions that must be addressed. The first is 
whether the comparative legal method used is appropriate to the topic and its adequacy to 
address the aims of the research. The second is as to the choice of jurisdictions being com-
pared. 
 
1.3.2 Is it appropriate to carry out a comparative research on the topic of insolvency 
laws? 
 
Corporate entities in any jurisdiction with a competitive market may face financial difficul-
ties and insolvencies. This is because market dynamics encourage the optimal use of re-
sources and consequently the competitiveness of companies to maximize the economic 
value. Therefore, insolvency law is an indispensable component of the laws of states and has 
been acknowledged to define the characteristic of a market economy.
20
 Since insolvency 
problems do not exclusively belong to one jurisdiction, no country can claim a monopoly 
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over the creation and development of insolvency laws.
21
 It is appreciated that the stages of 
development, systems of law and regulation and overall institutional frameworks are very 
different in almost all jurisdictions and can greatly affect how well a given jurisdiction’s in-
solvency system works. Nonetheless, given that the roles of insolvency law in all jurisdic-
tions are very similar, learning from other jurisdictions cannot be inhibited by the differ-
ences. Therefore, it is appropriate to do a comparative analysis of the insolvency rules, that 
is, the laws which performs similar functions in this regard in different jurisdictions. It is 
argued that a comparative analysis of insolvency law will be of academic value and practical 
significance to Kenya, especially in its reform efforts.  
 
The law is an ‘indissoluble amalgam of historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and 
psychological data, a compound, a hybrid, and a ‘monster’, an outrageous and heterogene-
ous collage’.22 In addition, the law is wide and deep, its dimensions range from the written 
law to the institutions and enforcement mechanisms, just to mention a few. Ruhl argues that 
a complex system cannot be understood fully by breaking it into smaller parts because a re-
duction ignores a lot, instead it is necessary to embrace a holistic view which leads to a 
deeper meaning of interactions.
23
 Arguably, the insolvency laws of any country are not an 
exception to such realities and such laws also significantly vary because of the different cul-
tural, historical as well as economic contexts of individual states. Therefore, in order to de-
velop a deeper understanding of the laws of any given jurisdiction, it is essential to move 
beyond the strict knowledge of the legal norms and examine the social and political context 
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of the rule.
24
 In fact, different functions of legal rules and different attitudes towards legal 
institutions of corporate insolvency law are captured through a comparative study. In es-
sence, comparative legal method is an appropriate methodology because it is a valuable tool 
for the legal analysis of national legal systems, stimulating awareness of the cultural and so-
cial character of the law in any given country.
25
 Besides, comparative legal method is com-
prehensive because it considers the cultural differences between legal systems as well as the 
potential arbitrariness in the selection of the objects of study.
26
  It is argued that by using 
such a method that permits a holistic approach, the research avoids the danger of putting too 
much trust in laws and institutions to achieve the desired results, and instead allows a con-
sideration of the practical limitations of the law and the social context of their implementa-
tion.  
 
1.4 WHY DOES THIS RESEARCH CHOOSE KENYA, ENGLAND, WALES AND 
MAURITIUS AS RESEARCH OBJECTS? 
 
A comparative study requires the identification of objects of comparison which, in our con-
text, are legal jurisdictions. The reasons for selecting Kenya as a research object are not only 
because the author is Kenyan and endeavour to make a contribution to Kenyan legal con-
struction but also because Kenya’s circumstances arguably represent those typical of a group 
of emerging economies, majorly from Africa, that have lagged behind in many aspects. The 
emerging economies, according to the dominant view of the multilateral institutions and the 
international community, are responsible for the occurrence of financial crises for the reason 
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of poor quality of their legal and institutional infrastructures for financial matters.
27
 There-
fore, the characteristics of Kenya, as an emerging economy with huge economic potential 
but with a glaring need for modernization of its insolvency laws, mean that it is a striking 
jurisdiction that can benefit greatly from the kind of research undertaken in this thesis. Be-
sides, there is substantial evidence that Kenya’s is now a dualistic economy, consisting of 
both the formal and informal sectors.
28
 In fact, the informal sector has become more signifi-
cant and has substantially increased through micro-businesses, a shift from earlier circum-
stances. Such changes raise concern as to the adequacy of the insolvency system to deal with 
current concerns brought forth by the informal sector, which have been positively encour-
aged through government measures in bid to provide opportunities to generate wealth for 
Kenyan citizens. 
Besides, in 2004, the World Bank assessment of the Kenyan insolvency regime revealed 
many weaknesses and in 2012 another World Bank report documented that there had been 
no reforms to address the concerns.
29
 For instance, a corporate rescue regime is lacking de-
spite rescuing businesses being an indispensable component of the bankruptcy laws of states 
and a process which ‘defines the character of market economy’.30 This absence of such laws 
is detrimental because insolvency systems have been acknowledged as vital for the eco-
nomic growth and attraction of investment. It is essential for Kenya to attract investors as 
well as to nurture an entrepreneurial spirit within itself using the formal mechanisms, as well 
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as developing workable alternatives to formal insolvency processes in line with the key 
characteristic of flexibility of an effective insolvency system. In doing this, it is imperative 
for Kenya to engage in reforms that are informed by the kind of research done in this thesis, 
capable of suggesting solutions to identified problems without undermining the peculiarities 
and cultural context of African insolvency systems. Besides, this thesis will, in a small way, 
contribute to addressing a glaring lack of literature on insolvency law both in Kenya and in 
Africa at large. Further, the existing insolvency law theories, as well as the international in-
solvency benchmarks that have emerged in recent years, have almost exclusively been de-
veloped and addressed from the viewpoints of developed economies. This is unsatisfactory 
because the same international benchmarks are the platforms that developing nations use to 
nurture their reforms and therefore the view of developing nations deserves to be consid-
ered.  
The choice of the UK as an object of research in this thesis is underpinned by a number of 
reasons. To start with, the imported English law is still in use in Kenya as a residual law. 
Much as Kenyan law has not been static but has actually evolved from the inherited colonial 
rules through enactment of much legislation, the tradition English Common Law is still very 
influential. In fact, the doctrine of judicial precedence, a feature of common law, is practiced 
in Kenya. It is submitted that Kenya, as a jurisdiction, is arguably used to the English ap-
proach to issues generally. It is therefore considered that it might be a good option for Kenya 
to follow the British footsteps in its law reform. In addition, there is a widespread accep-
tance and reference to the English insolvency laws in other jurisdictions, making the UK a 
suitable subject of study when considering the central rules and policies in insolvency. Be-
sides, the UK has enjoyed a relatively long history of bankruptcy laws, since the enactment 
13 
 
of the Bankruptcy Act (statute of Henry VIII) in 1542.
31
 Such a long history, coupled with 
active reviewing of its laws, captures a unique aspect of how the law should advance with 
the economy, as well as always addressing the concerns of each phase of development. It is 
acknowledged that other jurisdictions have even longer histories and might easily have been 
selected but the UK, as a jurisdiction, has been an influential pace setter in insolvency re-
form. For example the famous London Approach pioneered the modern workout which had 
influences the world over. In addition, schemes of arrangements, which may be regarded as 
among the first rescue oriented approaches, were started in the UK in 1870 and have greatly 
influenced insolvency reforms elsewhere.
32
 Most importantly, in the wave of corporate res-
cue laws initiated by the US Chapter 11, the UK led the way in promoting its insolvency re-
forms towards a modern corporate rescue culture.  
Mauritius is similar to Kenya in many relevant aspects and, most importantly, is an equally 
emerging economy. However, unlike Kenya, Mauritius has successfully undertaken insol-
vency reforms in the recent past. It is notable that this jurisdiction hugely benefited from le-
gal transplants in enacting its recent new law and its experience is a good example upon 
which to draw and learn how to negotiate the terrain of legal transplanting in insolvency 
law. Mauritius therefore provides a good comparative example as to how a developing 
economy can borrow experiences from developed and sophisticated economies and fashion 
them to its own circumstances. Despite this selection, the study is not exclusively limited to 
these three jurisdictions but it will draw examples from any other jurisdiction whose ap-
proach or experience can be relevant and informative to the research venture. 
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1.5 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE IN-
SOLVENCY LAW 
 
Corporate insolvency law refers to the law concerned with companies who are debtors and 
who are unable to pay their debts.
33
 It can be said to be a collection of laws and processes 
for the resolution of the financial affairs of companies in financial difficulties.
34
 Much as in 
Kenya, the terms ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ are understood and used interchangeably to 
refer to both individual and company insolvencies, technically, individuals become bankrupt 
and go into bankruptcy, as governed under Bankruptcy Act (Cap 53 laws of Kenya), and 
companies go into winding up or liquidation, as governed by Companies Act (Cap486 laws 
of Kenya). Firms encounter financial distress for myriad reasons which range from poor 
management to and external economic forces. Whenever financial distress occurs, it gives 
rise to many questions concerning a company’s prospects. Is it capable of being rescued or 
at least brought into better shape before finally being liquidated? Or is it beneficial to facili-
tate liquidation promptly? One company might be fatally flawed: it has an interesting idea, 
but can never make money pursuing it while another firm might have assets that are out of 
scale with its business, such as the airline that has more planes than it needs to serve its cus-
tomers.
35
 Yet another firm might be quite viable but for the debt it acquired in a leveraged 
buyout.
36
 Insolvency laws should therefore be able to look beyond the immediate position of 
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the company and should be sufficiently accessible to democratic influence to allow consid-
eration of factors beyond the narrow confines of the firm or the strictly economic.
37
 In addi-
tion it should arguably have a capacity to address the various potential problems a firm can 
encounter. Such a reality underscores the importance of laws that facilitate both liquidation 
and corporate rescue as each plays a crucial role in promoting the best use of resources.
38
 In 
particular the laws that facilitate liquidation are useful to an economically distressed com-
pany which cannot be rehabilitated, while the rescue provisions provide a legal platform for 
financially distressed but economically viable companies to reinvigorate.
39
 In corporate in-
solvency laws, particular concepts that are of importance are explored below. 
 
1.5.1 Corporate Failure 
Entrepreneurship has a beautiful side, of business creation, firm growth, market expansion 
and a dark side, of risks and failures of firms. In fact, in a market based economy, it is gen-
erally recognized that corporate failures are at times inevitable and that a business that can-
not compete successfully with its competitors and fails generally has no choice but to leave 
the market and give new businesses a chance.
40
 Equally, failure provides an opportunity for 
business resources such as capital and manpower to be reallocated efficiently. In addition, 
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some failures have led to advancements in necessary organizational changes.
41
 In essence, 
corporate failures happen and are painful but are a routine feature of a market economy and 
ought to not necessarily give to rise to legislative intervention.
42
 
However, corporate failure can destabilize the economic system in various ways such as in-
creasing unemployment by throwing workers into the labour market, increasing the level of 
poverty, depriving people, especially creditors, of their legitimate dues as well as potentially 
intensifying the crime rate and contributing to a reduction in the volume of tax earnings.
43
 
Such devastating effects make the need for an efficient corporate insolvency law imperative. 
The consequences of corporate failures justify legislative intervention as an attempt to pre-
vent or make its occurrence less devastating. Generally, where a business failure may be at-
tributed to mismanagement by a person in control of the company affairs, one concern of the 
law is making those responsible for such mismanagement accountable for their actions. 
However, where the failure is due to temporary financial difficulties or external economic 
factors, the law facilitates rehabilitation and preserves its business as a going concern wher-
ever possible. Given the vital role that the law plays in the occurrence of failure, the law 
should be shaped in a way that, so far as possible, the law does not contribute to undesirable 
failures or prove deficient in processing failed companies.
44
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Legally, a company is deemed as a failure or insolvent if it is unable to meet its current obli-
gations and settle outstanding debts.
45
 In corporate insolvency law, the term ‘insolvency’ is 
most commonly used such that a company is considered insolvent if it does not have enough 
assets to cover its debts and, in particular, if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. The 
term corporate failure is times confused with insolvency mostly because they are closely 
linked but strictly speaking are actually different. Both insolvency and corporate failure are 
significant aspects of a company in distress. However, corporate failure is broad and can be 
a consequence of poor performance; firms underperform as they compete in the market 
whereas insolvency is a distinct legal concept that refers to financial aspects,
46
 a matter of 
law as explored in-depth in 1.5.3 below. Corporate failure begins most of the time by mis-
management and unmarketable products, which may cause a decline in sales over several 
years and eventually insolvency.
47
 
As a concept, corporate failure has a wide meaning, therefore its interpretation and applica-
tion can vary. For example, corporate failure could be seen in terms of the inability of a cor-
porate organization to achieve its strategic aim of growth and development, to attain its eco-
nomic and financial objectives as well as legal obligations.
48
 Equally, corporate failure can 
be viewed from a managerial point of view such that there are irreconcilable disputes be-
tween leading stakeholders resulting in a management deadlock and where there has been 
failure of substratum in terms of the underlying business objective.
49
 In this view, a corpo-
rate entity could be successfully formed but technically fail despite having financial en-
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dowment and a conducive business environment. In essence a company can experience fail-
ure from a managerial standpoint before it is an economic failure and certainly long before it 
is legally deemed as a failure.
50
 
In addition, corporate failure can be seen as a threatening decline in performance which 
leads to destruction of shareholder value in the long run, failure could be as a result of poor 
managerial decisions, or high interest rates, recession-squeezed profits and heavy debt bur-
dens as argued by economists.
51
 Besides, industry-specific characteristics, such as govern-
ment regulation and the nature of operations, can contribute to a firm’s financial distress.52 
In this thesis, the term ‘corporate failure’ is used and understood as the unfortunate circum-
stance of a firm's inability to stay in business and more precisely a business failure in the 
context of financial distress.
53
 The concept of financial distress is significant in the realms of 
corporate failure and will be explored and distinguished from economic distress in 1.5.2 be-
low. 
 
1.5.2 Financial Distress versus Economic Distress 
Conceptually the two are variable terms used to describe a number of situations in a firm, 
relating to either a recent internal or external event, or a series of on-going problems that 
have not been resolved.
54
 However financial distress is distinct from economic distress and 
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the survival strategies in response to these two types of distress are very different. On the 
one hand, financial distress means that the firm’s promises to creditors are broken or hon-
oured with difficulty.
55
 However, such firms, much as they are currently facing difficulty 
repaying debts, are viable as going concerns; as they are entities without fundamental prob-
lems, but have high leverage.
56
 On the other hand firms facing economic distress also have 
difficulty repaying debts, and are also characterized by very low or negative operating per-
formance and they are therefore entities with fundamental problems.
57
 In essence, financial 
distress describes the situation of a firm faced with a temporary lack of liquidity and with 
the difficulties that result in fulfilling financial obligations on schedule and to the full ex-
tent.
58
 In essence, a firm may have a viable operation of real assets and thus not be economi-
cally distressed. For instance, an all-equity firm can be economically distressed, but can 
never be financially distressed because there are no creditors involved.
59
 
The interrelations between financial distress, economic distress and insolvency law espe-
cially when making or reforming the law are crucial. Stiglitz in his analysis of the Asian cri-
sis noted that the policy makers failed to appreciate these interrelations, and as a result im-
plemented policies that exacerbated the crisis.
60
 Accordingly, the macroeconomic effects 
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should be taken into consideration when a bankruptcy law is designed, and bankruptcy and 
distress should be taken into consideration when macroeconomic policy is implemented.
61
 
When a firm encounters distress, there is a significant possibility that, at some point, the 
firm itself should be shut down and its assets put to better use or the firm should be rehabili-
tated. The decision as to whether to most appropriately liquidate or rehabilitate depends on 
the distinction of whether a firm is economically distressed or financially distressed. A fi-
nancially distressed entity can restructure its debt and reach an appropriate level of solvency. 
This may require filing for bankruptcy as a strategic response by the management or owners 
to financial problems.
62
 It can also employ an informal strategy such as negotiating and 
reaching a compromise with the creditors as far debt payments are concerned. For an eco-
nomically distressed firm, the challenges the firm faces are of a high magnitude to a point 
that the firm can become a casualty of an impending bankruptcy. Such an entity will need an 
efficient legal framework to facilitate the engagements. Primarily, corporate insolvency law 
is an outlet for distressed firms but its role is not to save all companies from failure but to 
provide a collective procedure for the resolution of impaired contractual claims held against 
the firm either in financial or economic distress.
63
 Besides, it is widely accepted that insol-
vency laws play important roles in disciplining financially distressed firms and influencing 
corporate financial decisions.
64
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1.5.3 Insolvency as a Fact and as a Legal Concept 
One of the most significant threats that any business can encounter, despite its size and the 
nature of its operations, is insolvency. In fact, according to a recent survey on entrepreneur-
ship, people from a range of social and demographic groups rank the possibility of going 
bankrupt as the greatest fear associated with starting a business. In colloquial sense, insol-
vency consists of a debtor’s ultimate inability to meet his or her financial commitments65 
which must be distinguished from a mere refusal or omission by the debtor who otherwise 
has an ability to pay debts at their due date. Much as an unpaid invoice issued to the latter is 
one of the grounds that can trigger insolvency proceedings, the former is a less readily re-
solvable legal position in so far as the future of the firm is concerned, with ‘the likelihood of 
bankruptcy depending on the level of liquid of its assets as well as on credit availability’.66 
The transformation from a solvent to an insolvent state happens only on the date of maturity 
of a claim if the terminal value of the company’s assets is lower than the face value of 
debt.
67
 In an actual sense, a company can be distressed without defaulting. However, in most 
instances insolvency is preceded by financial distress to an extent that a firm defaults on its 
payments of debts as they fall due. 
Conceptually, insolvency consists of a debtor’s ultimate inability to meet financial commit-
ments
68
 but defined in different ways for different purposes.
69
 Accordingly, Armour, while 
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alluding to this reality, provides different meanings of insolvency.
70
 First is the definition 
based on the accounting concepts of balance sheet insolvency and cash flow insolvency, 
then economic failure on the one hand and the judicial aspects of default on the other hand 
and lastly from an insolvency proceedings of reorganization on one hand and liquidation on 
the other.
71
 To other scholars such as Wood, much as he acknowledges that the meaning of 
insolvency can be derived from divergent circumstances, often some confusion is caused 
because the word ‘insolvent’ is often used as a synonym for financial distress.72  Legisla-
tively, the term insolvency is not typically used such that in jurisdictions such as UK, it is 
represented by the term ‘unable to pay its debts as they become due’ which connote a state 
of affairs whereby a debtor is in financial distress.
73
 In essence, the wide berth that insol-
vency has been afforded leaves its meaning, at best, as vague and imprecise.
74
 
Despite the ambiguity on the concept of insolvency as noted above, a company, as a matter 
of fact, can become unable to pay its debts and become distressed to such an extent that it 
cannot escape from action which is taken by its creditors. Insolvency however, is not a con-
dition to which legal consequences automatically attach unless a formal process such as ap-
pointment of a receiver is done. In practice, determining whether a company is in financial 
trouble or on the verge of becoming insolvent is vital and insolvency law provides, as a 
guideline, two tests that, if satisfied, amount to sufficient evidence for insolvency proceed-
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ings to be initiated.
75
 A foremost test and a main ground for liquidating companies is that of 
cash flow insolvency, which exists if a company cannot pay its debts as they fall due.
76
 In 
this test, it is inconsequential if the value of a company’s assets exceeds that of its liabilities. 
If a company cannot pay a debt as it falls due, then there is no reason why a creditor should 
have to wait until the company can realize assets, some of which may not be in a form that 
can be readily liquidated.
77
 This test however serves to protect the current and short-term 
creditors leaving out future creditors. This is because the inability in this test basically fo-
cuses on the scenarios whereby an invoice has been sent to the company, and if the amount 
has not been disputed but is not yet paid within a specified time, then this can amount to 
evidence of a company unable to pay its debts.
78
 
Arguably, a cash flow test is in so many aspects ‘shallow’ when used to determine the vi-
ability of a company in financial distress. This is because; establishing whether a company is 
cash flow insolvent is a question of fact which can easily be proven since it is an inability 
inferred from a company’s failure to pay on demand a debt which is due. For instance, if a 
company has a large amount of outstanding debts and unsatisfied judgments then this may 
be something that the court may take as evidence that establishes that a company cannot pay 
its due debts.
79
 Equally, a company admission by itself or its solicitors that they are unable 
to pay is sufficient evidence.
80
 In addition, the absence of assets on which execution can be 
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levied suffices.
81
 A company demonstrating any of the aforementioned cash flow challenges 
is considered insolvent for purposes of insolvency proceeding and administration order or 
winding up order is then made. Nonetheless, a company can be able to presently meet its 
debts as they fall due but persons may still have serious concerns about the company’s state 
of affairs. This reality has long been recognized as vital in evaluating the solvency of the 
company. Traditionally, in the UK, contingent and future liabilities are statutorily consid-
ered in assessing a company’s present inability to pay debts.82 In essence, the scope of con-
sideration in inferring inability shifts from the current liquidity reality to the structure of re-
payments under the outstanding debt obligations and the nature of the assets available to sat-
isfy them. The alternative test for determining insolvency is therefore the balance sheet (or 
asset) test which is satisfied if the company has total liabilities that exceed the value of its 
assets, therefore the debtor has insufficient assets to discharge his liabilities.
83
 This test em-
phasizes that it is not sufficient for such a company to realize its assets to satisfy its liabili-
ties, since the ultimate liabilities would not be satisfied upon the realization of the com-
pany’s assets.84 Much as the court takes into consideration the financial obligations at that 
time, the term ‘liabilities’ has a much wider meaning than ‘debts’,85 such that debts refers to  
borrowed money but liabilities refers to  an obligation of any kind in relation to the com-
pany. In particular, for the purposes of winding up, rule 12.12(4) of the Insolvency Rules 
1986 provides that it is immaterial whether the liability is present or future, whether it is cer-
tain or contingent, or whether the amount is fixed or liquidated, or is being capable of being 
ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion. 
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The balance sheet test arises if, on a book or market valuation basis, the account of the com-
pany shows that its liabilities exceed its assets.  The test is fact specific focussing on whether 
there is or will be eventually deficiency in meeting liabilities. However, this does not mean 
that a company which is balance sheet insolvent should stop trading immediately. Insol-
vency is viewed as a set of situations of failure, such as the non-repayment of a debt, the in-
ability to pay dividends to the shareholders, which can all lead, or not, to the beginning of a 
judicial proceeding.
86
 Of significance, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in BNY Corpo-
rate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail [2013] UKSC 28, has helped to clarify the meaning of 
s123(2). The Supreme Court rejected the “point of no return” formulation, holding instead 
that the balance sheet insolvency test requires the court to be satisfied, on the balance of 
probabilities, that a company will have insufficient assets to be able to meet all of its liabili-
ties, including prospective and contingent liabilities, as and when they eventually fall due. 
1.5.4 Liquidation 
Financial distress has an impact on the performance of a firm. Such that, when a firm enters 
a state of financial distress, an important initial challenge is to distinguish between economi-
cally viable firms and firms that should be liquidated. What then is liquidation? As a term, 
liquidation, also referred to as winding up, is a formal legal process which a company un-
dergoes as a means of bringing it to orderly dissolution.
87
 In principle, liquidation is a col-
lective insolvency process leading to the end of the company’s existence88 and the principal 
role of a liquidator is to collect in and realize the company’s assets, ascertain claims, and 
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investigate the causes of failure and, after covering all the expenses of the liquidation, dis-
tribute the net proceeds by way of dividends to creditors as statutorily provided.
89
 
The procedure of liquidating a company can take a number of modes. In the UK, for exam-
ple, there are three procedures namely voluntary winding up,
90
 a compulsory winding up
91
 
and winding up through administration.
92
 It is worth noting that, much as administration 
gives the company some breathing space from any action by creditors, a company may enter 
administration to enable it to get a better result than in an immediate winding up; or even to 
realize property for the benefit of one or more secured or preferential creditors. In such in-
stances, it is arguably a mode of winding up. Each of the aforementioned procedures, much 
as they all have one goal, has some unique aspects that distinguish it.
93
 The principal differ-
ence between the voluntary and compulsory modes of winding up is attributable to the fact 
that the former is commenced with the passing of a resolution at a duly convened meeting 
while the latter is initiated by a court order upon a petition, often presented by a creditor. 
Besides, voluntary winding up is predicated upon the assumption that the company is, ulti-
mately, solvent, a fact that has to be duly attested to by a formal, statutory declaration.
94
 
However, compulsory liquidation is forced upon the company on the grounds of indebted-
ness to creditors where there is no reasonable prospect of being able to repay the debt as 
they fall due.
95
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1.5.5 Corporate Rescue 
Companies, in their business engagements, can encounter financial difficulties from which 
they can either survive or fail to. In fact, in a capitalist economy, a certain level of corporate 
demise has been acknowledged as both inevitable and necessary for the efficient functioning 
of the market.
96
 However, some companies, despite their financial distress, are viable, such 
that drastic remedial action is deliberately taken at a time of corporate crisis for the benefit 
of those who have a stake in the company. As such, according to Belcher, corporate rescue 
is a crucial intervention necessary to prevent the eventual failure of the company.
97
 Corpo-
rate rescue enables the avoidance of distress and failure, such that all activities that are con-
stantly done and repeated in ensuring that a company maintains or recovers its financial 
well-being are to an extent to be regarded as rescue attempts.
98
 In essence, the concept of 
rescue is not limited to legal rescue but extends to include intervention from the companies’ 
management or other interested stakeholders.
99
 This definition demonstrates that corporate 
rescue is very broad, as it encompasses both formal and informal rescue procedures, aimed 
at both avoiding crisis arising and at addressing it when it does arise.  
Given the breadth of the term ‘corporate rescue’, caution should be exercised. The term, as 
observed by Parry, is potentially misleading.
100
 In essence, the term can connote the restora-
tion of a company to financial health, such that a company as an entity survives without 
change of the company’s ownership, while, at the same time; it may simply mean the pres-
ervation of the value of a company facing financial distress in order to achieve a better result 
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than in an immediate winding-up.
101
 Most importantly, a distinction should be drawn be-
tween rescuing the company and rescuing the business of the company.
102
 The main differ-
ence is that, while the former involves a rescue attempt which results in the company emerg-
ing intact from the rehabilitation engagement, the latter often entails a sale of the viable 
parts as a going concern to a third party and the liquidation or dissolution of the remain-
der.
103
 Previously in UK, company rescue was difficult and in most instances a rescue en-
gagement entails reorganization such that a company is restored to profitability and, much as 
the company may have the same name, it will be different in many respects.
104
 The latest 
statistics shows that companies are sold especially through administration and such sales are 
more likely to succeed where they have purchased a business in a pre-pack, rather than after 
a period of trading in an administration.
105
 The odds of failure were 2.4 times higher in a 
purchase from a trading administration than in a pre-pack purchase.
106
  Admittedly, several 
factors such as market conditions, mismanagement, under capitalization/excessive debts 
affect the outcome of the sale.
107
 Never the less the general  purpose of a drastic intervention 
during the period of crisis is to avoid failure and it does not necessarily imply that the com-
pany will be restored back to its previous position, pre-financial distress.
108
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1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The study is structured in seven chapters. Chapter One (the present chapter) provides a con-
textual framework of the study. It contains an elaboration of the scope of corporate insol-
vency law with a focus on specific key concepts that are fundamental in this field. Chapter 
Two provides a theoretical perspective by exploring insolvency law theories. It is considered 
a prerequisite to understanding and appreciating why these laws exist and what they do. The 
target in this chapter is to understand the purposes served by insolvency law and theories 
that provide that platform and to explore how the existing insolvency law theories apply to 
the realities of a developing economy. Therefore, the chapter starts by illuminating Kenya’s 
historical and socio-economic background, that of a typical emerging economy. It then gives 
a brief discussion of the development of insolvency law theories and captures the ideological 
divide embedded in the debate. Subsequently, it discusses leading theories with some se-
lected few being explored in detail. Afterwards, it applies the theories to Kenyan circum-
stances to appreciate how far the insolvency theories mirror the realities of a developing 
economy.  
Chapter Three provides a detailed analysis of the existing Kenyan insolvency framework. In 
addition, by reference to international benchmarks as set by UNCITRAL and the World 
Bank, it undertakes an evaluative insight into the current Kenyan insolvency framework. It 
starts by building a comprehensive set of background issues; it traces the historical devel-
opment then gives an overview of the legislative framework. It then constructs a compre-
hensive evaluation of the substantive aspects of insolvency and detailed procedures from the 
30 
 
standpoint of encouragement of external and internal investment. The chapter reveals the 
Kenyan business culture and ideologies, historical development and internal economic pres-
sures which represent the realities facing corporate entities in Kenya. The existing inadequa-
cies, challenges and strengths are revealed and the next chapters explore how best they can 
be addressed. 
Chapter Four explores informal mechanisms which may address the gaps left by formal 
mechanisms. Informal mechanisms have been documented as significant in contributing to a 
holistic approach towards corporate insolvency.
109
 In consideration of the fact that informal 
restructuring activities come in a variety of forms and different modes of actions, the scope 
of interest is the engagement of corporate restructuring outside the formal statutory insol-
vency procedures. This chapter details the relationship between the formal and informal 
mechanisms and explores internationally recognized informal workout strategies. The Lon-
don Approach is explored in depth as an example of workouts and equally the UK pre-pack 
is explored. The last part details the Kenyan approach to informal mechanisms and, because 
there is no notable informal strategy documented, it explores whether a workout such as a 
London Approach equivalent can be nurtured.  
Chapter Five explores the development of corporate insolvency laws in the UK and looks at 
reform efforts in order to understand what drives the reforms. A number of drivers are iden-
tified and their roles and influence established in an attempt to demystify whether Kenya can 
learn from the UK in its reform endeavour. Given that the history of UK insolvency laws 
spans decades, the chapter starts with an investigation into the earlier centuries. However, in 
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the later centuries, a number of drivers of reform are identified and each is independently 
explored. 
Chapter Six revisits the Kenyan insolvency framework. It identifies and investigates the re-
form drivers of insolvency law in Kenya within the wider area of business reforms. In par-
ticular, the role and influence of the government, the business community and international 
organizations on the pace and content of legal reforms is undertaken.  In addition, a com-
parative analysis of how the same drivers have successfully influenced the reforms in Mauri-
tius is also undertaken.  
Chapter Seven, as a conclusion chapter, entails a summary of the research undertaken and 
details the main insights that have emerged from the study. The chapter also elaborates on 
the contribution to knowledge that the study claims to make, states the limitation of the re-
search and points out any areas that would benefit from further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
To understand and appreciate insolvency laws, it necessary to ask why these laws exist and 
why they do what they do. Much as this might at first glance appear to be a very simple task, 
it is in fact a difficult one since policy makers, judges and scholars disagree as to which 
goals are appropriate for insolvency law to further.
1
 Equally, lawyers and economists have 
been documented to view the bankruptcy system differently. Lawyers view bankruptcy as 
being concerned with the equitable treatment of creditors when the debtor's assets are insuf-
ficient to pay all of his creditors in full – an approach that may be regarded as concentrating 
on distributive aspects of insolvency law – whereas the economists often tend to concentrate 
on the allocative impact of bankruptcy.
2
 The quandary is whether insolvency law should fo-
cus on the creditors’ interest or whether it has more roles to play and if so, how they should 
be prioritized. However, there is consensus that corporate bankruptcy laws play the eco-
nomic function of reducing the cost of default by having a government-sponsored procedure 
that facilitates the resolution of debts.
3
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This chapter examines corporate insolvency law from a theoretical point of view. It starts 
with an exploration of the existing theories of corporate insolvency laws. It then analyses 
and compares the objectives and principles of corporate insolvency law in Mauritius, the UK 
and Kenya. Lastly, it considers how the theories can be applied in Kenya and how such ap-
plication might be used to inform policy in the light of the current insolvency reform process 
in Kenya. 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW THEORIES 
A corporation is an entity established for several purposes, one of which is to be used objec-
tively as an investment vehicle.
4
 Greenfield argues that corporations are hugely important 
and successful engines of wealth creation but they can be amoral behemoths that foul the 
environment, worsen political inequalities and take advantage of horrible injustices for their 
own financial gain.
5
 As an economic entity, a corporation fundamentally serves as a linkage 
of contracts; a single contracting party that coordinates the activities of providers of inputs 
and of customers of products and services.
6
 However, when a corporation fails, a new di-
lemma of ownership sets in; in a typical problem in insolvency, when a debtor is insolvent 
and its assets are potentially not enough to meet its obligations to all of its creditors, there is 
inevitably a problem of co-operation and competition for the available assets.
7
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For decades, economists and legal scholars have engaged in controversy over the nature and 
purpose of the corporation.
8
 This controversy mirrors the divergence of opinions concerning 
the role of insolvency. A number of theories emerged in the company law literature, heavily 
emphasizing two main theories, namely: the shareholder and stakeholder theories, which are 
normative theories of corporate social responsibility, dictating what a corporation’s role 
ought to be. On one hand, the shareholder theory (also referred to as shareholder primacy) 
asserts that shareholders advance capital to a company to be spent only in ways that have 
been authorized by the shareholders.
9
 The shareholders are the sole residual claimants of 
corporations and corporate directors are therefore required to serve only shareholders’ inter-
ests.
10
 As Milton Friedman explains:  
 ‘There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and 
 engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it … engages in open 
 and free competition, without deception or fraud.’ 11  
Under this approach, it is a legitimate expectation of the shareholder of a corporation’s that 
the primary goal is to maximizing their wealth.
12
  On the other hand, the stakeholders’ the-
ory asks what the responsibility of the management is to stakeholders. In answering this 
question, stakeholder theory asserts that managers have a responsibility to both the corpora-
tion’s shareholders and other constituencies that contribute to the company’s wealth-creating 
capacity and, as such, are to be treated as potential beneficiaries as well risk bearers.
13
 The 
ideological position of the stakeholders in this theory is advanced and is justified in the 
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management literature by describing a corporation as a constellation of cooperative and 
competitive interests possessing intrinsic value.
14
 In essence, the stakeholders’ contribution 
is vital for the organizational success of the company and therefore their interests cannot be 
wished away. The theory suggests that managers/directors should deliberately formulate and 
implement processes that take account of all of the groups who have a stake in the busi-
ness.
15
 However, the scope of the group interest to be considered is debatable. Some schol-
ars arguing in favour of the groups without whose support the organization would cease to 
exist and others are suggesting the inclusion of those groups or individuals who are affected 
by the organization as well as those who can affect the corporation.
16
 
 
Of significance to the area of focus is the influence of these ideologies on the corporate in-
solvency law theories. For instance, the creditors’ bargain theory is built on the sharehold-
ers’ primacy theory. The shareholders primacy theory asserts that the role of company direc-
tors is primarily to act in the interests of shareholders and maximize the wealth of share-
holders.
17
 In an insolvency scenario, a typical example of administration, the administrators 
will take the position of the directors and as they handle the affairs of the company they con-
sider the interest of creditors. In essence, shareholder primacy is substituted for a creditor 
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primacy.
18
 However, it is a simplistic and unrealistic view to replace the role and objectives 
of the directors in a solvent entity with that of administrators of an insolvency scenario. 
There is a noteworthy divergence between the circumstances and approach of managers on a 
day to day management of a company, with that of administrators in an insolvency scenario. 
The former is that of a regular engagement while the latter is a response to a potentially ca-
pricious scene rife with conflicting economic interests. 
 
Besides, corporations act through human agents; which introduces problems of agents’ fe-
alty, which are frequently encountered.
19
  It is customary to find a board of directors presid-
ing over the actual management of the company.
20
 They will have extensive management 
powers delegated to them by the articles and they will typically have service contracts with 
the company, which together with the articles delimit their powers and responsibilities.
21
 
This presents the first basis for contractual agreements for the agency theory. In principle, 
the agency theory suggests a fundamental solution for absent or distant owners/shareholders 
who employ professional executives to act on their behalf. The root assumption is that the 
agent will not serve their own interests but rather those of the principal. There are challenges 
and dynamics which are part of the corporate governance which will not be elaborated in 
this thesis. In a nutshell, agency in a corporation actually introduces a new level of interest 
to be prioritized. 
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An alternative view is presented by the team production theorists, who argue that sharehold-
ers are not the only group who provide specialized inputs into corporate production. Under 
this approach, team members are expected to give up important rights in the common inter-
est, such as property rights being given up by shareholders for the benefits of all team mem-
bers.
22
 They maintain that non-shareholders, such as employees, suppliers, amongst others 
who are constituents of such firms are particularly vulnerable to opportunism.
23
 To protect 
them, corporate law ought to mandate the directors to serve not only the shareholders’ inter-
est but also those of the employees, consumers and other ‘stakeholders’.24 Such arguments 
mirror the debates advanced by the stakeholders’ theorists. 
 
Generally, the stakeholder verses shareholders debates connote the impression of a contest 
between two factions with competing interests. In reality, an insolvency scenario is not a 
contest of any two groups but rather numerous interests competing for limited assets. Be-
sides, the genesis of insolvency is debt default such that one would easily assume that the 
conflict is between the creditor and debtor. Interestingly, an insolvency scenario entails 
many procedural engagements as well as divergent interest that should not be simply 
grouped into two. As such, bankruptcy law may be regarded as socially desirable and it ex-
ists not because it protects debtors from creditors, but rather because it equally protects 
creditors from one another.
25
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2.2 THEORIES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 
The jurisprudence on corporate insolvency has resulted in several theoretical explanations as 
to why insolvency law exists. Generally, the theories may be divided into two groups, or two 
schools, originally named the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ but characterized in literature as ‘Pro-
ceduralists’ and ‘Traditionalists’.26 The former groups are those whose main focus in an in-
solvency process is on creditors’ interests. To this group, bankruptcy laws are solely for the 
purpose of maximizing the debtor’s economic value for creditors’ interests or creditors’ 
economic recoveries.
27
 The latter groups are theorists and policy makers who emphasize as 
to the debtor’s diversified values, hence viewing bankruptcy as the procedure for addressing 
the vast range of social problems caused by business failure.
28
 The discussion starts by ex-
ploring the pro-creditors theory, starting from the creditors’ bargain theory. It then focuses 
on the pro-traditionalist group which includes theorists who have developed theories includ-
ing the value- based theory, visions theory, multiple approaches, team production and the 
authentic consent model. It is notable that some of the arguments or issues advocated by 
these theorists, especially those concerned with social welfare in corporate bankruptcies, are 
very similar. Therefore, some of the theories will be discussed more briefly than others, but 
the main views at the heart of corporate insolvency law debates will be captured. 
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2.2.1 The creditors’ bargain theory (CBT) 
The Creditors’ Bargain Theory was proposed in 1982 and as name of the theory suggests, it 
is creditor-focused.
29
 Accordingly, the CBT, as championed by Jackson
30
 and Baird,
31
 main-
tains that insolvency laws exist primarily and exclusively for the benefit of the creditors of 
the insolvent company.
32
 In fact, the law functions to maximize the collective return to 
creditors through a compulsory collective system and to solve the ‘common pool’ of assets 
problem, arising from diverse claims to limited assets.
33
 As such, all insolvency laws are to 
be tested by one principal question: does a law enhance the collective benefit of creditors?
34
 
The key rule is to consider only those entitlements that were created pre-insolvency. There-
fore, insolvency rules that enable shareholders and junior creditors to gain from company 
rehabilitation are seen as creating inappropriate incentives.
35
 
 
Much as CBT theorists advocate for insolvency law to take creditors’ pre-insolvency negoti-
ated rights as it finds them, and honour both the powers and limitations under non-
insolvency law without modifying them;
36
 they do not deny the existence of other interests 
in insolvency. However, they hold the view that when a company is insolvent, the creditors’ 
interests should take primacy over other interests. As such, the interests of any other con-
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stituency are only considered to the extent that the particular members of those groups are 
creditors with enforceable legal rights against assets of the insolvent company under non-
insolvency law.
37
 Besides, they take the view that non-creditor interests should be addressed 
outside insolvency law and that insolvency law should not concern itself with the public in-
terest.
38
 The payment of debts in accordance to the pre-insolvency entitlements ensures or-
derly proceedings. This is an advantage that enhances a crucial element of predictability. 
However, as acknowledged by Korobkin, an economic approach cannot realistically address 
the non-economic values, such as moral, political and social issues, especially following in-
solvency. However, corporate insolvency law must be explained ‘not as a maxi miser of 
economic outcomes but as a system for rendering richer, more informed decisions in re-
sponse to financial distress.’39 
 
The creditors’ bargain theorist (CBT) employs a neo-Rawlsian contractarian notion to ex-
plain and justify the structure of insolvency law.
40
 Because of this, the theory is grounded on 
the concept of ‘dramatic ignorance’, such that the parties to the creditors’ bargain are not 
only ignorant of their own attributes but also on insolvency outcomes.
41
 It assumes that in a 
bankruptcy scenario, there is a common pool of assets to which creditors would have re-
course, and that all parties are free and equal to enter into a bargain that is fair and just.
42
 
Besides, it also assumes that the essential features of insolvency law were not chosen by the 
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creditors but rather imposed on them, and that the various players act in an economically 
rational manner according to a single set of criteria.
43
 
 
Corporate insolvency law, in Jackson’s view, is a collective debt device.44  The merit of en-
suring that creditors’ act collectively provides a crucial platform to negotiate and reorganize. 
Besides, in Jackson’s view, ‘a single inquiry into recurring collection questions is likely to 
be less expensive than a multiple inquiries that happen in an individualistic remedies sys-
tem’.45 In addition, a collecting procedure discourages duplicative monitoring. Further, it 
promotes administrative efficiencies which are essential for the maximization of the debtor’s 
economic value, since the debtor’s assets may be worth more if administered together either 
in a going concern liquidation or reorganization.
46
 The corporate insolvency law that func-
tions as collective device, as championed by Jackson, has merits, such as being favourable 
for the risk-averse creditors, as they get better returns on their investment under a collective 
process.
47
 In addition, it eliminates the wasteful and potentially inefficient liquidation of the 
company assets by individual creditors pursuing their own claims individually.  
 
The potential merits that a law fashioned on creditors’ bargain theory would bring may be 
viewed as vital in an efficient and effective bankruptcy law of dynamic market. A good ex-
ample is ensuring an orderly process that facilitates efficiency. The collective approach to 
insolvency is perhaps the foundation of the automatic stay on creditors’ actions, which is 
vital in the preservation of insolvent estates. Besides, the underlying idea of respecting pre-
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insolvency entitlements is fundamental, especially to the secured creditors. In essence, the 
secured creditors’ property rights should not be sacrificed for the benefit of unsecured credi-
tors and preventing secured creditors from enforcing their collateral during rescue, without 
providing full compensation, is regarded as outrageous.
48
 Secured creditors are considered 
important since the credit they offer is crucial in starting and improving enterprises, which in 
turn encourages certain benefits of the society as a whole. In fact, Goode explains it suc-
cinctly: that investment security is necessary as it enhances the debtor’s ability to raise funds 
and engage in market operations.
49
 It is undeniable that economies are likely to advance if 
the secured creditors are certain as to the laws respecting their rights. This is because insol-
vency law, just like all investor protection laws and institutions, affects investors’ behav-
iour.
50
 For instance, the legal powers of creditors are likely to determine the availability of 
credit and, more crucially, the ease with which the lenders can force repayments, grab col-
lateral or even gain control of the business.
51
 
 
Despite the merits that can be potentially realized through an insolvency law fashioned on 
the ideologies of the CBT, this theory also has been heavenly criticized. For instance, Mo-
kal, in his attempt to apply the model to a significant feature of insolvency law– the auto-
matic stay– concluded that the model fails, as it has neither descriptive nor moral force.52 He 
criticizes the model for relying on nothing but creditors’ preferences, without any justifica-
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tions as to why the preferences ought to be considered binding.
53
 Equally, Finch correctly 
points out that the theory fails to value the continuation of business relationships that have 
not necessarily been formalized in contracts and omits from consideration those who are 
equally affected in the context of financial stress.
54
 In addition, the theory is based on as-
sumptions far removed from reality because certain problems that face non-creditors only 
arise in the context of insolvency and hence their interests need be protected.
55
 Further, it 
insinuates that all creditors are equal in terms of knowledge, experience and power; failing 
to take into consideration the fact that creditors are not uniform, some being stronger than 
others.
56
 
 
2.2.2 Communitarian theory 
The communitarian theory is an inclusive approach and hence emphasizes a variety of con-
stituent interests, especially the public interest.
57
 To this theory, insolvency law should not 
focus solely on protecting the private rights of creditors but should also consider the em-
ployees, suppliers, customers and the wider community.
58
 Central to this theory, are distri-
butional concerns, because redistribution is seen not as a deviation from the protection of 
creditors’ rights, but as a core and unavoidable function in insolvency law.59 Accordingly, it 
allows the distribution of values on insolvency, such that high priority claims may give way 
to others, including those of the community at large. In addition, this theory sees individuals 
as interdependent on each other and considers that it is important for them to act in the best 
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interests of others, even if this necessitates limiting their own individual freedom.
60
 Besides, 
one of the main considerations for communitarians is the economic life of a region in which 
the insolvent debtor is located, and this has to be given important consideration in the design 
of insolvency laws.
61
 In essence, the law should permit the rehabilitation of a commercial 
entity where this would have a better result for the community in protecting jobs, even at the 
expense of some other rights.
62
 
The expansiveness of the concerns embraced in this theory may be viewed as a problem in 
themselves. The theory has been criticized as lacking the degree of focus necessary for the 
design of insolvency law, as it is hard to select the interests that are worthy of legal protec-
tion.
63
 Schemer, while articulating the same critique, adds that choosing the interests worthy 
of legal protection from the variety that might be considered is bound to create substantial 
argument.
64
 This complexity creates inefficiency, since one cannot lay down parameters for 
the proposed community interest which could conflict, making it cumbersome for tangible 
legal protection to be offered.
65
 Inevitably, it leads to reliance on insolvency judges, who 
may not be the best persons to decide on what should be the community’s best interest.66 
However those in support of it dispute this criticism, arguing that it will be for the courts to 
undertake the balance to resolve such conflicts, since they often do similar exercises.
67
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2.2.3 Value based Theory 
This theory, in its attempt to offer a rich and full exposition of corporate insolvency law, 
embraces the views of the ‘Traditionalists’ group. The main proponent of this theory, Don-
ald Korobkin, while disapproving the idea of taking the debtor as a pool of assets, views it as 
a personality with dynamic potential.
68
 As such, the debtor’s estate reflects the character of a 
human life which, in its quest for a good life, is not achieved once. In reality, the dynamics 
of life can be challenging, and therefore success comes out as a contribution of each small 
achievement at a time. This is comparable in a corporate life to the contributions of the 
many stakeholders. As such, the theory considers insolvency law to be a response to ad-
dressing the ‘failure of collective autonomy’ and ‘supplying the reflective capacity that the 
enterprise [now] lacks’.69 Corporate insolvency law must inevitably involve itself in wider 
concerns. For example, it may ‘address the concerns of the employee who fears the loss of 
employment’.70 It must be mindful of the plight of ‘an employee who [entered] the corpora-
tion without skills or training and is thus viewed by her supervisors as especially dispensa-
ble.’71 In addition, insolvency law must, if necessary violate the pre insolvency rights of 
those with direct financial concerns in the company. 
 
2.2.4 Visions theories 
There are two ‘visions’ theories, namely, the ‘forum vision’ and ‘ethical vision’. These two 
theories champion an inclusive approach to insolvency processes. The forum vision, as de-
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scribed by Finch, is that of the insolvency process establishing a ‘forum’ in which all inter-
ests– not just monetary– that are affected by business failure would be recognized.72 The 
focus is shifted beyond creditors to all participants in the company’s financial distress. The 
theory requires the law to establish ‘space’ and should provide ‘not just interested parties’ 
with a ‘medium of …discourse’.73 The justification for this argument is that enterprise is 
more than the physical assets and stock, but it entails the interest (contribution) and concerns 
of all participants in the financial distress. 
 
The ethical vision, as promoted by Shuchman,
74
 brings in a new dimension by introducing 
moral concerns. The theory does not broaden the number of members or actors, and cham-
pions the idea that the philosophical foundation of formal insolvency rules should not disre-
gard the moral issues.
75
 As such, the situation of the debtor, the moral worthiness of the debt 
and the size, the situation and intent of the creditors ought to be considered in laying the 
foundations for insolvency law.
76
 To achieve this, however, reliance on the Judiciary to 
evaluate the moral needs and desserts of creditors, and the moral worthiness of the debtor is 
necessary; which in essence results in placing a large degree of faith on the individual’s 
(judge’s) moral judgment.77 It is argued that both the forum vision and ethical vision raise 
important aspects that attempt to solve conflicts that may be encountered in an insolvency 
scenario. In fact, most insolvency legislation contains provisions necessary to stipulate the 
expected qualifications of insolvency practitioners, as well as to regulate their conduct. 
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However, it is difficult to understand how the moral aspect can be part of a philosophical 
foundation of insolvency law without deviating from the substantive concerns that are cen-
tral to the realities of those entangled in insolvency. This is because morality itself is a 
highly contested notion in any given society. Even though morality may not be ignored, it 
cannot be a central aim of insolvency. Besides, the substantive issue goes hand in hand with 
the procedural and as such effective insolvency regimes should arguably have clear proce-
dures with precise targets to achieve.  
2.2.5 Multiple Value Approach 
 
This particular theory opposes the CBT and has similarities to the communitarian approach 
and is thus broader, as it asserts the fact that the effects of failure are wider than the impacts 
upon creditors’ interests.78 The proponents of this approach see insolvency processes as at-
tempting to achieve such ends as distributing the consequences of financial failure amongst 
many actors, establishing priority between creditors, enabling rehabilitation and protecting 
the interest of the employees, amongst others. The main proponent of this theory, Prof War-
ren, dismissed a single unifying theory of corporate law as vague and out of touch with 
complex reality.  However, she identified four goals of an insolvency system. These are: en-
hancing the value of a distressed business entity, distributing that value according to multi-
ple normative principles, internalizing costs of business failure among parties involved in 
the company and finally promoting reliance on private monitoring arrangements.
79
 For this 
approach, a judge is pivotal, having to balance a number of values, such as fairness and jus-
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tice, as well as efficiency, when making decisions.
80
 This theory, as acknowledged by its 
proponents, is ‘complex, dirty and elastic’ since it is problematic to predict its outcome or 
even fully articulate all the relevant factors to a policy decision.
81
 Besides, it offers little as-
sistance to decision makers on the management of contradictions between different values.
82
 
In addition, there are no core principles that emerge to guide those decisions, determine 
trade-offs or establish weightings.
83
 However, every purpose that a law seeks to attain has 
two facets. The substantive aspect, which justifies the existence of that particular law by 
showing it in its best light, and procedural features, which are those concerned with how the 
law goes about attaining its substantive goals.
84
 Therefore, much as this theory fails to pro-
vide clear principles, it has contributed greatly to identifying the substantive aspects that an 
insolvency procedure should pursue. The interests that this theory seeks to include in the in-
solvency process are similar to most of the inclusive approaches and are useful in giving a 
window into the broad economic and social transformation that is necessary in a developing 
economy, as will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
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2.2.6 Team Production Theory 
 
This theory derives its name from the team production concepts in institutional economics 
literature.
85
 The team production theory (TPT) of corporate law dates back to 1999 when it 
was developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout as a powerful contractarian theory of the 
public corporation.
86
 However, Professor Lynn LoPucki applied the same theory to bank-
ruptcy, developing it into a normative and alternative theory of analysing insolvency law.
87
 
In applying TPT to insolvency law, the reorganization ceases to be a regulation imposed by 
the government and in its place, becomes a contract term by which the shareholders and 
creditors agree to subordinate their legal rights to the preservation of the going concern.
88
 
Therefore, this theory opposes the view that the main obligation of the firm is to maximize 
the wealth of its creditors. As such, it implies that preservation may necessitate that the team 
production obligations are honoured by giving them priority over legal obligations. Team 
production theory, in effect, supports the non-legally enforceable entitlements of team mem-
bers over the legally-enforceable claims of creditors and interests of shareholders.
89
 
 
The basis of team production is mutual trust and recognition of the fact that the resources 
essential in team production do not, in a sense belong to one individual.
90
 Some targets re-
quire joint efforts; hence corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all its 
stakeholders, which include shareholders, managers, employees and even the local commu-
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nity. In the same regard, insolvency should be a collective proceeding that accounts for the 
rights of all those involved because, besides contributing, they also have various degrees of 
economic interest. Much as this theory strives to disapprove the narrowly focused creditors’ 
bargain theory, hence incorporating wider concerns, both theories are contractarian, though 
the basis of their contracts varies. For instance, the creditors’ bargain is based on a hypo-
thetical contract but the TPT is grounded on actual contracts entered to by the firms’ team 
members.
91
 
 
Another assumption underlying this theory is that the economically efficient institutions are 
those that contracting parties would choose. In addition; there is a presumed understanding 
among the team members that all their interests will be served by those in authority.  The 
creditors and shareholders deliberately commit themselves to dealing with the board of di-
rectors, which in a manager-displacing insolvency context will be the insolvency practitio-
ners. In essence, the bankrupt firm should honour its obligations to all who made firm-
specific investments at the invitation of the firm but it is not able to protect them in other 
ways. In this theory, reorganization law allows the team production arrangement to continue 
during reorganization almost unchanged. 
 
TPT theory carries an important and popular view that insolvency law should not focus on 
only creditors, since creditors are just a part of a big team involved in the running of a cor-
porate entity. It looks at those forms of co-operative behaviour that can be mutually advan-
tageous for all interested parties in an insolvent scenario to engage in. For instance, a busi-
ness is highly dependent on skills, and technical knowhow, as opposed to capital assets, and 
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all these are arguably sealed off in its good will and going concern values.
92
 The TPT envi-
sions that, during insolvency, consideration of all team members’ interests should be catered 
for. As such, the debtor should continue trading if the total benefits accruable to team mem-
bers exceed those accrued in liquidation. This approach will allow reorganization, where 
viable, and continuation of employment, even where a business changes ownership. As 
such, bankruptcy policy should take into account the distributional impact of business failure 
on both the direct financial interest, as well as non-financial claims. This view is beneficial 
to any economy and more so to a developing one, where closing a business has dire conse-
quences. 
2.2.7 The Authentic Consent Model 
 
The Authentic Consent Model theory (ACM) arose from dissatisfaction with the creditors’ 
bargain theory and other theories subscribing to ‘Traditionalist’ views. Mokal, the proponent 
of this theory, criticizes the CBT as ‘arbitrary, incoherent, lacking justificatory force and 
unable to describe a central part of insolvency’.93 He then proposes a collective contractarian 
approach, which assumes that the insolvency process offers a voice to all creditors.
94
 This 
contractarian approach has its foundation in early social contracts, where citizens would 
agree with the government and empower it to maintain order and protect citizens’ rights.95 
The citizens of a social contract have to co-operate with the government, just like the co-
operation expected of each participant in an insolvency scenario. As such, each party that 
complies with the publicly recognized rules is to benefit in an appropriate way, for instance 
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by being given an opportunity to advance their own view of what is good in the circum-
stances.
96
 The fundamental issues of a social contract are the characterization of the original 
state and the rationality of the contractors.
97
 Arguably, it is difficult to determine the original 
state in a social contract, such that pinpointing the exact time when people entered into the 
social contract and chose to sacrifice their physical freedom to do whatever they please is 
problematic. 
 
The application of social contract to insolvency law is based on the concept of ‘dramatic ig-
norance’ as discussed under the CBT. However, Mokal’s model involves a movement away 
from traditional contractarianism that was based on trust to a methodical contractualism ap-
proach of analysing insolvency law.
98
  Contractualism, unlike contractarianism, is not trust-
based. ‘Contractarianism holds the view that persons are primarily self-interested. When ap-
plied to the company, contractarianism sees the company essentially as a ‘nexus of con-
tracts’ among those that constitute it’.99 Besides, CBT is different from ACM in the sense 
that inasmuch as they are all based on contracts, not all classes of creditors can have a say in 
actual insolvency proceedings in the type of agreement CBT proposes. Mokal believes that 
his ACM offers a voice to all creditors in insolvency. In essence, the position taken by the 
ACM is totally at variance with that of the CBT; which champions the prioritization of the 
interests of the company’s creditors with legal rights to its properties to the exclusion of all 
non-right holders’ interests.  
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In fact the ACM, as advanced by its proponent, is intended to accommodate and resolve the 
substantive goal of fairness with the procedural goal of transaction cost efficiency.
100
 This 
theory has however been criticized as not being in connection with facts.
101
 For instance, the 
actions of creditors in an insolvency scenario are triggered by wider considerations than pure 
economic rationality and, as such, creditors do not and cannot act rationally all the time.
102
 
The model also regards all parties as free and equal, while in real life the parties may not be 
blessed with ideal qualities.
103
 In fact the individual conceptions of fairness or justice may 
differ considerably as influenced by religious and philosophical beliefs.
104
 It also argued that 
this theory fails to propose precise principles on how the conflicting interests should be ac-
commodated, Further, it is argued that this theory is actually based on assumptions, such as 
everyone being ignorant, which are far from reality. This is primarily because the series of 
presuppositions can hardly replicate the complex realities of a business life or the many pos-
sible decision makers and the matrix of circumstances in which the decisions have to be 
reached.
105
 
2.3 OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 
The significance of the theories of corporate insolvency analysed is to demystify the proper 
purpose of the law. It is appreciated that the goal or objectives ‘depend somewhat on what 
theory of insolvency law is adopted.’106 The following discussions will briefly elucidate 
comparatively the objectives and principles of corporate insolvency law between the UK, 
Mauritius and Kenya. 
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2.3.1 Mauritius 
Mauritius has a hybrid legal system which combines both civil and common law practices, 
due to its history of having been both French and a British colony. The nature and character 
of their legislation reflects the historical influences. For example, all types of security pro-
vided for under the Civil Code are available, but the fixed and floating charges are preferred 
by banks.
107
 The corporate insolvency framework in Mauritius was previously governed by 
multiple laws which included: the Bankruptcy Ordinance 1888, the Protected Cell Compa-
nies Act 1999, the Companies Act 1984, the Companies Act 2001 and the Insolvency Act 
1982. All these Acts were oriented almost exclusively towards liquidation, which in practice 
produces little or no return to unsecured creditors, and a comparatively low return even to 
non-bank secured creditors.
108
 However, the reforms brought in by the Insolvency Act 2009 
changed the focus of the Mauritian insolvency framework. This statute came into force in 
June 2009 with a thrust to principally consolidate and modernize the insolvency legal 
framework by updating and integrating a modern and comprehensive regime.
109
 Notably, the 
statute embodies four insolvency procedure options namely restructuring and workouts, ad-
ministration, receivership and liquidation.
110
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The predominant objective of the Mauritian insolvency framework is spelt out in the Insol-
vency Act 2009 as ‘… to amend and consolidate the law relating to insolvency of individu-
als and companies and the distribution of assets on insolvency and related matters’.111 This 
objective was a result of the weaknesses experienced by having the relevant laws spread out 
in a number of statutes. It must however be appreciated, that the reforms sought to achieve 
more than consolidating and modernizing the insolvency framework. The other objectives 
that can be gleaned from the Insolvency Act are as follows:
112
 
a) to establish straightforward and fair procedures for resolving insolvency;  
b) to provide alternatives to bankruptcy procedures for the rehabilitation of businesses, 
in particular options for workouts and administration as alternatives to their outright 
winding up; 
c) to give greater protection to employees; 
d) to address the issue of cross-border corporate insolvencies.  
The out-of-court restructuring guidelines for Mauritius published in 2013 provide further 
indications of the underlying principles of the insolvency framework.
113
 For instance, the 
guidelines were intended to provide debtors and their creditors with a framework based on 
international best practices in this field. 
 
Hitherto, the Mauritian insolvency framework was not completely lacking in business rescue 
mechanisms. However, restructurings were conducted under the company legislation, which 
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permits amalgamations, takeovers and compromises which were markedly inadequate.
114
 
The deliberate introduction of rehabilitation procedures as an alternative to winding up is a 
clear indication of the scope of interest the law seeks to protect. This eradicated a major 
weakness of the previous legal framework for corporate insolvency in Mauritius. In essence, 
the law sought to embrace a pronounced rescue culture and so to provide a better platform 
for the negotiation of restructuring viable businesses. Besides, the law has defined the rights 
and obligations of creditors and in particular redefined the priority of claims in the distribu-
tion of assets in liquidation and gives workers’ unpaid salaries higher priority than the 
claims of secured creditors.
115
 The reform realized through enactment of the Insolvency Act 
of 2009 inculcates a broad objective of an efficient insolvency regime that effectively bal-
ances the interests of the stakeholders affected by insolvency. 
 
A reflection on the Mauritius corporate insolvency laws, evaluated against the theories dis-
cussed in 2.2 above, leads to a general conclusion that the older regime was aligned with the 
creditors’ bargain propositions. This is because the law was oriented almost exclusively to-
wards liquidation which in practice is a collective procedure. It is recognized that liquidation 
is not ordinarily a debt collection device but is primarily a procedure of bringing a business 
to a close. Arguably, it can be a very powerful debt collecting device in its own right be-
cause it is one of the ways of enforcing a judgment after a claim. Conversely, the latest re-
forms are more aligned with the traditionalist theories, primarily because of addressing the 
social problems, such as the needs of employees. However, each of the theories can apply to 
varying levels of generalization. 
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2.3.2 United Kingdom 
Goode summarizes the aims of English corporate insolvency law as addressing the questions 
of priority and control.
116
 Basically priority concerns the order of distribution of assets of an 
insolvent company, whereas control is essentially procedural in nature and is designed to 
safeguard the assets by placing them in the hands of a manager.
117
 The objectives of the 
English insolvency law, in contrast to those of Mauritius and Kenya, are easily discernable 
as the statutes clearly state them. For instance, the purposes of administration are specified 
in the Insolvency Act 1986 with a hierarchy of three objectives, which may be paraphrased 
and simplified as (a) rescuing the company as a going concern, (b) achieving a better result 
for the creditors as a whole than would be possible in an immediate liquidation (c) realizing 
property to make distributions to one or more secured or preferential creditors.
118
 It will be 
appreciated from the list of objectives that the purpose of administration takes on a holistic 
approach, whereby it attempts to bring about an alternative result to that of liquidation.
119
 
It should be added that a consideration of the purpose and objectives of the UK corporate 
insolvency regime is incomplete without the mention of the Cork Report
120
 which laid down 
the foundations for the insolvency framework as well as the values that should be pursued 
when a company is in financial distress. It is acknowledged that it has been  many years 
since the Cork Report was published but arguably the objectives envisioned in the report are 
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‘alive’ in the current UK insolvency laws.  In summary, the aims of an insolvency process as 
envisioned by Cork included the following, amongst others:
121
 
a) A law that recognizes that, since the creation of wealth depends on systems of credit, 
the system should, as a correlative, have an insolvency procedure that helps the casu-
alties. In essence, the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of 
the insolvent and his creditors, but other interests of society or other groups in soci-
ety are also vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome.
122
 
b) A need for law that facilitates the efficient closure of non-viable businesses but yet 
provides means for the preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable of 
making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country.
123
 
c) A looming threat of insolvency should be recognized and dealt with at an early, 
rather than a late stage. 
d) A regard to the rights of creditors, including the unsecured. 
e) The assets of the insolvent, which should properly be taken to satisfy his debts, with 
minimum delay and expenses. 
f) A distribution of the proceeds of the realizations among the creditors in a fair and 
equitable manner, returning any surplus to the debtor;
124
 
Collectively, the proposals by the Cork Committee and subsequent inclusion in the objec-
tives in Sch.B1, as noted above, demonstrate an underlying principle that has fundamentally 
shifted from facilitation of liquidation to a new way in which the company is managed in 
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insolvency. In essence, the reforms embraced a rescue culture which was further fostered by 
the Enterprise Act 2002, which virtually abolished administrative receivership in an attempt 
to build a more efficient model, better suited to rescuing a distressed company.
125
 As is typi-
cal, the English law offers two alternative routes to an insolvent company: reorganization, 
on one hand and liquidation in another. The two alternatives are very specific objective start-
ing with restoration of a viable company to profitability. This is achieved through admini-
stration or workouts. The maximisation of returns to creditors is achieved through a collec-
tive debt collection procedure, a significant aspect of both the administration and liquidation 
procedures. Besides, the interests of creditors are in principle given precedence over those of 
others. For example in administration in the UK, two objectives focus on creditors 
namely:
126
 
a) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely 
if the company were wound up; and 
b) Realising property of the company in order to make a distribution to one or more se-
cured or preferential creditors. 
A reflection on the UK corporate insolvency law against the theories considered above leads 
to a conclusion that the law has always promoted the protection of communitarian and credi-
tors’ interests at almost all stages with varying levels. To start with, the UK laws have been 
traditionally regarded as ‘creditor friendly’ because of the strong priority given to the protec-
tion of creditors’ interests.127 In particular, prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 
the law contained the administrative receivership procedure and a scheme of arrangement. A 
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receiver can best be described as ‘an independent contractor whose primary responsibility is 
to protect the interests of his appointer’.128 At the same time, he also owes a duty to his 
deemed principal, the company which entails refraining from conduct that damages the 
goodwill, and a separate duty, by statute, to observe the priority given to preferential credi-
tors.
129
 Arguably, if receiver approaches an insolvency scenario carrying the aforementioned 
obligations, the administrative receivership can potentially be used to address more than the 
interest of the appointing creditor. 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of such obligations cannot prevent a receiver manager from 
promoting only his appointer’s interests and ignoring other unsecured creditors. In fact, the 
two procedures were criticized as inadequate, basically because in administrative receiver-
ship, the floating charge holder wielded more power and in schemes of arrangement the pro-
cedure was too ‘procedurally cumbersome and failed to safeguard sufficient and effective 
protection for the company’.130 It should however not be lost that, much as the administra-
tive receivership procedure has always been regarded as creditor friendly, it was not de-
signed to be a collective procedure, but rather a debt enforcement remedy available to a 
creditor holding a floating charge. In essence, it is an individual debt collection device that 
fails to fit in neatly to the creditors’ bargain ideologies.  
 
The reforms that were championed, starting from Cork’s list of aims, are more articulate that 
insolvency law should promote the survival of viable businesses. If this is achieved, other 
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interests such as those of employees and the economy at large are equally protected. Such 
engagements endorse the aspects of communitarianism. Besides, the recognition in the Cork 
Report
131
 of private interests of the insolvent, the creditors, the public and employees who 
are affected by company insolvency demonstrates a clear inclination towards the communi-
tarian view. The same proposals were realized through the enactment of the Insolvency Act 
1986, which introduced more elaborate corporate rescue procedures. In particular it intro-
duced alternative measures such as the Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs). Tradi-
tional CVA was done without moratorium and was documented to be relatively rare because 
the company remains vulnerable to attack by creditors while the proposals are being put to-
gether.
132
 Later, CVA with Moratorium was introduced for eligible companies in order to 
remedy a perceived weakness in the traditional CVA procedure. It was hoped that the avail-
ability of a moratorium during the period of formulating and presenting a CVA proposal to 
creditors and such proposal being approved would address this weakness and, as a result, 
increase the use of CVAs and the incidence of corporate rescue.
133
 On the contrary, the CVA 
with moratorium procedure is in fact very little used.
134
 Generally, the existence of a CVA is 
one of the pointers of general ideologies of a traditionalist view of insolvency law designed 
not just to enhance and allocate an insolvent firm’s value among existing entitlement holders 
but also protect interests, other than those of creditors, of those who are likely to have been 
particularly harmed by the debtor’s insolvency 
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2.3.3 Kenya 
As far as Kenya’s theoretical framework is concerned, no attention has been given to the 
theories of insolvency law. Besides, the law has been static, as detailed in Chapter Three of 
this thesis. As such, the basic objective that stands out from the relevant sections, which are 
Part VI- IX of the Companies Act is to facilitate closure of a company. In consideration of 
this, the focus of discussion below will primarily be a reflection of what each of the theories 
could offer to Kenya, as an emerging economy.  
2.3.3.1 Application of Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
Attraction of direct foreign investment is crucial for Kenya, as articulated in the develop-
ment programme branded ‘Kenya Vision 2030’.135 The policy has clear objectives of boost-
ing economic activities geared towards making Kenya a globally competitive and prosper-
ous nation with a high quality of life by 2030.
136
 One of the areas specified is globalization 
and technological innovations; which are considered critical in creating new and more in-
vestment opportunities for local enterprises. Second is to increase Kenya’s competitiveness 
in attracting foreign direct investment. The idea envisioned is to enable Kenya to bring in 
more business and employ more Kenyans. This is anchored on a widely acknowledged trend 
that high value foreign investment tends to make the greatest contribution to the national 
economy of the host country. In fact, in contrast with developed countries and other devel-
oping countries, the stock and flow of foreign direct investment to Kenya and Africa at large 
has always been small.
137
 That trend continues today, as shown by the yearly reports of 
global FDI and the reasons for this decline could be numerous, ranging from inadequate leg-
                                                          
135
 Kenya Vision 2030,  A Globally Competitive and Prosperous Kenya (Nairobi, Kenya, 2007 
136
 Ibid 
137
 Kojo Yelpaala, ‘Cost and Benefits from Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Ghana’ (1980) 72 N. Y. J. 
INT’L & COMP 2, 81-82 (1980) 
63 
 
islation or inefficient enforcement mechanisms, to limited entrepreneurial spirit.
138
 In the 
same spirit, there is a growing trend among developing economies to reform their insol-
vency laws with a view to attracting and facilitating foreign investment, as part of the activi-
ties in the poverty reduction strategy.
139
 
 
Therefore, for Kenya to improve its attractiveness to foreign investment, legislative reforms 
have to be used as a key incentive of creating a favourable legal environment. Evidence 
shows investors’ decisions as to where to invest are influenced by financial and political 
risks, as they are key to stable and predictable business environments.
140
 In essence, inves-
tors are keen on the existence of efficient institutional and legal systems as they provide a 
degree of predictability.
141
 An approach based on the CBT arguably offers that crucial pre-
dictability. In particular, the focus on creditors’ entitlements has merits, especially in a liq-
uidation where a business has little left than to ensure a fair distribution of assets of an in-
solvent business.  
 
It is notable that the existing insolvency framework in Kenya has an outstanding nature of 
reflecting the CBT views courtesy of the colonial history. In reality, insolvency fundamen-
tally leads to liquidation and this resonates through the existence of receivership and liquida-
tion procedures whose main agendas are to protect the interest of creditors.
142
 However, the 
limitation of CBT, as discussed earlier, is/will be more pronounced in a developing econ-
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omy. The primacy of the creditors’ interests will result in undermining other interests vital to 
boosting the economy. For example, evidence shows that firms experience a reduction of 
corporate innovation and intensity of patterns when creditors’ rights are strong.143 As such 
there is a need for a regime that balances between protecting the interests of creditors with-
out ignoring the impacts of insolvency. In fact, many jurisdictions have recognized that re-
habilitation of business is a legitimate factor to be considered in insolvency decision mak-
ing.
144
 For instance, the US Congressional record on the Bankruptcy Code says that: 
‘...the purpose of business reorganization is to seek to restructure business finances 
so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs pay its creditors 
and provide for its stock holders.’145 
Elsewhere, similar sentiments were expressed and in particular; the objectives of Ch 11 have 
been described in the following terms: 
‘In proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a trou-
bled enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in future. By 
permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to 
provide jobs, satisfy creditors’ claims and to produce return to its owners. Congress 
presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabili-
tated business than if sold for scrap’.146 
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As such, the fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into 
liquidation with attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.
147
 There-
fore, it is crucial that the laws facilitate innovations and ensure continuity of businesses, so 
that those whose livelihoods depend on it do not join the millions wallowing in unemploy-
ment, a burden every developing economy struggles with.  
2.3.3.2 Application of Communitarian Theory 
 
The application of this theory to a developing economy will be a challenge. As noted in sec-
tion 2.2.2 above, the interests that insolvency law should protect, according to this theory, 
are so wide that they cease to be identifiable. Undoubtedly, community interests are the ob-
jects of desired social welfare goals that policy makers the world over ought to consider 
when designing insolvency laws, a flexibility offered by the communitarian approach. Ac-
cordingly, insolvency law should operate in a manner from which the community can bene-
fit; it should rescue viable businesses whenever possible and facilitate liquidation where 
necessary. However, stretching the law to unknown limits makes it vague, besides present-
ing complexity as to how such a law should be structured to cover all interests– a challenge 
to policy makers. Further, inasmuch as such a law may enjoy flexibility, it will lack predict-
ability and so investors will not be able to assess the risk of investment. As such, the law 
should strike a balance between the rights of those willing to invest and those who become 
victims as a result of those investments. Furthermore, a system that relies on the courts to 
balance the conflicting interests cannot be effectively implemented in a developing economy 
where specialised bankruptcy courts are lacking. Besides, the general courts that engage in 
all manner of legal matters will be ill-equipped to provide a reliable balance. In essence, the 
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establishment of a legislative framework for a developing economy must be in tandem with 
realities of insolvency practice and what can feasibly be achieved through effective regula-
tion. 
2.3.3.3 Application of Value Based Theory 
 
This theory contradicts the CBT and corresponds to the communitarian approach. The un-
derpinning philosophy is that corporate insolvency laws should protect wider considerations 
than the creditor’s interests. The Kenyan circumstances of nurturing businesses that can pro-
vide employment and be part of the process of elevating the living standards of its citizens 
will easily be accommodated in the wider scope it incorporates. However this theory intro-
duces a unique aspect of considering the human attributes that a corporate business can em-
body. It might help to bear in mind for policy makers that a corporate body can play out its 
moral, political and social values. The question is whether the bankruptcy system is suited to 
such a task. The restructuring of the corporation, for example, may inevitably entail a 
change in the ownership structure of the company as well as the redistribution of losses be-
tween various stakeholders, including employees. Legal systems can attempt to create a bal-
anced and legitimate insolvency regime which enables corporate restructuring and which 
includes employee participation to a varying degree. Such a precise goal can be pursued. 
However, how will insolvency legislation cater for the political aspects of a corporation? It 
is appreciated that corporations can participate in politics by financing political agendas. In 
fact such engagements can be beneficial but may never be devoid of instances where corpo-
rations are manipulated to pursue political interests that are detrimental, hence becoming 
vehicles of injustice. Therefore, it is submitted that insolvency law, like any other legisla-
tion, can only address a certain number of issues in any given society. As such, while this 
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theory presents an interesting possibility, it is difficult to comprehend it actually applying in 
an insolvency scenario. 
2.3.3.4 Application of TPT 
 
LoPucki’s view that a collective insolvency proceeding should account for all those with 
various degrees of economic interest in the company, resonates well with the Kenyan goals 
of creating job opportunities as a means of empowering its citizens to be able to adequately 
earn a living. In particular, the TPT position that the team contract has to continue during 
bankruptcy allows for reorganization of the business and more importantly, should the busi-
ness be sold to a new owner, it supports the retention of the employees in their employment. 
This is a good view that the law should reflect. Besides, business survival of viable entities 
should be one of the key objectives that a developing economy’s insolvency law should em-
brace. This is because insolvency reforms, where they have been done effectively, have led 
to significant developments in economies being experienced, particularly in Latin America 
and Asia.
148
 To a Kenyan scenario such an approach would allow both locally grown busi-
ness, as well as multinational firms to participate in promoting the government’s agenda of 
securing employment. Besides, both local and multinational firms could face financial dis-
tress and the liquidation of these firms is often neither desirable nor socially efficient.
149
 Se-
rious social issues may erupt due to large scale redundancies of workers, and this could also 
increase the burden of social security. In extreme cases, it has the potential to threaten stabil-
ity through protests or crimes, which inevitably invoke political crisis and social chaos. 
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2.3.3.5 Application of Multiple Approaches 
 
The merit that the Multiple Approach theory offers to Kenya, is illuminating the issues that 
the law makers should consider. The arguments advanced in this theory substantially dem-
onstrate the danger of focusing on creditors alone. However, this theory fails to give clarity 
on how the law should address the issues. Therefore, Kenya, like all emerging markets, 
should attempt to balance effective facilitation that increases consumer lending and attrac-
tion of investors, with limiting the impact that corporate failure can leave on individuals and 
the national economy. In addition, because of its reliance on the courts, achieving its full 
potential necessitates the existence of legal institutions that are stable and efficient. It is 
submitted that this theory voices current realities that the jurisdiction faces and a critical ex-
amination of many jurisdictions validates the concerns about the consequences of business 
failure.  Kenya’s, approach to corporate insolvency law is fully aligned to the protection of 
creditors, which practice has led to closure of businesses, leaving many jobless. 
 
In contrast, the UK, from which Kenya inherited the law, has moved away from that prior 
approach. The UK administration’s main purpose is, amongst others, to rescue the company 
and the whole of its undertaking as a going concern.
150
 Another good example is the US 
Chapter 11, whose purpose is to provide the debtor with legal protection necessary to give it 
the opportunity to reorganize and thereby to provide creditors with the going concern value; 
rather than the possibility of a meagre satisfaction that Chapter 7 liquidation offers.
151
 Fur-
ther, it is interesting to observe that bankruptcy objectives in jurisdictions like France are 
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safeguarding the business, maintaining firm operations and lastly discharging liabilities.
152
 
As such, they have for a long time operated a system of heavily rescue centred laws, primar-
ily for the protection of employees. Nonetheless, France acknowledged that its initial rescue 
agenda was too ambitious and it has subsequently allowed companies to directly proceed to 
winding up in some cases.
153
  
 
This divergence of approaches of the aforementioned jurisdictions clearly indicates that 
none of the proceduralist or traditionalist approaches offers a clear-cut solution as to what 
the insolvency law should seek to achieve. The different theorists are responding to different 
concerns and it may be observed that these theorists are often describing disparate aspects of 
the same phenomenon, rather than disagreeing about certain simple claims about law. Legal 
systems are extremely complex and inevitably a theory about law can capture only a portion 
of the relevant fact.  As such, a realistic approach that borrows the best from each school and 
develops an appropriate view that reflects a jurisdiction’s particular circumstances is neces-
sary. 
 
For instance, it is prudent to consider legislating along the lines of approaches that are not 
exclusive to creditor’s wealth maximization, despite its merits. Emphasis too should be 
placed in creating an institutional framework that encourages international co-operation with 
multinational enterprises. The policy should also address and eliminate transaction costs 
which discourage foreign investors and hamper the expansion of domestic ventures. Most 
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importantly, for any tangible result to be realized through legislative reform, the law should 
be cognizant and true to the challenges facing developing economies with poor information 
acquisition technologies and bank-based financing systems.
154
 In addition, account should 
be taken of unique realities, such as limitations of equity markets in developing economies 
and a lack of diversity in financial instruments resulting in relatively small and nominal re-
sources being invested.
155
 
2.4 Relevance of theories to insolvency reforms 
 
Various views on corporate insolvency law have been effectively articulated and communi-
cated using theories as a platform. One might ask, of what value are such views to the de-
velopment of insolvency law, especially to the jurisdiction in focus? It is appreciated that the 
theories discussed are primarily based on western economies and philosophies of advanced 
legal systems. The dilemma that immediately crops up is how relevant these theories are to a 
Sub-Saharan African country with its unique circumstances. In fact, a number of reasons 
could be advanced against their relevance. To start with, it has been recognized that bank-
ruptcy laws are a vital indicator of the attitudes of a legal system.
156
 As such the theories 
will reflect the attitudes of the jurisdiction on which their development was based. Besides, 
insolvency systems have been described as social tools, which are not only value-laden but 
require formulation with care in order to reflect the particular values of a culture.
157
 Un-
doubtedly, variances in culture and values exist. For example, the UK had a popular nega-
tive attitude towards debt and bankruptcy which influenced the creditor-friendly nature of 
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the insolvency procedures and perhaps the prevalence of equity over debt financing.
158
 In 
contrast, in the US, business failure is thought of as a misfortune rather than wrongdoing and 
the US therefore more forgiving towards bankrupts and perceived as debtor friendly.
159
 The 
distinct divergence between the UK, having negative attitudes in contrast to America, is ar-
guably no longer so marked, as evidenced a number of reforms which promote rescue and 
reorganization and a rise in creditor influence in the US.
160
 Nevertheless, it serves to demon-
strate how attitudes influence the law. Further, the extent to which the law of a particular 
country observes or departs from the principle of collective maximization of returns for 
creditors in insolvency is directly related to its pre-insolvency economic and social policy.
161
 
As such there is an obvious connection between national insolvency policy and the social 
context in which it is implemented.  
 
On the surface, it may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion that there is no merit in ap-
plying the existing theories developed using western economies to an African context. How-
ever, theories in the natural and social sciences attempt to describe the world in a way that 
we can understand why the past events occurred or predict how the future events will un-
fold.
162
 In essence, it involves the use of past experiences which are likely to be so different 
from the prevailing circumstances, and equally far removed from the future reality. How-
ever, the divergence does not necessarily negate the utility. Arguably, legal theories, just like 
scientific theories are based on historical inclinations, and they can still be informative. 
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Moreover, once it is clear what the purpose of the claim is, it helps in advancing an agenda. 
For instance, the understanding of the law and ability to predict its impact are crucial to an 
effective functioning of any law. Therefore, theories are arguably useful in enhancing a con-
structive interrogation of a legal pathway, considering that they are developed using existing 
legal realities. 
 
Besides, it is important to highlight that there is evidence indicating trends in legal systems 
using foreign ideas to reform their own regimes, or to measure the effectiveness of their own 
laws against those of other jurisdictions. In fact, is widely accepted as an efficient means of 
learning about other legal cultures and improving on one’s own legal system.163 A perusal of 
reforms in the area of corporate rescue across many nations will identify the pervasive influ-
ence of Chapter 11.
164
 In France for instance, the Sauvegarde procedure is analogous to the 
US Chapter 11 with a number of key similarities, such as existing management remain in 
place, an automatic stay on enforcement action, ipso facto provisions that are unenforceable 
by the counterparty and the ability to bind creditors.  These features are based on similar ma-
jorities as those required under Chapter 11.
165
 
 
In addition, New Zealand’s efforts to reform its laws acknowledged that the changes were 
driven by the Australian experience and culminated in the adoption of Australia’s voluntary 
administration regime as an alternative to liquidation for companies capable of being reha-
                                                          
163
 Edward J Eberle ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’  (2009) 8 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 3:451 
164
 David Milman, National Corporate Law in a Global Market: The UK Experience in Perspective ( Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2005) pg 9 
165
 Adam Plainer, Sally Willcock, ‘Comparative Guide to Restructuring Procedures’ available in 
http://eurorestructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Comparative-Guide.pdfacssed on 8th August 
2015 
73 
 
bilitated.
166
 China, when reforming its insolvency laws, took account of models in the US 
and Europe, and developed a distinct law with Chinese characteristics, reflecting its own 
economic, legal and cultural peculiarities.
167
 Closer home is the Tanzanian example which 
has borrowed largely from the UK in its recent insolvency law reforms.
168
 All the aforemen-
tioned are typical examples of jurisdictions adopting and adapting foreign models. It is ar-
gued, therefore, that since there is substantial evidence that the modern way of reforming 
legislation involves a lot of borrowing from other jurisdiction, the foreign theories can 
equally be borrowed, with modifications, to help in understanding a domestic law.  
 
Theoretical debates which are actually about social policies underlying the insolvency pro-
cedures have arguably influenced court opinions and legislative enactments in many juris-
dictions.
169
 In the United States, for instance, the rescue attempts that are akin to a rebirth of 
a business in trouble are available only to ‘honest debtors.’170 This reflects a moralistic pres-
sure in fresh start analysis. It was noted in the ‘ethical vision’ theory that the philosophical 
foundation of insolvency has to consider morals. To a developing economy, a theoretical 
and philosophical basis for insolvency law provides a lens through which a critical analysis 
of legislative agendas can be weighed, considering that all parties affected by insolvency 
law are important to the economy. The Creditors’ Bargain argument is useful in identifying 
and explaining why the law should promote a collective device. Jackson articulated clearly 
that it would reduce strategic costs if creditors were required to co-operate. This is essen-
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tially an accounting aspect of insolvency which the law must be cognizant with. Besides, the 
CBT’s central idea that the creditors’ bargain is solely for maximizing creditors’ pre-
existing interests is an approach that most creditor-friendly jurisdictions have been follow-
ing. Much as honouring pre-insolvency agreements may negate wider interests, like efforts 
to reorganize, as articulated through inclusive theories, it has its own merits grounded in 
lenders’ behaviour. For example, lending institutions will limit credit creation for businesses 
if lenders are at risk of their status as secured creditors being interfered with upon the liqui-
dation of their debtors. Besides, a general objective of corporate insolvency law has been 
acknowledged as the reduction of uncertainty, promotion of efficiency and fair and equitable 
treatment of participants.
171
 It is crucial therefore for a developing economy to ensure that its 
insolvency regime promotes certainty as well as helps to simplify risks associated with lend-
ing, as this will affect the availability of credit essential for investments to increase. The UK 
has benefitted from recent improvements to its law and, as such, the recent shift to a more 
rescue oriented system is a response to dynamics that have shifted in the society. It has 
dawned on many that the preservation and growth of value are important and that the social 
significance of insolvency law requires much more than the enforcement of private rights. 
As such, a theory like the Team Production Theory agitates for recognition of all the stake-
holders’ contributions. To the Kenyan jurisdiction, a reflection of the existing laws through 
the lens of insolvency theories is worthwhile as it helps in appreciating what role the law 
needs to prioritize. 
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2.4.2 Important insights 
The divergence of views captured in the theoretical debates reflects an actual reality noted 
earlier by legal scholars like Rawls, who noted that life creates differing self- interests.
172
 
Nonetheless, a deeper reflection on these theories on the foundations and appropriate policy 
objectives of insolvency law exposes a number of mutual points. To start with, the theories 
share the understanding that efficiency considerations justify the enforcement of contractual 
bankruptcy arrangements.
173
 Therefore, a function that insolvency law serves is to provide 
the procedural and substantive framework to ensure efficiency. Secondly, the proponents of 
these divergent theories generally agree that preservation of the debtor’s value is a key goal 
of bankruptcy. There is no attempt to dispute the suggestion that, if greater value can be re-
alized by keeping a firm trading than by permitting it to be dismantled, then keeping the 
business alive is an appropriate use of bankruptcy process. Receiving the same unanimity is 
that insolvency systems should have a collective nature. As such, the primary role of an/the 
insolvency system is to replace the ‘free for all’ pursuit of individual claims with a statutory 
regime necessary for orderly collection and realization of assets.
174
 Notwithstanding the de-
bate on the choice of beneficiaries, in which of course each view would prefer to maximize 
their favoured beneficiary; insolvency law has a distributional role which requires co-
operation from all the parties involved. Because of this, the insolvency system is regarded as 
laying down the fair terms of cooperation amongst all the parties affected by the peculiar 
circumstances brought in by insolvency.
175
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It is also notable that creditors are the common contenders and, as such, even those who are 
keen to pursue the communal interest must address how best to accommodate the creditors, 
to avoid the creditors making a bad situation worse. This is because creditors have legal 
rights to the properties of the debtor. For instance a charge holder can, with precision and 
using the law, realize the security, in contrast to other interests, such as the impact to the 
economy, which equally suffers the consequences of a failed corporation. 
Further, despite the fact that these theories have a potential to influence policy objectives of 
diverse jurisdictions, the views do not take into account differing levels of economic devel-
opment. It exposes the divergence of insolvency systems that exist in the world, as reflected 
by the emphasis that each theoretical views accentuates.
176
 In reality an insolvency system 
of a well-developed jurisdiction might not necessarily be appropriate to an emerging econ-
omy. Therefore, Kenya would need to consider this divergence in the context of a develop-
ing economy with a view to developing a system that will not only be workable but also ap-
propriate in boosting its national economy. Lastly, there is an evident emphasis on efficiency 
and an assumption that the protection of entitlements that arose prior to insolvency will 
maximize aggregate efficiency.
177
 It is considered that the enforcement of prior entitlements 
secures the efficient planning of credit transactions by solvent corporations.
178
 Insolvency 
law seeks to ensure that there is a fair and orderly procedure that handles the affairs of the 
insolvent debtor in a predictable way and guarantees that debts are satisfied as far as possi-
ble with as little delay and expense as possible.
179
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
The most controversial theory considered above is the CBT for its bias towards the protec-
tion of creditors’ interests and upholding pre-insolvency rights. The rest of the theories 
largely agree that insolvency law’s role should not be merely confined to maximizing re-
turns to creditors, but that it should include other roles such as rescue (where viable), protec-
tion of employment, the public interest etc. It is acknowledged that the theoretical debate as 
to what the role of insolvency ought to be will remain vibrant and will still be evolving. 
However, insolvency law is a crucial tool in modern economic times.  The results of empiri-
cal studies that have been done, suggest that the quality of domestic governance has an im-
portant quantitative impact on a country’s ability to attract foreign investors who prefer to 
invest in countries with good governance.
180
 In effect, the quality of governance is associ-
ated with efficient regulations as well as enforcement mechanisms. Amongst the most cru-
cial pieces of legislation are those directly related with businesses, such as insolvency laws. 
It was noted that different theories that explain the usage of insolvency law exist at different 
levels of generality and have varying applications and uses as explanatory tools. It became 
evident that bankruptcy laws must attempt to achieve different, sometimes incompatible 
goals, given that this legislation must determine what to do with the insolvent company and, 
at the same time, must not be a hindrance to credit flow for investment. Besides, there is not 
one theory that adequately reflects all the ideals, and, from the theoretical point of view, de-
veloping a bankruptcy law requires understanding and achievement involving a lot of trade-
offs in the many interest to be balanced.  While some theorists are creditor focused, resulting 
in an exclusive approach, others are inclusive, proposing that the bankruptcy law should 
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consider the wider interest. Depending on which option – inclusive or exclusive – the policy 
makers embrace, it will be inevitable that the sphere of insolvency law will be extended be-
yond the protection of creditor interests, given the magnitude of impact that accompanies 
corporate failure. The extent of inclusion will be very subjective to the circumstances of any 
given jurisdiction. The theories illuminate the realities that the insolvency legislation has to 
struggle with. 
The UK insolvency law, as evidenced from the aims championed by the Cork Report and 
reflected in the objectives of the Insolvency Act 1986 and Enterprise Act, can be regarded as 
reflecting aspects of the communitarian and multiple values approaches. The law caters for 
interests such as those of employees and provides an opportunity for the rehabilitation of a 
business entity. In fact, it is evident that the issue of corporate insolvency and the mecha-
nisms for its resolution established in bankruptcy regulations can influence the financial de-
cisions of firms and investors, even in those situations in which financial distress are not ex-
pected. Equally, the Mauritian insolvency laws in the recent reforms mirror generally the 
inclusive views. However, the Kenyan insolvency system employs an exclusive approach 
with a pronounced emphasis on creditor interest protection. In addition, the realities that 
Kenya as a nation has to consider in its insolvency reforms are, in a way, opposing. For ex-
ample, the need for predictable and precise legislation that will attract investors naturally 
leans more on the CBT’s approach. However, the glaring poverty, unemployment and other 
challenges would be better catered for in an inclusive approach. Nonetheless, Kenya will 
have to engage in a trade-off, as done in other jurisdictions, especially the western econo-
mies which have modern restructuring procedures. In a nutshell, these theoretical debates 
have highlighted the interests at stake. It was noted that culture has for a long time, and in 
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many jurisdictions, influenced the law, yet the new wave of reforms are not premised on cul-
tural dynamics. As such, Kenya in its legislative reforms can experiment and learn from ex-
periences of other jurisdictions as it undergoes the modern economic transformation.
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF KENYAN INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICIES 
BASED ON INTERNATIONAL BENCH MARKS 
INTRODUCTION 
Insolvency law is considered an essential tool in modern economies as it structures the flow 
of credit that fuels developments. As such, countries the world over have been actively en-
gaging in reviewing, re-evaluating and reforming their laws in this area. There is an in-
creased interest in the design of insolvency systems from a perspective of resource alloca-
tion, efficiency, and stability as well as equality and fairness.
1
 In this quest for reform, the 
motivating factors that led to any reforms are crucial in understanding the intricacies of the 
approaches taken. In fact, literature reveals that reforms in developing economies are mainly 
undertaken as part of the initiatives by countries to create a favourable environment to at-
tract foreign investment.
2
 In broader terms, the underlying reasons for such activity are the 
need to facilitate growth of trade and investment, and attract direct foreign investment with 
view to reducing poverty.
3
 As such, it is a credible course of action but arguably wanting in 
urgency if other local needs and priorities are neglected. Kenya should not be left behind if it 
has to fit and benefit in the global market. Actually, the changing economic climate and 
pressure from multilateral institutions have emphasized the need to have efficient and effec-
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tive insolvency laws in Kenya.
4
 But unless we first appreciate what Kenya’s insolvency law 
currently entails, its culture and ideologies, historical development and internal economic 
pressures, it is hard to propose any tangible reforms. This chapter will therefore seek to pro-
vide an evaluative insight into the current Kenyan insolvency framework with an interest in 
its inadequacies and strengths. 
The chapter starts with an overview of the Kenyan insolvency legislative framework. It will 
then detail the insolvency procedures. The second part will analyse and evaluate Kenyan 
insolvency law from the standpoint of encouragement of external and internal investment. 
To achieve this, international benchmarks will be used to evaluate the law.  For instance, 
UNCITRAL offers a legislative guide on insolvency which assists in the establishment of an 
efficient and effective legal framework. Besides, the World Bank considers countries’ in-
vestment climates and ranks them according to their performances. For a long time, their 
‘Doing Business’ report focused on capturing the time, cost and outcome of the most likely 
in-court proceeding involving a domestic debtor in each economy.
5
 However, they have in-
troduced a new component, the strength of insolvency framework index which tests whether 
an economy has adopted internationally recognized good practices in the area of insol-
vency.
6
 Notably, the new indicator has been documented to be based on the World Bank’s 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.7 The 
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benchmarks of these international bodies
8
 provide an evaluative framework which is widely 
accepted and they are in common usage because, much as they are a global standard, neither 
their conditions of formulation are as demanding, nor their conditions of implementation as 
severe, as a convention.
9
 Besides, the benchmarks are responsive to the particular needs of a 
given state as it may implicitly permit states to exclude or modify some provisions.
10
 It is 
noteworthy that compliance must be voluntary and countries are assessed on the basis of the 
progress they make towards compliance rather than their absolute compliance.
11
 
But as Berkowitz et al argue, the quality of laws,  as  often  measured  by  the country’s  le-
gal  origin,  is  only  a  crude  proxy  for  the  effectiveness  of  legal  systems.
12
 Rather, it is 
the effective enforcement of laws, rather than the quality of laws, that matters.
13
 Cambodia’s 
legal system is a good example where, despite adoption of a modern and comprehensive in-
solvency law, the country has experienced low recovery rates, indicating that a modern law 
is not enough in itself to achieve an efficient insolvency practice; since effective implemen-
tation and a developed judiciary framework are also essential.
14
 The evidence of the quality 
of the law on the statutes suggests that this is at best a partial story, including the dynamic of 
the reform process and its impact on the development of effective institutions to enforce the 
new law.
15
 Therefore, it is equally necessary to have a viable enforcement mechanism that 
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has the ability to translate laws from the statute books to practical results with expediency.
16
 
Undeniably, there is tangible evidence from many countries that the lack of adequately 
trained specialized bankruptcy judges is a critical shortcoming in the efforts to reform.
17
 For 
instance, Russian administrators have been alleged to have manipulated the bankruptcy pro-
cedure, in order to expropriate tax revenues from the central government and this does little 
to alleviate the distress of a failed firm.
18
 In Hungary too, the bankruptcy procedure, much 
as it is similar to the US Chapter 11, which has been hailed as being effective, has been said 
to produce inefficient going-concern value, due to a lack of effective judicial oversight.
19
 
Accordingly, laws and regulations that fail to take into account weaknesses of the agencies 
that are supposed to enforce them can create more problems than they solve. In considera-
tion of how vital the enforcement aspect is to the law, this thesis will briefly discuss the 
Kenyan judicial system in so far as enforcement of the law is concerned, though to a limited 
extent in this in this chapter. Finally, it will consider the existing reform initiatives and their 
potential implications. 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
According to the author’s best information, corporate insolvency laws in Kenya are appro-
priately described as archaic; and the laws are not in tandem with the modern demands of 
commercial practices. As such, an approach to law reform, based on the basic idea that it is 
necessary to have legal review regularly to keep in conformity with real life, as expressed by 
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ever changing social economic and cultural trends, is lacking. In addition, the public domain 
is awash with tales of failed business and shattered ambitions of many young entrepreneurs 
and their employees. The relevant laws could be destroying more than they support and in-
evitably, the net effect in such circumstances will be detrimental to economic development. 
Besides, insolvency law is a subject that has gained considerable attention in states world-
wide but more significantly in developed economies. From this, there can be an appreciation 
that law and regulatory institutions play a central role in the development of financial mar-
kets and in corporate finance. The attention accorded could have varying reasons but can 
majorly be seen to arise as a result of the impact of insolvency in commercial life, undermin-
ing business relations and the obligations arising through contract. As a result, jurisdictions 
have been actively involved in legislative reforms aimed at building a well-tailored and effi-
cient corporate insolvency system. In fact, a wide range of jurisdictions have been formulat-
ing their insolvency frameworks towards a rescue culture.
20
 Conceptually, an insolvency 
system has certain features that are essential to its functioning.
21
 For instance, it may subject 
a debtor’s freedom to continue engaging in credit related transactions to an external con-
trol.
22
 Secondly, insolvency regimes typically provide a legal regime in which creditors’ 
rights and remedies are suspended and a process established for the orderly collection and 
realization of debts.
23
 Thirdly, insolvency systems provide relief for the ‘honest but unfortu-
nate’ debtor while properly identifying and punishing those who culpably exploited the trust 
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of their creditors.
24
 Fourth, insolvency laws are concerned with attempting to discharge a 
debtor from all debts and restoring it as a functioning entity.
25
 
Legally and procedurally, an insolvency framework provides a predictable and conducive 
environment where business transactions can be carried out in the knowledge that the 
framework will provide, in the advent of crisis, a platform to resolve it. Besides, an insol-
vency regime should also deliver an ex-post efficient outcome, in that the highest total value 
is obtained for the distressed firm with the least direct costs and loss of going concern 
value.
26
 In doing this, a functioning and efficient system nurtures the confidence of local in-
vestors as well as attracting foreign investment. However, this does not undermine the fact 
that there are competing theories that are found in literature that compete and even conflict 
in attempts to justify the roles of insolvency laws and that disagree as to what the key focus 
ought to be, as already detailed in Chapter Two. Besides, jurisdictions tend to prioritize their 
objectives differently. 
For a country to attract both foreign investment and encourage local investments, its world 
image and standing ought to be appealing. Therefore, current positions both in the region 
and globally are very informative. For instance, according to the ‘Doing Business 2009’ re-
port offered by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Bank, Kenya ranks 95
th
 out of the 183 economies surveyed, worldwide, on their ease of do-
ing business.
27
 This helps not only in appreciating how Kenya’s environment compares to 
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those of other jurisdictions, but also provides a measure of any progress when considering 
contextual reforms. The aforementioned report tracks aspects of the business-closing process 
which is liquidation to identify problem areas in insolvency regimes. The issues it focuses 
on include the time it takes, on average, to complete the process, expressed in years; the av-
erage cost of the procedure, expressed as a percentage of the value of the debtor’s estate; and 
the average recovery rate, expressed in cents in the dollar. Such a report offers a valuable 
evaluation of an insolvency regime, in particular liquidation, and in fact gives a clear picture 
of how the laws support or frustrate investment and it is therefore informative to any reform 
quest.  However, to promote the understanding and evaluation of the Kenyan insolvency 
framework, an exploration of its history as well as an in-depth analysis of the current insol-
vency framework is necessary. After all, an important aspect of a country’s insolvency re-
gime is the ability to reflect the ideals and uniqueness of that jurisdiction, its specific fea-
tures and degree of enforcement. 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE KENYAN CURRENT INSOLVENCY LEGISLA-
TIONS; AND A BRIEF HISTORY. 
 
The Kenyan legal system, and in particular the present insolvency framework, is traceable to 
the historical colonial legacy. As such, the principles of English law and English concepts 
are still generally applicable in Kenya, subject to compatibility with the local circumstances. 
This is evidenced by section 3 of the Judicature Act Cap 8 of 1967
28
 which sets out the 
sources of law applicable in Kenya. They are basically the Constitution and Acts of Parlia-
ment and include foreign laws named in the First Schedule of the Judicature Act. In addi-
tion, the sources include the substance of the common law, doctrines of equity, English Stat-
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utes of general application, and procedure and practice observed in courts in England until 
12 August 1897, so far only as the circumstances of Kenya and its inhabitants permit and 
subject to such qualifications as those circumstances may render necessary.
29
 
From the aforementioned section of the Judicature Act, it is clear that the Constitution and 
all other local written laws are the principal sources of law in Kenya and therefore, English 
law operates subordinate to the local written laws and may be resorted to only where the lo-
cal legislation does not extend or apply.
30
 Unfortunately the Judicature Act Cap 8 is out 
dated as it has not been reformed to reflect the changes introduced by the Kenyan Constitu-
tion 2010. For instance the judiciary has a higher court, the Supreme Court.
31
 Equally, inter-
national law is also a source of law though it is not listed under the Judicature Act but is rec-
ognized in Articles 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010,
32
 as a valid norm 
within the legal system. 
Moreover, insolvency legislation that is currently in force in Kenya, i.e. the Companies Act 
(1962) Cap 486 was taken from the English Companies Act 1948. In fact, the statute was 
adopted almost in its entirety and actually, other investment-related laws are based on that 
founding legislation. The imposition of the English laws was done through a process de-
scribed as an involuntary transplant through re-enactment of reception clauses, local ordi-
nances and in some instances the entire colonial legislation.
33
 Reception clauses are provi-
sions meant to adopt the common law approach and English legal statutes as the basis for 
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judicial decisions.
34
 The reception of these laws, as was typical among all former British 
colonies, comprised the English common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of general 
application then in force in England. 
The main problem experienced with the Kenya Companies Act 1962 is that it provides for 
the procedure and practices as they pertain in England to apply to companies facing crisis in 
Kenya. It has not been reformed and as such Kenya continues to base its insolvency prac-
tices on codes drafted by the colonial power and in the authors view to probably meant to 
serve the master’s interest. Unfortunately the United Kingdom has since completely over-
hauled its insolvency legislation and introduced dedicated legislation with the Insolvency 
Act 1985, consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986, and the 1986 Act was further improved 
on subsequent occasions, in particular with the Enterprise Act 2002. Kenyan law has not 
kept pace with these reforms.  In essence, the Kenyan laws have not changed to reflect cur-
rent business reality in Kenya and therefore do not reflect the culture and business dynamics 
within the Kenyan jurisdiction. There are two insolvency procedures embodied in the Com-
panies Act 1962 namely receivership
35
 and winding up.
36
 However, the receivership and liq-
uidation of enterprises varies in accordance with the statute that governs its registration and 
activities, as shown in the table below. 
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Table 1
37
 
Type of Enterprise    Governing statute  Modes of receivership 
and liquidation 
Companies The Companies Act (Cap 
486) 
As specified in the Com-
panies Act (part vi and vii) 
Cooperatives Societies The Cooperatives Socie-
ties Act (Act No.12 of 
1997) 
The Cooperatives Act read 
together with Companies 
Act. 
Banking institutions 
(Including non-bank 
financial institutions) 
The Banking Act (cap 
488) 
Central Banking Act (cap 
491) read together with the 
Companies Act 
Insurance Companies The Kenya Insurance De-
posit  Act 2012  
The Insurance Act read 
together with Companies 
Act. 
Building Societies 
 
The Building Societies Act 
(Cap 489) 
 
 
 
The Building Societies Act 
read together with Compa-
nies Act. 
 
As the table illustrates, the principal law that explicitly sets out procedures that apply to re-
ceivership and liquidation is Companies Act Cap 486. However, depending on the other leg-
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islations that are concerned with their registration, some aspects of engaging in an insol-
vency procedure will be slightly different. For example, with commercial banks, the central 
bank of Kenya initiates the receivership process as regulator. Likewise, the Commissioner of 
Building Societies would have rights of audience in the petition concerning any such soci-
ety. 
Another piece of legislation that contributes to regulating insolvency is the Bankruptcy Act 
originally passed in 1930, which is extensive, with 164 sections and numerous amendments. 
It is acknowledged that this legislation focuses on individual bankruptcies and therefore has 
little to do with corporate insolvency, the core research area. It must also be noted that the 
Kenyan legislature has attempted to address the problems facing the businesses in Kenya 
and as a result a number of bills are underway but, at the time of writing, it remains to be 
seen whether they will become laws. Nevertheless the Insolvency Bill 2010
38
 at least in the-
ory was set to establish a clear framework for insolvency regulation. The Bill was initially 
rejected in 2010 and referred back to stakeholders for further review. After incorporating 
their amendments, the Bill was introduced as Insolvency Bill 2012 but equally failed to be 
enacted. In 2014, a new Insolvency Fill was proposed by the Cabinet Secretary of Treasury. 
The 2014 Bill just like the 2010 Bill gives priority to the revival of distressed firms rather 
than auctioning and liquidating them. For in-depth analysis on on-going effort to reform the 
relevant legislation see sec 3.5 of this chapter. 
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3.3 CURRENT KENYAN INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK. 
The insolvency framework in Kenya addresses both personal and corporate insolvencies. On 
one hand, the individual insolvency provisions, or bankruptcy laws as they are commonly 
known, are contained in Bankruptcy Act (Cap 53 laws of Kenya). The legislation is silent as 
to what types of procedures are involved in the bankruptcy process. Arguably, the civil pro-
cedure rules Cap 21 laws of Kenya addresses this concern. Besides, it can also be argued 
that the Act contains two, one being the insolvency procedure which is initiated either by a 
creditors’ or debtors’ petition, although it is not given any name in the legislation39 and a 
composition or scheme of arrangements contained in section 18.
40
 It is notable that a debtor 
can exercise his discretion and make a proposal for a composition in satisfaction of his 
debts, or a proposal for a scheme of arrangement of his affairs by expressing his intentions 
in writing to the official receiver. This however happens once a petition has been made and 
the conditions stated in section 6 as are satisfied, the court issues a receiving order which has 
an effect of appointing an official receiver.
41
 It admittedly forms part of the main insolvency 
procedure albeit the process takes a different form if a scheme or a composition is proposed 
and accepted by the creditors.  This research will not consider personal bankruptcies in more 
detail as they are not the core area of focus. 
On the other hand, corporate insolvencies are governed by Companies Act Cap 486 and it 
encompasses two basic insolvency procedures namely winding up and receivership. It is 
necessary to explore each procedure independently. 
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3.3.1 Winding up 
The winding up of a company is a prologue to its ultimate demise.
42
 (Refer to 1.5.4 for a de-
tailed discussion of the concept). The legislation provides for this procedure in part (vi) sec-
tion 212 of the legislation and has two kinds of winding up: creditor’s voluntary winding up 
and a compulsory winding up by the court.
43
 For a compulsory winding up, although the 
court allows a broad range of persons to initiate the proceedings, the most prevalent peti-
tioners are creditors. A petitioner is not entitled to a winding up order without showing some 
good cause to it. This procedure is the oldest and most traditional way of dealing with corpo-
rate entities and exists in many different jurisdictions. In England for instance, legislative 
provisions require the presence of similar grounds in support of the petition to those required 
in Kenya, as mentioned above, with a requirement to advertise the petition.
44
 Besides, a 
court can actually dismiss a petition if not duly advertised in accordance to the governing 
rules.
45
 
Section 219 enumerates a number of circumstances under which the winding up order can 
be made. A notable ground is the company’s inability to pay its debts as elaborated later in 
the chapter and another is where the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that 
the company should be wound up. These two conditions are by far the most important and 
most commonly invoked. The inability to pay debts is considerably easier to establish, since 
the just and equitable requirement relies on the court’s interpretation and discretion. In fact, 
Kenyan courts have not delved into this aspect in depth. The existing precedent in this re-
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gard is the old English case of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd,
46
 where the court ex-
plained that for a petitioner to be able to rely on the just and equitable clause, it is necessary 
go to court with ‘clean hands’, such that the cause of dispute between him and the other par-
ties is not due to his misconduct. Otherwise, such a petitioner cannot insist on the company 
being wound up if others in the company wish for it to continue. The details of the admini-
stration of voluntary winding up follow the same pattern as for the creditors’ compulsory 
winding up, although there are some differences but interestingly, they are a replication of 
the UK version.
47
 As such, they entail using liquidators with powers of sale and distribution 
of assets with court supervision. 
3.3.2 Receivership 
Receivership is a process initiated by a creditor to recover amounts outstanding under a se-
cured loan in the event of the company defaulting on its loan payments. In practice, the 
banks as a secured creditor holds a floating charge over part or the entire undertakings of the 
company with a right to appoint a receiver manager out of court or by a petition to the 
court.
48
 The receiver manager would then be deemed an agent of the company and liability 
for any actions of the receiver would fall upon the company rather than the appointing credi-
tor.
49
 In Kenya, this procedure is contained in Part VII of the Companies Act Cap 486 which 
starts by disqualifying a body corporate from appointment as a receiver manager. This pro-
cedure can be initiated in two ways. The first is through a court order when applied on be-
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half of the debenture holders or other creditors of a company which is being wound up.
50
 
The second is an out of court appointment, where a receiver is appointed under the powers 
contained in any instrument of the company.
51
 A receiver manager who is appointed out of 
court may apply to the court for directions in relation to any particular matter arising in con-
nection with the performance of his functions. Once appointed, a receiver will be personally 
liable on any contract entered into by him in the performance of his functions except in so 
far as the contract otherwise provides.
52
 A notification that the company is in receivership is 
then issued to all the creditors and other stakeholders. The company within fourteen days 
after receipt of the notice, or such longer period as may be allowed by the court or by the 
receiver manager, must prepare and submit a statement of affairs of the company in the pre-
scribed form. These accounts are then forwarded by the receiver manager to the registrar 
with his comments, if he so wishes to add any. The legislation is limited and has very little 
details as to what more happens in a receivership process. 
3.4 IN DEPTH ANALYSIS/EVALUATION OF THE KENYAN INSOLVENCY 
LAWS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BENCH 
MARKS 
 
A Kenyan story narrated in any forum is never complete without the mention of its colonial 
past. It is tempting to attribute some of the realities in Kenya, to the colonial impact that 
greatly shaped Kenya’s legislative history. Kenya may have been involuntarily consigned by 
the colonial process to its position, but to continue following that same legislation today in 
the 21st century voluntarily, deliberately, and on its own accord is a total failure. Prima fa-
cie, Kenya is an active business hub but underneath it has a story of insufficient reforms to 
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support and encourage these economic efforts. The current state of Kenya from the legal 
context and economic standards is in many ways a result of poor leadership and not neces-
sarily the negative impact of colonialism. If anything, jurisdictions like Botswana, South Af-
rica and Mauritius, despite being colonized have achieved economic growth by adopting 
good policies. It is documented that Botswana sustained the minimal public service that it 
inherited from British and developed it into a meritocratic, relatively non-corrupt and effi-
cient bureaucracy.
53
 As such, one of the most important legislative policy agendas for Kenya 
is to eliminate, or at least reduce, the inefficiencies of its legislation. To comprehend these 
inadequacies and weaknesses, a critical assessment of the law is mandatory, as well as a re-
view of how its provision reflects insolvency law ideas found in other parts of the world. 
However, assessing the law is an ambiguous task that warrants more clarity. Finch argues 
that, it is impossible to evaluate any area of law, suggest reforms or even develop the law 
unless there is clarity concerning the values and objectives that such a law seeks to 
achieve.
54
 The objectives underlying any law are important statements of a national policy. 
The legislative history and the legislation itself reveal important principles and assump-
tions.
55
 Conversely, the principles and objectives underlying Kenya’s insolvency law are not 
easily noted from the legislation because they are littered throughout a bulky document 
(Companies Act Cap 486). Nevertheless, they can be deduced from the legislation after a 
critical examination. In contrast, in the insolvency bill 2010 the objective is clear and appar-
ent, even from its title, which states as follows:  
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‘An Act of Parliament to amend and consolidate the law relating to receiverships, in-
solvency, provisional supervision, winding up and individual bankruptcy, to provide 
for corporate and individual insolvency, to provide for the rehabilitation of the insol-
vent debtor and for connected purposes.’ 
In addition, insolvency regimes are complex and varying in design as they try to balance 
several  objectives, including protecting the rights of creditors, which are crucial to the mo-
bilization of capital for investment and working capital and other resources and obviating 
the premature  liquidation of viable firms.
56
 Therefore, the substantive objectives and proce-
dural terms, as well as the extent to which a statutory mandate is efficiently implemented, 
ought to be accorded weight. 
Besides, the existence of  competing theories as to what insolvency law’s role and key focus 
is, as already elaborated in Chapter Two, adds to the ambiguity. Further, jurisdictions tend to 
prioritize their objectives differently. However, the multilateral institutions, driven by the 
collective will of G7 have developed global insolvency norms to benchmark the develop-
ment of effective insolvency law systems around the world. Generally, developing countries 
are perceived as having weak crisis resolution systems and consequently they are regarded 
as a major threat to stability of the entire globe.
57
 Therefore, special regard is given to 
emerging nations in the multilateral institutions’ deliberations.58 A key feature of the re-
sponse of multilateral institutions is the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 
which contains nine key objectives to be used for the evaluation of insolvency systems.
59
 
                                                          
56
 Claessens and Klapper  (n 26) 
57
 Onder (n11)  
58
 Ibid 
59
 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004, 10-13 available in 
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf > assessed on 25/03/2011 
97 
 
The aforementioned UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law contains detailed 
information as well as precise key objectives that are fundamental in attaining a comprehen-
sive evaluation of the law. Incidentally it must be noted that domestic insolvency laws and 
resulting international insolvency standards that developing countries are pressed to comply 
with owe much to the best practices prevailing in developed countries.
60
 In addition, there is 
a wide divergence of national insolvency law systems but nevertheless there exist common 
and uniform aspects of best practices within these systems, and these different insolvency 
systems have therefore been utilized to develop a global standard of best practices to 
benchmark the development of effective domestic insolvency regimes.
61
 
These standards offer an important base for evaluation of existing systems as well as for the 
development of modern insolvency systems which could be tailored to the needs and cir-
cumstances of the countries. The identifications of such principles and usage have been cen-
tral in enacting new corporate insolvency laws in other parts of the world. For instance, in 
China, much as its Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 resulted from internal debates, these 
international efforts were reflected in those debates.
62
 
The aforementioned international insolvency standards provide recommendations, guide-
lines and reference for respective national policy and lawmakers, in a non- binding nature of 
‘soft law’, rather than through legally binding treaties.63 This is important as national gov-
ernments are not willing to relinquish sovereignty of their states to the world and besides, 
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the national systems are diverse so a soft law offers an interactive alternative to the formal, 
legally enforceable treaties at international level.
64
 It therefore gives the states room to un-
dertake an assessment of any modifications in either law or administrative practice that may 
be necessitated. Despite their non-binding nature, these standards have a strong persuasive 
leverage. Not infrequently, leverage proceeds through persuasion, when international or-
ganizations and professionals in their circle host conferences, write articles, and give 
speeches in regional meetings about the merits of particular scripts or other national models 
that adhere to those scripts.
65
 The persuasion can be coupled with systems of reward or in-
centives; sometimes financial, as in foreign aid or technical assistance loans, and sometimes 
moral, where for instance the international organizations suggest that a country’s reputation 
will be enhanced or diminished by its conformity to global standards.
66
 In these ways, the 
multilateral institutions that monitor observance and intricacies of the globalised economy 
use them as a strong force of reform.
67
 
This Chapter will now seek to identify the key principles and assumptions that are reflected 
in Kenyan insolvency laws and to contrast them with the ideas reflected in the international 
benchmarks. In particular, from section 3.4.1 onwards, the nine objectives identified in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide will be used in this analysis.  
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3.4.1 Provision of certainty in the market to promote economic stability and growth 
The nature of the legal environment is widely acknowledged as one of the important factors 
that determines the inflow of foreign investment in a country.
68
 Ramcharran, points out that 
regulation and risk reduction play central roles in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and that 
an unaccommodating legal environment is the main deterrent of FDI.
69
 Besides, legal stabil-
ity is crucial for stimulating FDI inflows and increased transparency regarding the legal 
framework of a country affects FDI decisions.
70
 In essence, foreign investors are most con-
cerned with the presence of a transparent, reliable and efficient legal system by which to con-
duct their business. Interestingly, a critical look into the insolvency legislative framework in 
Kenya leaves much to be desired. To start with, in Kenya, just like in most developing coun-
tries, bank lending is the prime source of credit to enterprises. However, the facilitation and 
provision of finance for start-up and reorganization of business is hampered by legal regula-
tory and operational constraints.
71
 In particular, the creation of security interests, perfection 
of such interests through informing the public of their existence and priorities as well as en-
forcement of the securities are costly. This is majorly because the registering and updating 
of public records is not efficient, making searches difficult and expensive. These obstacles 
make the starting of a business difficult, expensive and in some instances result in limiting it 
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to larger and established firms. This is detrimental, especially in the current trends where 
credit is the lifeblood of an economic development.
72
 
Furthermore, continuing financing is the crucial and troublesome problem bedevilling every 
corporate re-organization regime.
73
 Without a set of post- petition financing provisions 
which clearly define the hierarchy of priorities for potential post-petition lenders, other great 
efforts to cast an effective rescue regime may prove fruitless.
74
  On this front, a problem 
with Kenyan legislation is that it does not provide for a regime of ‘super-priority’ funding as 
part of its restructuring process. As a result, companies in Kenya, in any potential rehabilita-
tion process face this central problem of a lack of funds in order to allow a turn around to be 
effected or facilitate an efficient liquidation. 
However, a critical look at the sections of the legislation dealing with the receiver manager’s 
duties and obligations,
75
 in so far as the company in receivership is concerned, implies that 
book debts,
76
 as they are known in UK, are often the only funds available for the purposes of 
financing continued operations through the receivership periods. This is because there is no 
other stipulated provision allowing post-petition financing. In other jurisdictions, super-
priority financing can be used which is basically a type of credit financing available to in-
solvent companies, where the credit finance given to a company during insolvency will be 
regarded as a claim superior to other claims hence given priority in payment.
77
 Besides, the 
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aforementioned book debts is not very clearly stated but the provisions ( Part VII of Cap 
486) allowing the receivers or liquidators powers to handle all receipts and payments in their 
managing the company, and as well to enter into contracts, can be interpreted as giving ac-
cess to use this cash to facilitate the necessary processes during that period. 
Similarly in the winding up procedure, there is no provision as to how the process will be 
funded, save for section 302, which states that the costs, charges and expenses incurred in 
winding up shall be payable from the company assets.
78
 This provision caters only for the 
liquidation cost and is very limited. This is detrimental, considering that the success of any 
insolvency proceeding depends on two fundamental questions: first, what arrangements 
should be put in place for new money or loans required by the troubled company?
79
 Sec-
ondly, what arrangements shall be put in place for existing loans and financial accommoda-
tion to the troubled company (bearing in mind that one fundamental aim of all corporate res-
cues should be to bring high levels of debt down to levels that the company can cope 
with)?
80
 
It is submitted that the Kenya’s post-petition funding measures are not adequate and may not 
provide sufficient incentives for potentially interested parties to effectively fund restructur-
ing efforts. Second, an efficient framework should have laws and institutions that promote 
restructuring of viable business and efficient closure of those that are beyond salvage. 
Kenya’s current insolvency laws have two crucial procedures, as already detailed in 3.3 
above. In so far as effective closure is concerned, Kenya has established procedures for the 
winding-up of companies that have been applied consistently over a long period of time, 
                                                          
78
 There is very little mentioned on post-petition financing and in fact the few sections like the Kenyan 
Companies Act 1948, Section 302 refer to a voluntary winding up of a solvent company 
79
 Denis Petkovic, ‘Corporate rescues and restructurings in Hong Kong’ (1991) 6 Journal of International 
Banking Law 7, 264-275 
80
 Ibid 
102 
 
hence making the system recognizable and this system may be functional for all the stake-
holders. Nonetheless, the efficiency and effectiveness of these procedures are questionable. 
Part VI of the Companies Act 1962 stipulates the process. There are a number of grounds for 
winding up the company stated in the legislation.
81
  
 
The insolvency test is stated as one of the reasons why a company can be wound up. The 
legislation refers to cash flow insolvency, as opposed to balance sheet insolvency.
82
 The two 
tests are fundamental in determining the solvency of a company but they are not the same 
and establishing cash flow insolvency is arguably easier. The balance sheet test is potentially 
more complicated and refers to the value of the company's assets being less than the amount 
of its liabilities.
83
 In fact Slade J in Re Capital Annuities Ltd, described it as a question of 
whether the debtor is in ‘possession of assets insufficient to meet its existing, contingent and 
prospective liabilities’84 However, it is not a mechanical exercise of comparing the value of 
a company’s assets against the value of its liabilities, but a more sophisticated test requiring 
a judgment as to whether the present assets of a company will reasonably enable the com-
pany’s present and future liabilities to be met.85 Noteworthy, the recent court decision has 
provided more clarity on the two tests. In particular, cash flow test as provided for in s 
123 of Insolvency Act 1986) was interpreted by Briggs J in Cheyne Finance Plc that test is 
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not a snapshot of debts due here and now but requires an element of futurity
86
 and the for-
mer is when a debtor is over indebted.
87
 In Eurosail, the Supreme Court approved this 
decision and emphasized cash flow test is concerned not simply with the petitioner’s own 
presently-due debt but also with debts falling due from time to time in the reasonably near 
future.
88
 Arguably though what is the reasonably near future will depend on all the 
circumstances as well as the nature of the company’s business.  
In older times, little attention was paid to the difference between cash flow and balance 
sheet insolvency when determining the solvency of the company. However, modern trends 
have paid due diligence to the distinction and embraced the cash flow test as the most ap-
propriate for efficiency and value maximization of the insolvent debtor’s estates, as well as 
encouraging early resort to insolvency proceeding.
89
 Undoubtedly, the question of whether a 
company will be able to pay its debts when they ultimately fall due is of significant impor-
tance whenever the court is asked to make a winding-up order and the balance sheet test 
plays a crucial role when considering a practical recognition of the company’s potential. 
On the issue of restructuring or rescuing a company, Kenya has numerous challenges. The 
problems facing receivership have their foundation in the law that governs the procedure, 
the Companies Act. To start with, the legislative regime is fragmented, outmoded and in-
complete.
90
 Kenya’s entire legal order rests on values and principles based on the common 
law, as agreed in the independent constitutional settlement of 1963. This implies that the in-
solvency law, like many other statutes that have not been reformed, is out-dated and does 
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not meet the needs of modern business. These laws have been criticized as not being in 
touch with realities and dynamics prevailing in Kenya today. In contrast, many jurisdictions 
have reformed insolvency laws dramatically in the last 30 years. For instance the People’s 
Republic of China, which originally had a very basic and limited bankruptcy law, has, 
through several attempts, enacted and reformed its legislation.
91
 In that jurisdiction there 
was a bankruptcy law passed in 1935 but later abolished and, later, in 1986 and the Enter-
prise Bankruptcy Law was enacted on a restricted and trial basis, this was reformed by a 
new Bankruptcy Law passed in 2006.
92
 To emphasize, the entire globe has been a hub of 
insolvency reforms and, for example, in the past 8 years, ‘Doing Business’ recorded 126 in-
solvency reforms, most of them in OECD high-income economies and in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.
93
 It was noted that, much as different jurisdictions focused their efforts on 
different aspects of insolvency, these reforms still shared some common features, like pro-
moting reorganization, regulating the profession of insolvency administrators and strength-
ening the rights of secured creditors.  
Kenya has failed to make any reforms to insolvency law, and it can therefore be regarded as 
lagging behind in the development of its legal infrastructure to support business, which 
brings the risk of under-performance in the global market. In addition, the existing legisla-
tion is bulky, complicated and time consuming. The fact that insolvency legislation forms a 
part of a law concerned with other issues is the first pitfall. This makes it cumbersome to 
access the relevant sections. This is further worsened by its disorganization. The sections are 
not arranged in a manner that reflects the normal chronology of insolvency proceedings.  For 
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instance, the statute addresses the issues of liquidation and winding up in Part VI before ad-
dressing the procedure that applies to the appointment of a receiver in the subsequent Part 
VII. In fact, the sections keep referring to the receivers before they introduce who they are 
and what their duties are. 
Besides, sections of the Companies Act cap 486 that govern the entrenched insolvency pro-
cedures overlap, making it difficult to distinguish how either receivership or liquidation is 
undertaken.
94
 For example, section 236 titled the ‘Appointment and Style of Receiv-
ers/liquidators’ states that the official receiver shall, by virtue of his office, become the pro-
visional liquidator and shall continue to act as such until he or another person becomes liq-
uidator. There is an interchange in the use of the terms ‘liquidator’ and ‘receiver’ yet in 
principle the two should have distinct roles in relation to the company. It is submitted that 
the law governing applications for receivership should be consolidated to enable an orderly 
process and enhance clarity to the interested parties. 
It must be noted though that some of the aforementioned weaknesses in the legislation have 
been acknowledged and given attention in the Insolvency draft bill of December 2010. For 
instance, the draft consolidates all the information necessary in an insolvency procedure into 
one statute. Its sections are well arranged, and most importantly ingrain a well pronounced 
rescue culture. It seeks to introduce administrations
95
 and company voluntary arrange-
ments.
96
 This is well elaborated under section 3.5 on ‘on-going reforms’. 
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3.4.2. Maximization of value of assets 
To maximize the value of assets for the benefit of creditors requires a number of well-
tailored approaches to be entrenched in legislation as detailed below. 
3.4.2.1 Timing of insolvency proceedings 
The commencement date of insolvency proceedings will impact and even determine how 
much can be realized by stakeholders in an insolvency process,
97
 as may the length that the 
insolvency process takes. Because of this, it is important that stakeholders have the incentive 
to behave in ways that will maximize their return from a company in an insolvency proceed-
ing.
98
 As such, an efficient and effective way of influencing the creditors’ behaviour is 
through an introduction of a mechanism that denies the creditors other alternative choices of 
conduct than those that are part of the collective process.
99
 Essentially, outside an insolvency 
situation, a secured creditor whose debtor has defaulted in payment can seize the collateral, 
sell it and keep the money up to the amount owed to him.
100
 Should the amount realized be 
less than the debt, he can still proceed to pursue the remaining sums from the debtor and, if 
the proceeds from the sale are of high value, refund the excess.
101
 Such an action will have 
negative consequences for the debtor as well as other stakeholders in the company. 
On the aspects of time, the legislation does not incorporate a clear time frame to guide the 
plans of a distressed company in receivership, although it has very detailed provisions on 
winding up. The Act does not stipulate the anticipated duration of proceedings. An example 
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is section 351(1) (b) by which the managers of the company are to submit a statement of af-
fairs to the receiver within a stipulated period. Another rare instance is the duration of the 
period given to the receiver to submit financial reports in sections 351(2) and 353(1). The 
absence of a clear time frame for other steps is very detrimental because it leaves the official 
receivers with a lot of discretion that can be abused to the detriment of the entire receiver-
ship process. For instance, prolonged proceedings increase the cost of bankruptcy in terms 
of administration costs. It must be remembered that formal insolvency procedures involve 
both direct costs, such as fees for accountants, bankruptcy lawyers, auditors and other pro-
fessional and ‘indirect costs’ which includes a prolonged procedure. A distressed company 
is likely to incur considerable ‘indirect costs’ from functioning inefficiently during insol-
vency proceedings.
102
 These costs include conflicts of interest, foregone investment oppor-
tunities, a loss of competitiveness, costs of suboptimal use of resources, losses of sales and 
as well as management of time.
103
 Unfortunately, because all of these costs are borne by an 
already distressed company, they diminish the returns to creditors, so that the maximum 
value of assets cannot be realized. Therefore, an expeditious handling of the insolvency 
process, which includes strict time limits being imposed, is necessary. In practice, literature 
documents that it takes an average of 4.5 years to complete formal insolvency proceedings 
in Kenya.
104
 It is however not clear whether this refers to liquidation or receivership. Be-
sides, there are no documented statistics to corroborate this and therefore it is unclear to both 
foreign and local investors what they may anticipate in the event of their ventures being in-
solvent, and this uncertainty undermines confidence in Kenya as an investment destination. 
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3.4.2.2 Automatic stay 
 In insolvency, a unique feature that an effective and efficient procedure benefits from is an 
automatic stay.
105
 In principle, the automatic stay stops all the collection activities against 
the debtor with an economic goal of protecting assets that have ‘going concern value’.106 
This legal freeze on all activities against the debtor redresses the bargaining power of all 
creditors and encourages an organized redistribution of resources where necessary.
107
 The 
Kenyan insolvency legislation has an equivalent of the automatic stay, although it is not 
termed so. The Companies Act section 224, stipulates that, once a winding up petition has 
been filed, the property of the company cannot be disposed of or dealt with adversely, no 
action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by 
leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose. This means that the 
creditors cannot engage in the chaotic race to protect their interests when the company has 
filed for a winding up procedure. Unfortunately, this automatic stay, as stipulated, refers to a 
winding up process and nothing is mentioned in so far as receivership is concerned. More-
over a moratorium to facilitate reorganization is presently lacking. 
In practice though, receivership has enabled the successful rescue of companies in some in-
stances, supported by a consensual stay by creditors. For illustration, in Uchumi, a unique 
story of success in Kenya, the receiver manager Ciano acknowledges that he had to persuade 
bankers and creditors to provide a breathing space.
108
 In essence, it was an informal ar-
rangement and had no legal backup. It was a rare scenario where the creditors, out of good 
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will, consented to be patient with the receiver manager but the same cannot easily happen in 
all cases, hence the need for a legislation to provide for an automatic stay.  
Notwithstanding such clear statutory provisions, as far as the automatic stay in winding up is 
concerned, some directors still attempt to engage in defeating or diverting the cause of jus-
tice. A good example was in the case of Re matter of Invesco Insurance Company Limited v 
In the matter of Companies Act Neptune Credit Management Limited
109
 where a director of 
a company which had instituted a winding up process deliberately disposed of shares owned 
by the company. He denied having sold the shares in question and further denied having 
benefited from the proceeds of the sale of the said shares. However, the court was able to 
establish that the directors were attempting to put the assets beyond the reach of creditors 
and ordered the director to return the proceeds of the sale. It is submitted  therefore that, in 
addition  to the stipulation of adequate  legal  rights,  there  is a need  for an efficient  judi-
cial system  to  enforce  these  rights,  or  at  least  to  serve  as  a  credible  threat to deter 
wrong doing,  and  to  speedily conduct the process of winding up or restructuring when so 
desired. Certainly, a heavily supervised insolvency procedure like the Kenyan one (refer 
generally to sec 3.3 of this thesis) performs best when its courts are equally performing effi-
ciently. 
3.4.2.3 Transaction avoidance 
The provisions that govern transaction avoidance have been considered necessary to com-
pliment the general aims of insolvency law.
110
 In fact the provisions have been documented 
as key features of an effective insolvency framework, basically because they may be used to 
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maintain and enforce schemes set out under the insolvency laws for the distribution of the 
estate of the insolvent company. It is widely recognized that when a company is established, 
the shareholders are the owners of the property and therefore have rights over the property 
of the company. However, the property of an insolvent company, as a matter of law is sup-
posed to be readily available to be distributed to the creditors with shareholders only being 
entitled to the residual value (if any). Conversely, there is a significant potential that the es-
tate can be badly depleted prior to the filing for insolvency to an extent that hardly anything 
is left for distribution. To address this potential risk, transaction avoidance provisions are 
meant to help liquidators to maintain and enforce the scheme of distribution.  
 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law states three types of avoidable trans-
actions that are available  in most legal systems: transactions intended to defeat, hinder or 
delay creditors from collecting their claims; transactions at undervalue; and transactions 
with certain creditors that have the effect of preferring them over all other creditors.
111
 Each 
of these avoidable transactions has some specific characteristics, depending on the circum-
stances of the transaction.
112
 However, a particular transaction may fall within the conditions 
of avoidance under more than one provision, and thus the insolvency representative may be 
able to choose on which basis to challenge it.
113
 Basically, two main forms of behaviour that 
can undermine the scheme set out in legislations are targeted. First, the scarcity of assets of a 
distressed company presents an incentive for the company managers to engage in distribu-
tion prior to the company being put under insolvency proceedings, which could be by prefer-
ring creditors by paying them ahead of others, or granting security over previously unse-
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cured debts.
114
 The second is where managers remove assets from the estate entirely either 
by gifting, entering into a transaction in respect of which the company receives value that is 
lower than that which it gives, or by fraudulent conveyance.
115
 
 
The Kenyan law contains transaction avoidance provisions, which are arguably limited, con-
sidering that vulnerable transactions must have been entered into within a period of only six 
months prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
116
 A contrast with the 
time frame given in other jurisdictions supports this criticism. For instance, in China the 
range and breath of the transactions that can be voidable includes those that took place 
within one year prior to the acceptance of the insolvency case.
117
 In the UK, the legislation 
is more detailed and distinguishes the undervalue transactions from preferences. Specifi-
cally, so far as undervalue is concerned, the law provides for a ‘relevant time’ which refers 
to a time period as well as the financial condition of the company at that time. The period is 
two years prior to the onset of insolvency proceedings and the company must have been un-
able to pay its debts, or the transaction must have caused this dire financial state of affairs.
118
 
The time frame for avoidance of preferences is generally six months prior to the onset of 
insolvency, under section 240(1) (b) but, where the creditor is connected to the company, it 
is extended to two years.
119
 
However, in Kenya the transaction avoidance provision covers a wide range of transactions 
and states as follows:  
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 ‘(1) Any transfer, conveyance, mortgage, charge, delivery of goods, payment, execu
 tion or other act relating to property made or done by or against a company within 
 six months before the commencement of its winding up which, had it been made or 
 done by or against an individual within six months before the presentation of a bank
 ruptcy petition on which he is adjudged bankrupt, would be deemed in his bankrupt
 cy a fraudulent preference shall in the event of the company being wound up be 
 deemed a fraudulent preference of its creditors and be void accordingly. 
 (2) Any transfer, conveyance or assignment by a company of all its property to trus
 tees for the benefit of all its creditors shall be void to all intents’.120 
 
A critical observation on the Kenyan provision leads to two main conclusions. One, sub-
section one of the above quoted provision does not connote fraudulent preferences but rather 
fraudulent transfers though both defraud creditors. Secondly, the section and the legislation 
generally arguably do not cover all other types of transaction that would normally be void-
able, as anticipated in the UNCITRAL Guide. Admittedly, the legislation does not expressly 
mention transactions at undervalue as well as those intended to defeat, hinder or delay credi-
tors. However, given the breadth of the Kenyan provision, as quoted above, it can be in-
ferred that it encompasses a variety of transactions. However, the Insolvency Guide pro-
poses that the law should specify the particular characteristics of the transactions to be 
avoided either as ‘fraudulent’ or ‘preferential’,121 a specification which is presently lacking. 
Transactions avoidance provisions must help to ensure that the scheme of assets distribution 
applicable to insolvency is observed and that contractual certainty is not undermined un-
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duly.
122
 The timing of a transaction is a crucial aspect in the avoidance provisions and juris-
dictions like the UK have specified the time period within which a transaction must have 
taken place, as already mentioned above, as well as requiring evidence of a diminution in 
assets available to creditors, among other conditions to be met to avoid a transaction.
123
 This 
aspect is missing in the Kenyan provision. Nonetheless, the law in Kenya permits that the 
person preferred shall be subject to the same liabilities, and shall have the same rights, as if 
he had undertaken to be personally liable as surety for the debt to the extent of the mortgage 
or charge on the property or the value of his interest, whichever is the least.
124
 
 
In addition, the UNCITRAL provision proposes that the design of avoidance provisions re-
quires a balance to be reached between competing social benefits. In essence, in respect of 
actions to restore assets to the insolvency estate, legislatures should consider issues like 
whether the transaction will be beneficial to the estate and whether the taking of an avoid-
ance action may disrupt reorganization proposals, and account should be taken of the likely 
cost of avoidance proceedings to the estate.
125
 The law should also provide avenues to miti-
gate the negative effects of avoidance, such that some transactions may not be avoided if 
certain conditions are satisfied, for example where the beneficiary acted in good faith or 
where the transaction was entered into for the purpose of carrying on the debtor’s business. 
In this latter instance, evidence of reasonable grounds for the belief that the transaction 
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would benefit the debtor’s business would be required.126 However, the Kenyan avoidance 
provision does not give any details as to how the balance of the competing interest is struck. 
3.4.3. Striking a balance between liquidation and reorganization 
Companies and other business entities are undoubtedly the vehicles for commercial devel-
opment. Their existence and vitality is therefore a very basic need to any economy. In a so-
ciety and at times when the use of credit to fund businesses has become a norm, more 
mechanisms are required to support businesses. Therefore, an environment that has adequate 
relevant legislation is a fundamental. In addition, such legislation ought to be in stride with 
the expectations and challenges facing business. It must equally be appreciated that the im-
pact of business failure goes far and wide. The worry and the misery that is caused by col-
lapsed entities was best captured by Kariuki’s expression,  
 ‘……Seeing the company going down it’s like when your daughter has been taken to 
 hospital and admitted in ICU, and you are just there waiting. The effects on me were 
 very painful. I went into depression.’127 
Sadly, Kenyan corporate history is littered with companies that have gone into receivership 
but only handfuls have successfully emerged from it. In fact, those few that emerged, had 
either political muscle or certain rules were overlooked to enable them operate again.
128
 For 
instance, the revival of Uchumi Supermarkets under a state rescue package, and that of In-
vesco Assurance Company through the injection of capital by Matatu Owners Association 
are good evidence. To detail this, Invesco Assurance Company
129
 is an insurance company 
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formed in 1998 and which achieved great success in its operations until 2005, when it 
started experiencing financial problems. A care taker board was appointed to probe its ac-
tivities. However, it was not until 2008 when it was placed under statutory management, 
which lasted up to 2010, that it was licenced to operate again. In addition, Uchumi Super-
markets
130
 went into receivership in 2006 and the issues acknowledged as having contrib-
uted to its fall were mismanagement, political interference, and competition. However, the 
supermarket was able to recover as well. The happenings in these few successful cases could 
be a very helpful platform from which to progress the Kenyan insolvency structure but the 
details of what transpired remain a guarded secret. 
Nevertheless, the available information in respect of such successful rescues as well as many 
written off entities indicates that there is much to desire as to whether the insolvency law 
strikes a balance between liquidation and reorganization. On the surface, the stipulated pro-
visions do not anticipate financial distress, due to temporary extraneous factors over which a 
company has no control. In addition, the insolvency legislation does not contain a corporate 
rescue mechanism that can be used to save ailing but viable companies. It is notable that 
provisions for Prosecution of delinquent officers and members of a company are en-
trenched.
131
 This is commendable as such provisions have a vital role in an insolvency sce-
nario especially in dealing with insolvent trading. However, it must be appreciated that busi-
ness failure is not always the fault of management and could be as a result of market dynam-
ics, for example a product losing value because of a new discovery by a competitor.
132
 Such 
realities require a law that facilitates rescue, whenever the business is viable and liquidation 
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when it is not. Unfortunately the law in Kenya fails to achieve this, considering that there is 
evidence that almost all companies which enter into receivership are being liquidated.
133
 It is 
argued therefore that current Kenyan insolvency laws have a liquidation culture, giving 
creditors the leeway to liquidate companies that could be saved by proper management. 
However, as noted, the current legislation is not completely devoid of provisions that may 
facilitate rescues, as those relevant to receivership  have been used as form of corporate res-
cue although the depth and details of how such has been done remain scanty and purpose 
built rescue procedures are lacking.  
Rescued entities are very rare in contrast to the many businesses which have been liquidated. 
This reality arguably indicates that the laws fail to achieve an appropriate balance between 
restructuring and liquidation. The deficiencies and the strengths of the law are ultimately 
reflected by the attempted rescues and liquidation operations. It is important to state that, 
whereas it is acknowledged that not all businesses are worth rescuing, businesses facing fac-
tors such as bad management choices or temporary financial strain may still be capable of 
being turned around. For instance in Kenya between 1990 and 2002, interest rates rose to 
levels which many businesses could not afford. Such businesses experienced financial dis-
tress, a typical example of temporary problems.
134
 Therefore, keeping viable businesses op-
erating should be one of the important goals of an insolvency system.
135
 In fact, keeping vi-
able businesses alive may be the most efficient outcome as the creditors get a chance to re-
cover a larger part of their credit, more employees keep their jobs and the economy is 
boosted. However, liquidation, whenever a business has little left to be redeemed, should be 
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facilitated by the law, despite it being a dreaded outcome any business man would wish to 
avoid. It is essential that the law ensures that the proper functioning of insolvency law en-
hances maximizing the collective return to the creditors.
136
 
Besides the formal procedures that many jurisdictions use in insolvency, there are informal 
options that contribute to solving business problems and are not regulated by the insolvency 
law and will generally involve voluntary negotiations between the debtor and some or all of 
its creditors. The importance of these procedures is acknowledged in the UNCITRAL Legis-
lative Guide on Insolvency Law.
137
 The IMF in its study of insolvency and debtor protection 
regimes has also acknowledged the importance that informal structuring mechanisms play in 
a holistic approach towards corporate insolvency.
138
 This implies that, informal restructuring 
cannot be ignored in its contribution to corporate rescue. In Kenya, there are no well-
developed informal approaches to corporate insolvency, as detailed in chapter 4.5 of this 
thesis. In essence, stakeholders are obliged to use existing structures, even if they are inef-
fective and unsuited to ensuring a company rescue. This can be contrasted to the English 
system that is diverse in having a number of rescue processes and gateways (formal and in-
formal).
139
 Such procedures, in particular the informal, would give companies a flexible op-
portunity to attempt to resolve their troubles outside the rigid, lengthy and even time-
consuming formal approaches. 
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 Furthermore, the ease with which a winding up petition can be issued in Kenya and the lack 
of moratorium in receivership are detrimental as this implies that even business entities that 
are viable and which can be restructured are not given a chance of survival. In addition, the 
stipulated insolvency test of failing to pay a debt requires only a small sum of one thousand 
shillings to be unpaid and this worsens the situation.
140
 As a result, creditors who are entitled 
to exercise their authority in light of a lack of alternatives can abuse their authority and en-
gage companies in endless legal battles. As already mentioned, the Company Act of 1962 
contains fairly detailed provisions on winding up a company and even though there are pro-
visions to challenge winding up petitions in court in section 223 of the same legislation, they 
are affected by a lack of coherence in the rules dictating the procedures that are to be fol-
lowed. In view of these weaknesses, Kenya can be said to be out of touch with modern 
trends without a rescue culture. Whereas it is important to appreciate the need to safeguard 
creditors’ interests, winding up, particularly of public companies, tends to yield more dire 
economic repercussions for the country in terms of employment, lost business opportunities 
and loss of the initial investment in setting up the business. 
3.4.4 Ensuring equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors 
The extent to which creditors are susceptible to serious harm in their debtor’s insolvency is 
only one of numerous important considerations in determining their proper ranking in corpo-
rate liquidation. It is important and necessary that the law is clear on how the claims are to 
be treated and which claims deserve to be favoured without causing ambiguity. This clarity 
and predictability is what every investor, both local and foreign, desires to see and every 
credit lender wants to understand. It must also be appreciated that, in as much as the law at-
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tempts to address legal problems, there is also a market dynamic that seeks to stretch the 
law. Nonetheless, insolvency laws all over the world entrench exceptions to most legal prin-
ciples. For instance the rules such as pari-passu and insolvency set-off amongst other.  
To start with, pari- passu is often said to be the fundamental rule in corporate insolvency 
law. It holds that in winding up, unsecured creditors shall share rateably in those assets of 
the insolvent company available for distribution.
141
 Basically, it is a distributive principle 
that expresses collective justice, designated in ensuring fairness and gives legitimacy to the 
mandatory insolvency regime.
142
 In addition, insolvency set off is where the law provides 
for the taking of an account of what is due from each of the insolvent company and its credi-
tor to the other, for the setting off of those sums against each other and the payment only of 
the net balance.
143
 In essence, if it is provable in the favour of the company, it is payable to 
the liquidator and if in favour of the creditor, the liquidator pays it on behalf of the company. 
English laws provides for insolvency set-offs in Insolvency Rules.
144
 In principle, English 
insolvency set-off is automatic and mandatory upon insolvency of one counterpart in a mu-
tual creditor/debtor relationship.
145
 Such rules play certain roles in insolvency and in fact, 
English insolvency set-off has been recognized as one of the most important protection of-
fered by English law in relation to commercial and financial activity.
146
 However, critics of 
insolvency set-off  insolvency argues that such arrangements creates for the  unsecured 
creditor a position comparable to that of secured creditors without the need for a  charge 
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over assets, because it guarantees that his claim, up to the value of his debt to the insolvent, 
is paid in full.
147
 
Nonetheless, these two aforementioned insolvency principles arguably allow preference. In 
reality certain attempts to gain preference are undesirable, because they undermine the bene-
fits associated with collective decision-making. However, structured preference permitted 
through clear legal framework are beneficial and both the insolvency set-off and parri-passu 
are good examples. For instance, insolvency set-off is deliberately intended to do substantial 
justice between the parties; its application is not limited to particular categories of claim, but 
rather applies to all cross claims provided they are mutual and measurable in money 
terms.
148
 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in so far as creditor conflict is concerned, suggests that 
the role, rights, and governance of creditors in proceedings should be clearly defined and, 
where a committee is established, its duties and functions, and the rules for the committee’s 
membership, quorum and voting, and the conduct of meetings should all be specified by the 
law.
149
 In addition, there is evidence from literature, that affirms that to be able to treat 
creditors equitably, it is first necessary to categorize them into groups and the most recog-
nized groups are, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, preferential debts and liquidation 
expenses.
150
 It is noted that the Kenyan legislation does not refer to the creditors in the spe-
cific terms of the aforementioned categorization but they all exist in different sections of the 
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statute with different names. In fact, they are grouped into more less those recognized gen-
eral categories. 
In addition, in most reputable insolvency processes around the globe, the achievement of an 
equitable treatment of creditors has been dealt with using a fundamental rule called pari 
passu as a foremost principle.
151
 In essence, the unsecured creditors’ claims are satisfied pro 
rota to the extent of their pre-insolvency entitlements or the sums they are owed. The pro-
ponents of this principle argue that it often constitutes a fundamental rule of corporate insol-
vency law, as a way of collective dealing with unsecured creditors as a class, and enhances 
efficiency in so far as avoiding the time and cost of dealing with each claim on individual 
merit is concerned.
152
 Goode supports the pari passu principle but notes that ‘the principle 
has been gravely diminished, first by the extensive range of security rights and analogous 
devices that have evolved over the years, and, secondly by a massive expansion of the range 
of debts made preferential by statute.’153 Besides, the Cork report in the UK, while acknowl-
edging the exceptions to this principle, reiterated its fundamental importance to an orderly 
and fair liquidation of an insolvent business.
154
 And accordingly, the committee proposed 
the following: 
 ‘ ….principle of pari passu distribution of the insolvent’s estate should  continue 
 to form a cornerstone of any new insolvency legislation……..We accept that no one 
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 should be able to contract out of insolvency law, and pari passu distribution in partic
 ular.’ 155 
However, other scholars like Mokal disagree and argue that the principle is less important 
than it is sometimes made out to be and it does not fulfil often any attributed function.
156
 
Nonetheless he acknowledges that the principle represents formal equality in insolvency law 
and seeks to be informative on how insolvency law decides on the treatment of different 
types of creditors.
157
 Elsewhere, it has been submitted that it would be a serious misconcep-
tion to suppose that the pari passu principle operates in a comprehensive way because the 
pari passu principle is applied sequentially in relation to certain, discrete groups of claims, 
ranked into categories according to a fixed system of priorities.
158
 
Nonetheless, regardless of which side of the debate one subscribes to, it is appreciated that 
the pari passu principle cannot easily be overlooked. The entrenchment of the principle in 
Kenyan merits applauding as an effort to ensure that creditors are treated equitably. This 
provides a glimpse to investors as to what to anticipate should they find the debtor in the 
winding up procedure. However, because there are other dynamics that are significant in any 
insolvency process, there are exceptions to this rule, which are also recognized in the statute. 
A good example is the treatment of preferential creditors, which are more favoured than 
other creditors. The list of the preferential payments such as taxes and local rates due, gov-
ernment rents and wages and salary are specified in Section 311 of the Companies Act. Such 
claims are ranked ahead of general claims, such that all preferential debts must be dis-
charged in full before general unsecured creditors are paid anything.  
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3.4.5. Provision for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency 
The success of a rescue procedure and survival of business depends on when the rescue 
process is started. Equally the maximization of value realized in a liquidation process de-
pends on when the necessary measures are taken. A rescue process that could be initiated 
without the requirement of a company being insolvent may potentially be initiated earlier 
during the distress cycle when the rescue prospects are more likely to be successful.
159
 On 
the other hand, a company should be protected from being forced into an insolvency proce-
dure in inappropriate circumstances. This was demonstrated clearly in the case of High 
berry Ltd and another v Colt Telecom Group Plc
160
 where a creditor, keen to put a company 
into administration, filed a petition when the company was cash flow solvent and balance 
sheet solvent in order to achieve a selfish interest. The particular creditor wanted to effect a 
debt for equity exchange hence gaining full value from the notes they had purchased. Rely-
ing on a fall of the company share price over the preceding year, they argued that the com-
pany would be unable to repay a substantial amount of capital which was to be due four 
years later, as it was unclear how the company would be able to generate enough cash. The 
judge, on rejecting the petition, described the petition as having no substance and considered 
the allegation of insolvency as a serious matter that requires serious foundation. 
In Kenya, the receivership procedure can be started through a court application by the credi-
tors or just by a debenture holder through the powers contained in an instrument.
161
 It is 
however unclear what key reasons or circumstances have to be there before the process is 
triggered. Interestingly, the legislation states that the company which is being wound up 
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(section 347) can have a receiver appointed if an application is made by the debenture holder 
or any other creditor. In practice, an application tends to be made when the company is un-
able to pay its debts. It is argued that the unclear triggering factors present a risk that the re-
ceivership process could be started too early and it is equally probable that it may in some 
cases come rather too late. It has been documented that the key to enhancing the success rate 
of reorganization is to encourage the directors to recognize the problem early and take ap-
propriate actions.
162
 This is however made possible only if the legislation has the right in-
centives for the company to easily access the use of reorganization alternatives. 
For instance, in other jurisdictions a policy of ‘debtor in possession’ has been embraced as a 
way of encouraging a company to invoke the reorganization procedures when there are signs 
of financial distress, rather than waiting until the problems are advanced and possibly irre-
versible.
163
 A typical example is the US which has a policy of debtor in possession to go 
hand in hand with encouraging a company to invoke the Chapter 11 reorganization proce-
dure early.
164
 The rationale behind DIP is that, the possibility to remain in managerial con-
trol encourages the directors that Chapter 11 protection will safeguard their position, as well 
as providing them with the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan.
165
 Managers 
who believe that their jobs will be preserved in a Chapter 11 context will be more likely to 
put their company into Chapter 11 at an early stage while the company may still be viable. It 
may benefit the company that those most acquainted with the company will continue han-
dling it. As a side note it must be added that there has been evidence from the literature that 
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the position in practice is different. In fact, it been stated that ‘the Chapter 11 of the 1980s’, 
where the directors and managers seemed to dominate bankruptcy no longer exists and in-
stead a new approach has taken over where the creditors have converted existing contractual 
tools into important governance levers.
166
  Therefore, the extent to which Chapter 11 is DIP 
in practice is debatable. 
In contrast to Chapter 11, the relevant statute in Kenya does not have any incentives or pro-
visions that can enable the company to start a rescue process early, which is arguably detri-
mental to businesses. This means therefore that a business will continue to keep running 
without addressing visible problems which could be ameliorated to enhance long time bene-
fits so that it ultimately becomes insolvent. Besides, the management is not allowed to stay 
in place once such proceedings are started. The question of who remains in control inevita-
bly influences the early filing of rescue procedures. In addition, business failure is perceived 
negatively and liquidators/receivers are empowered with the consent of the attorney general 
to investigate the actions of directors. It may be noted that risk averse management may be-
come less motivated to work hard under a strictly enforcing regime which not only removes 
them from office upon business distress but also severely penalizes them as a bonus if they 
are later found to have effectively resigned too late.
167
 But it must be noted that the DIP, just 
like the PIP model, has its own strengths and limitations and both models are developed and 
influenced by existing risk attitudes and market dynamics. The diversity of management ori-
entation, as reflected by the two, shows the complex, multifaceted nature of the insolvency 
process in which conflicting interest are adjusted.
168
 In this regard, policy makers may have 
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to employ a unique approach that can coax and not threaten the managers so as to take ac-
tion early but still be able to change the management if its enhances better results. 
The receivership procedure is essentially an appointment of the official receiver (displacing 
the company directors) in one of the following ways. The first is through a court order, when 
an application is made to the court to appoint a receiver on behalf of the debenture holder or 
the other creditors of a company being wound up.
169
 This court appointed receiver is an offi-
cer/agent of the court. Second is the out of court appointment where they are appointed 
through the powers contained in the company instruments.
170
 The effects of the receiver’s 
appointment are twofold: any floating charges ‘crystallize’ and the director’s powers to con-
trol the company are suspended as the receiver takes over management functions and the 
company directors’ powers to deal with assets of that company are suspended and taken 
over by the receiver.
171
 When appointing the receiver, the debenture holder is entitled to pre-
fer his own interests to those of a company and so his position is adverse to that of the com-
pany.
172
 Besides, the receivers’ first power relates to the possession and realization of the 
security and in this role he is deemed as an agent of the debenture holder.
173
 This raises the 
concern whether a receivership procedure can be efficient, given that it is likely to fail to 
maximize the value for all creditors. Undoubtedly, there will always be a divergence be-
tween the interest of the appointing debenture holder, to whom the receiver owes principal 
duties, and the general unsecured creditors.
174
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The availability of an out of court means of appointment of the official receiver gives re-
ceivership a merit of flexibility. A debenture holder in the course of the lending relationship 
acquires information about the company’s financial standing. With the benefit of this privi-
leged position, receivership gives them a principal advantage to act on the information with-
out interference from other less informed creditors. This opportunity, if used appropriately 
with a conscious commitment to rescue the company, can actually enhance the benefit of 
having had early resort to the rescue mechanism. The pitfall however is that, where the 
company’s assets are worth more than the bank is owed, nothing obliges the bank to do any-
thing to save the business.
175
 In addition, the legislation is silent as to whether the company 
can object to the appointment of a receiver but there is evidence from the judicial decisions 
that a borrower can move to court seeking an injunction restraining the receiver from taking 
over the company affairs. This is however at the considerable discretion of the court.  
In, fact, for a long time the position in Kenya was that the Courts would not generally inter-
fere with the appointment of a receiver. This was explained in the Madhupaper Interna-
tional case,
176
 where the directors brought a suit to challenge the appointment of receivers. 
They pleaded that the receivership would gravely prejudice the company’s investment in its 
Thika Plant. The trial judge decided the balance of convenience as favouring the appointing 
creditor. The Court of Appeal after conceding that the terms of the debenture were draconian 
affirmed the decision in the following words: 
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‘It is correct law that a debenture holder which has a right to appoint a receiver is 
under no duty to refrain for exercising its rights because doing so  might cause loss 
to the company or its unsecured creditors.’177 
Notwithstanding the view expressed above, the appointment of a receiver has been subject 
to considerable judicial scrutiny in recent times. The debenture holder’s privilege to appoint 
a receiver has weakened. This was reflected in the Fina Bank case,
178
 where the Court com-
pelled the receivers to vacate the borrower’s premises and stated that, where a party exer-
cises a statutory right ‘oppressively’ the Court would have a right to interfere. Justice Tunoi 
in this case seemed to consider the wider impact and stated as follows: 
‘The issue of receivership is an emotive one and I understand why the respondent 
had to resort to litigation. It destroys the business. It is expensive.’ 
Much as the decision given was a good precedent, it failed to lay down any objective guide-
lines as to what amounts to oppression.  
In addition, the Jambo Biscuits case
179
 shows how the appointment of receivers can be chal-
lenged. Justice Ringera, in upholding an application to restrain receivers in a number of 
rather technical grounds, stated that: 
`‘I find that the company has made out a prima facie case with a probability of suc-
cess at the trial that the appointment of the receivers/managers was illegal and inva-
lid...’  
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The technical grounds expressed were that the debenture was not drawn up strictly in accor-
dance with provisions of the Advocates Act Cap 16 and that the letter of the appointment of 
the receiver was ineffective for lack of attestation. It is rather obvious from the above cases 
that impartiality enhances creditors’ confidence that the insolvency process will be fair. 
However, the preferential treatment given to the debenture holder over other creditors to ap-
point the receiver has led to receivership being manipulated to serve interest of a few. It is 
argued therefore that the law has made it difficult for companies placed under receivership 
to return back to profitability with appointed managers acting more like undertakers rather 
than managers keen to revive the ailing companies. This sentiment was best captured in 
Jambo Biscuits v Barclays Bank (2002), where Justice Ringera, at his analytical best, stated 
that: 
‘I think it is notorious facts of which judicial notice may be taken that receiverships 
in this country have tended to give the kiss of death to many a business.’180 
In addition, according to Standard Investment Bank (SIB), receivership law provides leeway 
to entities owed money and whose chief concern is recovery of their debt, to appoint re-
ceiver managers who more than often have overstepped their mandate when executing court 
orders leading to eventual collapse of companies that could have been saved by proper man-
agement.
181
 It must be noted that similar sentiments were expressed in relation to the English 
administrative receivership procedure which Kenya inherited. Administrative receivership 
was widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of power to creditors holding floating 
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charges, which, because of their secured status, lacked sufficient incentives to rescue failing 
companies.
182
 
It must also be noted that receivership presently lacks moratorium, a very significant feature 
of many rescue processes and whose importance is acknowledged in jurisdictions with suc-
cessful rescue ventures. This means that the creditors can still engage in the chaotic race to 
protect their interests despite the company going into an insolvency procedure, giving rise to 
inefficiencies and unfairness and even making the receiver’s work difficult. In view of these 
weaknesses it must be observed that Kenya’s rescue culture is at a stage of development that 
lags behind those of recognized and successful approaches in other jurisdictions. In the 
United States for example the automatic stay on creditor enforcement action is an intrinsic 
feature of Chapter 11. The purpose of the stay is to give the company a breathing space to 
allow survival prospects to be assessed and a restructuring plan to be put in place. English 
law has two types of moratoria-a moratorium for the period that the company is in admini-
stration and, prior to that, an interim moratorium pending the disposal of an administration 
order application or the coming of an out of court appointment of an administrator in the pe-
riod following the giving of notice of an intention to make such an appointment.
183
 The 
moratorium during administration is intended to provide a breathing space and allow a com-
pany an opportunity to negotiate with its creditors.  The interim moratorium protects the 
company during the appointment process, a time when it is vulnerable to hasty action by 
creditors. 
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An efficient law should provide an appropriate structure for the supervision of an insolvency 
process by professionals, such as receivers, statutory managers and liquidators. Besides, it 
has long been acknowledged globally that insolvency practitioners play a key role in the 
management of insolvencies. However, jurisdictions vary in their approaches to insolvency 
procedures and equally to their practitioners. In fact, some jurisdictions have heavily regu-
lated professionals while in others their practitioners’ skills are unregulated and lightly su-
pervised. The Kenyan statute does not contain any professional or other qualification re-
quirements that must be met for a person to be appointed as receiver. In practice, account-
ants generally handle insolvency matters. This can be contrasted with the regime in the UK, 
where there is a requirement that an insolvency practitioner must either be a member of a 
recognized professional body or obtain authorization to act under section 393.
184
 Accord-
ingly, the liquidators and administrators in the UK are both officers of the court and licenced 
insolvency practitioners who are subject to an intense and severe regulatory system.
185
 Inter-
estingly, the most the Kenyan legislation does is to stipulate the ineligibility of a body cor-
porate
186
 and an un-discharged bankrupt
187
 from being appointed. The legal position of a 
receiver or manager is dependent on the manner in which the appointment is made. If the 
receiver is appointed by the court, then the receiver is an officer of the court and is not 
deemed to be an officer of the company. In such a case the receiver is bound by the direc-
tions and instructions of the court.
188
 Where the receiver is appointed out of court he or she 
is regarded as an agent and officer of the company and must act in accordance with the 
terms of the instrument on the basis of which he or she has been appointed, in addition he 
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may apply to court for directions in connection to the performance of his functions.
189
 In 
practice, official receivers and liquidators are normally accountants. 
In addition, it must also be noted that the legislation has no mechanism in terms of which the 
receivers can be held accountable for the estates that they administer. Besides, there is even 
no manner in which to gauge how much work has been conducted by the insolvency admin-
istrator, or whether the administration has been conducted efficiently. This, coupled with the 
lack of a clear time frame on when and how an insolvency procedure should unfold, is not 
only detrimental to a rescue venture but also increases the cost because it can run on for too 
long. In contrast, other jurisdictions like the UK have legislative controls which entail a re-
quirement that insolvency practitioners holding a licence must have in place security for the 
proper performance of their functions.
190
 The security takes the form of a bond issued by a 
surety that covers a liability of £250,000 pounds for an enabling bond and a further £5000 of 
specific penalty. In addition insolvency practitioners are required by the IPA Professional 
Indemnity Insurance (PII) Regulations to have PII cover; and by the statutory Insolvency 
Practitioners Regulations to have a general penalty bond for £250,000, together with specific 
penalty bonds in relation to individual insolvencies to which he/she is appointed.
191
 How-
ever to have professional indemnity insurance is not unique to insolvency practitioners as 
many profession require the same as part of their respective industry body’s regulatory re-
quirements. 
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On the remuneration of receiver managers and liquidators, the Kenyan court may, on an ap-
plication by the liquidator/receiver fix the amount to be paid.
192
 There is however no obliga-
tion to make such an application, leaving room for speculation and uncertainties as to what 
will happen should they not apply to court. Such loopholes give room for exploitation of the 
insolvency process which should be a safety net for both the creditors and the debtor.  It is 
noteworthy, that the current insolvency law, in many aspects, stipulates the involvement of 
the court through the insolvency procedure. This, when adequately and efficiently used, can 
provide a good supervisory structure. There is however a general perception that Kenyan 
court is not impartial and hence is not to be trusted to expedite the insolvency process.
193
 
Besides, the courts always have a backlog of cases, resulting in cases taking too long to be 
decided and, when they are decided, this is too late for any meaningful recovery to take 
place.
194
 
3.4.6. Preserve the insolvency estate to allow equitable distribution to creditors 
 
A fundamental objective of collective insolvency regimes is to preserve the value of the in-
solvent estate and ensure that this value is then distributed in harmony with the appropriate 
and efficient statutory procedure.
195
 In fact the UNCITRAL legislative guide states that the 
preservation of the estate involves prevention of premature dismemberment of the debtor’s 
assets by individual creditor actions to collect individual debts and a stay on creditors’ ac-
tion. Despite it being one of the key tasks of an insolvency procedure, there are different 
reasons that can be attributed to the inability of a regime to preserve effectively the insol-
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vency estate, which will be discussed here. Liquidation, being a collective process, requires 
cooperation amongst creditors achieved through the law. Therefore, individualistic enforce-
ment of action by creditors, a move contrary to the collective approach, dismembers the cor-
porate estate and thus destroys value. Basically, the provisions that allow for a stay on en-
forcement actions by creditors are vital as they ensure that the estate is preserved. 
The law is clear, as contained in Section 316, that, in a winding up by the court, any disposi-
tion of the property of the company, including things in action, and any transfer of shares, or 
alteration in the status of the members of the company, made after the commencement of the 
winding up, shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be void. This is supported by Section 
228 which equally stays actions once a winding up order has been issued.  
Automatic stay is a common practice in many jurisdictions. In Australia for example, the 
appointment of the administrator under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act automatically 
commences stay on creditors’ claims subject to certain exceptions.196 The actions for 
recovery of property in the possession of the insolvent company are stayed, together with 
other litigation but the fact remains that notices of termination can be given under the 
company’s contracts with third parties. The debtor company in Australia is not divested of 
the property upon entering insolvency and the debtor will therefore retain the capacity to 
perform legal acts and so liquidators or administrators can act on behalf of the company as 
agents.
197
 There is an expectation that the liquidators will do everything in their power to 
collect any disposed assets of the company using the various powers for recovering debts.
198
 
It is argued that this approach might prove costly as the liquidators’ pursuit to recover assets 
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will inevitably entail a lot of litigation and the cost will be on the debtor and this require-
ment is inconsistent with the idea of preservation. Besides, the aforementioned exception 
allowing termination of contracts due to insolvency negates the benefits of automatic stay. It 
has been documented that the absence of an automatic stay deters usage of bankruptcy.
199
 
Some jurisdictions, for instance the UK, in addition to disabling certain types of dealing 
with the company, also empower the liquidator/receivers with investigation and re-curative 
tools.
200
 In Kenya, similar powers of liquidators are detailed in Section 241 of the Com-
pany’s act Cap 486 but subject to the control of the court, as stated in the subsequent provi-
sion. The importance of such empowerment was seen in the case of Adrian Spencer Dearing 
& Another v James Abiam Isabirye Mugoya
201
 where the receivers had to apply to court re-
questing that the respondent be compelled to submit and verify the statement of company 
affairs. In addition he was instructed to attend to the application given by receiver managers, 
to give a precise and concise account of all missing plant and machinery of the company, 
amongst other prayers. 
The learned judge, while granting the receiver’s prayers, acknowledged that the applicants 
were discharging their statutory duties under the Companies Act and that the duties were not 
incompatible with seeking prohibitory and mandatory orders, as long as the orders sought 
were limited to facilitating their statutory commands. As such, an insolvency practitioner 
cannot be effective without support of a court whenever their functions are challenged, as 
they were in the above case. Undoubtedly, the court plays a vital role. However, an ambigu-
ity that needs to be noted when it comes to prosecution of delinquent officers and members 
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of company in criminal liabilities (section 325(1)), the liquidator needs the consent of the 
Attorney General, or he must report to the Attorney General, who will take the necessary 
action. It is unclear what purpose this requirement serves and its inclusion in the provisions 
is wanting. Besides, the establishment of the office of the Director of Public Prosecution in 
article 57 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 makes this requirement obsolete. It is submitted 
that the involvement of the Attorney General is an unnecessary hurdle to the effective func-
tioning of a liquidator. It limits the powers of the liquidator and even delays or prolongs the 
investigation. The court already plays a considerable supervisory role in as far as the powers 
and functions of the liquidators are concerned, which it is submitted provide a sufficient 
check and balance. 
Another, key weakness of the Kenyan liquidation process is that most of its provisions con-
sistently mention voluntary winding up.
202
 The detriment of this is that many companies that 
are being wound up in reality are insolvent companies that are in crisis, contrary to what the 
statute anticipates. There is a gap between the needs that the legislation addresses and prob-
lems that need legal attention. However, the availability of an option to manage the com-
pany while in liquidation, where necessary or the room to engage in a receivership process is 
in itself a provision that allows for preservation, if properly used. It is submitted that an effi-
cient restructuring procedure in itself is preservation as this gives room for a business to be, 
at the least, preserved as a going concern whenever possible. The lack of such provision in 
Kenya’s laws has already been emphasized. Lastly, the provision that stipulates how the 
creditors and their rights are treated ensures that there is an equitable distribution of assets. 
Under section 311 of the Companies Act Cap 486, the respective rights of secured and unse-
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cured creditors, and as to debts provable, and to the valuation of annuities and future and 
contingent liabilities, as are all recognized and are to be treated under the law of bankruptcy. 
The ability of a Kenyan liquidation system to perform any of the functions necessary for 
preservation of the insolvency estate, as it stands now, is dependent on the support of a 
sound judicial system. This is because the entire insolvency process has an extensive in-
volvement of the court system, which has numerous merits. The greatest challenge is when 
the judiciary lacks efficiency or has lost the confidence of the general public and investors 
alike; it becomes a problem. Unfortunately, the Kenya judiciary is burdened with a loss of 
public confidence and trust, due to rampant corruption, inefficiency and incompetence.
203
 In 
addition, it struggles with a backlog of cases, causing delays. With such a negative image, 
there is little expected in as far as supporting the insolvency processes and boosting inves-
tors’ confidence is concerned. It is notable that a great number of reforms have been initi-
ated in the Judiciary since the Constitution of Kenya 2010 came into force. However, the 
evidence available so far demonstrates that the public still has mixed views of and degrees 
of confidence in the Kenyan Judiciary.
204
 
3.4.7. Ensure a transparent and predictable insolvency law that contains incentives for 
gathering and dispensing information 
 
The legislation provides room for the gathering of information in so far as both liquidation 
and receivership are concerned. In fact, the reports submitted to the liquidator and receiver 
have the input of the officers of the company, as well as anyone in the employment of the 
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company wishing to give an opinion, and even creditors, by petition to the court.
205
 All these 
persons are sources for official receivers to gather relevant information. The receiver’s first 
duty, just like that of a liquidator, is often to do a preliminary assessment of the company’s 
financial position using the statement of affairs submitted to him. It is expected that within 
two months from the day that he received the statement, he will forward the statement to the 
court, registrar and the creditors  together with his comments, if he so wishes to comment.
206
 
At this point, the receiver will not yet have taken any managerial duties but once he has 
made his decision on the best option that can be pursued, he is empowered to apply to court 
on performance of his functions.
207
 The statute does not explicitly direct the receiver on his 
next move but there is an implied power that, through this application, he may either request 
to manage the company, if he finds the business viable, or recommend it be liquidated. 
The precise duties assigned to the liquidator, as well as the time stipulation, foster transpar-
ency as well as predictability. These will not only serve the interest of the creditors engaged 
in an insolvency procedure but they will also ensure that the local and foreign investors who 
are keen on investing can easily understand what to anticipate should they need to resort to 
such procedure. The statute gives no further details on what actually is anticipated in the re-
ceivership process. This implies that even the holding of a creditors’ meeting need not nec-
essarily happen. Besides, there is no time limitation on the formulation of the rescue strat-
egy, which raises concern as to whether receivership provides an acceptable level of trans-
parency and accountability to all those interested in the company affairs. 
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Much of what the statute stipulates by way of financial transparency arises through the re-
port that the receiver must submit within every twelve months, or such longer period as the 
court may allow after the expiration of the period of twelve months from the date of his ap-
pointment, to the registrar, trustee of the debenture holders and the company.
208
 This should 
detail the financial transactions that have been undertaken during that period. However, the 
receiver appointed under the powers contained in an instrument must submit the financial 
reports every six months.
209
 In both instances, there is lack of accountability to the creditors 
as a whole, supporting the view that the receivership is a procedure beneficial only to deben-
ture holders. Besides such lapses in communication with creditors can prompt other credi-
tors to apply to court for liquidation order which, if granted will undermine the rescue ef-
forts. 
Once appointed, a receiver must notify the company of his appointment.
210
 This is necessary 
where the receivership is initiated without court orders. Upon the receipt of this notice, the 
company has to prepare and submit to the receiver a statement of affairs of the company 
verified by an affidavit, within 14 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the 
court.
211
 Equally, the other creditors will be notified of the appointment of the official re-
ceiver.
212
 The statement of affairs has to show the position as at the date of the receiver’s 
appointment, including the particulars of company assets, debts and liabilities, names, postal 
address and occupation of creditors, and the securities held by them respectively. 
In the liquidation process, a well-detailed provision on the effects of opening proceedings 
requires that, once the winding up order has been issued by the court, the liquidator shall not 
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only become an official receiver but shall summon a meeting with creditors and other con-
tributors of the company for the purposes of dispensation.
213
 He also has powers to do a 
number of things, including bringing legal proceedings, carrying on business as may be 
beneficial for winding up, and making compromises or arrangements with creditors, 
amongst other things.
214
 There is a requirement for both liquidators and receivers alike, to 
notify the company and trustees of their appointment, as well as sending a statement to the 
registrar. These are all avenues of disseminating information. In addition, the requirement in 
section 349 that every invoice, or order for goods shall contain a statement that a receiver 
has been appointed ensures that unsecured creditors are notified. In summary, the legislation 
facilitates continued and transparent communications with all the creditors. It is emphasized 
that this extensive dissemination of information is limited to the liquidation process. There is 
a requirement to hold a meeting with creditors in a liquidation procedure and also to ascer-
tain their wishes.
215
 The statute does not mention any creditors’ meeting in a receivership 
process. 
 
3.4.8 Recognize existing creditors’ rights and establish clear rules for ranking of 
priority claims. 
 
It must be appreciated that an essential feature of the security that the secured creditor en-
joys is a right to priority of payment from the sale of the collateral on enforcement.
216
 In es-
sence, it is important to do an investigation into the company’s details first to ascertain not 
only the financial standing of the business but also to establish all the rights and liabilities 
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necessary for repayment purposes. Unless this is done, it will be difficult to gain entitle-
ments that rank the claims in priority. The standard set by the UNCITRAL Insolvency Guide 
suggests more than the recognition and ranking of these claims by adding an aspect of pre-
dictability and consistent application of the rules, as well as ensuring that the claims are 
based upon commercial bargains.
217
 As a result, all the creditors and contributors meetings 
which are statutorily held are of benefit, as this will ensure that their wishes and rights are 
recognized. The law should appreciate that some rights, for example those of secured credi-
tors, confer entitlements, which relate respectively to priority of payment and to control of 
the collateral.
218
 This does not imply that they are exempted from procedural restrictions 
imposed by insolvency law.
219
 This is because the collective nature of insolvency proceed-
ings is meant to ensure that secured creditors do not opt out of the insolvency proceedings 
but instead participate in them without giving up the benefit of their security.
220
 Securities 
are necessary for reasons of cost effectiveness and in fact, some securities are very vital for 
continued trading in the business. 
Besides, a company has two main groups of creditors; secured and unsecured. In this aspect, 
the legislation must strive to recognize the existing rights of each category. Sections 309-
311 of the Companies Act detail the proof and ranking of claims and this is done without 
allowing unjust enrichments, as the law embodies provisions on voidable transactions.
221
 
However, there are loopholes within the legislation that a debenture holder, as a secured 
creditor, can use to the dismemberment of the debtor’s business. This is because the en-
forcement of such a security interest can involve the sale of all of the debtor’s assets, either 
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together as a going concern, or broken up on a piecemeal basis, as is appropriate. A similar 
approach is available in the UK for the holders of floating charges covering all, or substan-
tially all, of a debtor company’s assets, in an ‘administrative receivership’, although admin-
istrative receivership was virtually abolished under the Enterprise Act 2002.
222
 
A legislative recognition of the existing rights of the debenture holder; the right to appoint a 
receiver manager to proceed with enforcement of the debenture holder’s rights, has its own 
demerits.
223
 In fact, it undermines the interest of other creditors, recognized already in the 
same law. Because of such a problem, the English jurisdiction virtually abolished the admin-
istrative receivership procedure from 2003, and replaced it with an entitlement for a floating 
charge holder to initiate a more collective mechanism, administration.
224
 This reform has 
safeguarded the interests of all creditors through the appointment of an administrator run-
ning the case under a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of all creditors, with a requirement 
to refer his proposals to a vote of the unsecured creditors.
225
 Nevertheless, a receiver in the 
Kenyan context has a duty of managing the company’s business so as to enhance the realiza-
tion prospects
226
 but should the liquidation process be started while still in office, he may act 
as a liquidator and he is obliged to distribute the proceeds of realization to creditors in ac-
cordance with the priorities set by the law.
227
 In fact, the assets are distributed pari passu 
among the creditors according to their rights and interest in the company. There are also de-
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tails on how preferential payments are to be ranked in addition to clear provisions that show 
respect to the rights of secured creditors.
228
 Lastly, the costs, charges and expenses incurred 
in the winding up, including the remuneration of the liquidator, are payable out of the com-
pany’s assets in priority to all other unsecured claims. Virtually all existing creditors’ rights 
are recognized and the legislation categorically states, in section 311 of the Companies Act 
Cap 486 that, in an insolvent company, the same rules shall prevail and be observed with 
regard to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable. 
However, gauging the predictability and consistent application of aforementioned provision 
on creditors’ rights in practice is difficult.  
 
3.4.9 Establishment of a framework for cross-border insolvency. 
There is little literature on Kenya’s involvement in international insolvencies and evidence 
as to the implementation of measures that may assist business entities in any cross-border 
insolvencies is equally limited. Intrinsically, there are theories that attempt to explain these 
docile legislative and judicial situations in Africa in so far as insolvency and cross border 
insolvencies are concerned. One of the theories attributes the limited development of law to 
the inherent weaknesses of the process of transplantation of the relevant law.
229
 The other 
theory attributes the inactivity to the failure of economic forces to trigger sufficient local 
growth and economic activities as well as international commercial ventures that could gen-
erate the application of insolvency law.
230
 An additional theory attributes the under devel-
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opment of insolvency law to the radical institutionalized policies that came with political 
independence.
231
 These radical, socially inclined, policies frustrated foreign investment re-
sulting in a remarkable negative impact on the development, application and enforceability 
of insolvency law. It is submitted that each of the mentioned theories are feasible and all 
could have contributed in different measures. 
 However in the recent times, there has been an accelerated growth of foreign investment, 
trade, globalized production and distribution of goods and services. As a result, it is un-
avoidable that Kenya will be faced with more cross border insolvencies in the near future. 
Cross border insolvency may result from a company which has branches in more than one 
jurisdiction facing challenges in meeting the claims of its creditors. The crucial question 
then is how to address such a scenario, since the case crosses national borders and each terri-
tory has its own legal system. Inevitably, crucial aspects such as jurisdiction, choice of law, 
recognition and enforcement must be pondered.
232
 
The legislative provisions concerned with cross border insolvencies in Kenya are contained 
in the Kenya Companies Act.
233
 As far as the administration of cross border corporate insol-
vencies is concerned, there are a lot of gaps that the law fails to address. To start with, the 
only provision that could be linked with cross border insolvencies is section 359 which is 
concerned with the winding up of a foreign company by a Kenyan court when it ceases to 
carry on business in Kenya. However Kenya can refer to English provisions, as explained in 
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the early part of this chapter
234
 which implies that Kenya is still largely reliant on the Eng-
lish common law in dealing with its cross border insolvencies. Unfortunately, the extent and 
manner in which the relevant common law will be invoked remains uncertain and unpredict-
able.
235
 Besides, there is little that has happened regarding cross-border insolvency proceed-
ings in Kenya, denying the courts a chance to expound on this. 
 
3.5 THE ON-GOING REFORMS AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPLICATION 
 
A well-balanced insolvency system that distinguishes companies that are financially dis-
tressed but economically viable from inefficient companies that should be liquidated has 
been very elusive for the reasons already discussed. However, as at the time when this re-
search was in progress, the Kenyan legislature has had a number of Insolvency Bills drafted 
and published. To detail it, there has been Insolvency Bill 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
lastly 2015 is currently at a second reading stage in parliament. Arguably the drafting of an 
independent legislation concerned with insolvency issues is a good start.  
 Generally, these Insolvency Bills have advanced in many respects though the several drafts 
but for purposes of the discussion the Insolvency Bill 2015 is referred to. The persistent ef-
forts to reform the insolvency regime are a demonstration of the keen desires for change, as 
well a testament of the inadequacies of the current corporate insolvency framework, as em-
bodied in Companies Act Cap 486. To start with, the Bill consolidated all of the information 
necessary in an insolvency proceeding into one statute. It actually combines provision for 
personal bankruptcy and corporate insolvencies into one statute, making it a very bulky 
document with seven hundred and thirty five section and five schedules. Despite the size of 
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the document, the sections are well arranged making it easier to navigate the document. The 
objective of the Insolvency Bill 2015 is set out in its preamble that it seeks to amend and 
consolidate the law relating to the insolvency of natural persons, and incorporated and unin-
corporated bodies as well as to provide an alternative to liquidation procedures.  
In a number of respects, the Bill embraces the international benchmarks. For example, the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, in its objective number three, provides that an efficient in-
solvency framework should strike a balance between liquidation and reorganization.
236
 The 
Bill has enhanced provisions for liquidation, with a number of winding up procedures, 
namely voluntary liquidation, members' voluntary liquidation, creditors' voluntary liquida-
tion and liquidation by the Court.
237
 Notably, section 384 states the circumstances in which a 
company is unable to pay its debts to include one, where a creditor to whom the company is 
indebted for hundred thousand shillings has served on the company, and the company has 
for twenty-one days afterwards failed to pay the debt or to secure a reasonable satisfaction of 
the creditor. Second, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the company is un-
able to pay its debts as they fall due.
238
 This is in contrast to the requirement in Cap 486 
where the debt due was at the lower limit of a thousand Kenya shillings.
239
 Arguably, this 
amount was too small and could potentially make the liquidation process open to abuse by 
creditors who could easily sue a company in petty disputes.  
In addition, the Bill embraces a rescue culture with an introduction of two new procedures 
namely, the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA)
240
 and Administration.
241
 To detail 
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the administration procedure, section 522 stipulates the objectives of the administration of a 
company as follows:  
‘(a) To maintain the company as a going concern:  
(b) To achieve a better outcome for the company's creditors as a whole than would likely to 
be the case if the company were liquidated (without first being under administration); 
 (c) To realize the property of the company in order to make a distribution to one or more 
secured or preferential creditors’242 
Arguably, the objectives are clear and gives corporate rescue due attention, replicating the 
established single hierarchy of objectives of the UK administration procedure.
243
  
The Kenyan administration procedure is intended to be initiated with the appointment of an 
administrator which can happen through the following ways: by the company directors un-
der section 541, by the holder of a floating charge under section 534 or by court upon appli-
cation under section 530. Notably, the court is to exercise its discretion and it may make an 
administration order in relation to a company only if satisfied-(a) that the company is or is 
likely to become unable to pay its debts; and (b) that the administration order is reasonably 
likely to achieve an objective of administration.
244
 As a result, the procedure will facilitate a 
possibility of an insolvency proceeding being started early, which has been recognized as 
enhancing the prospects of successful rescue.
245
  Besides, section 522(3) obligates the ad-
ministrator to perform his functions with the objectives of administration in mind unless the 
administrator believes that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve the objectives. 
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Besides, the Insolvency Bill 2015 if it becomes law, the process of receivership will be abol-
ished with the introduction of an administration procedure. However, the rights of a floating 
charge holder are still protected under Part VIII Division four, with a significant change 
such that the holder of a floating charge does not appoint a receiver manager but rather an 
administrator. Fundamentally, this procedure becomes part of administration procedure 
which is intrinsically an insolvency procedure tailored to facilitate corporate rescue. The un-
derlying aim in the administration regime is to encourage collectivity and the administrator, 
whether appointed in or out of court, owes duties to the creditors as a whole, representing a 
shift from what currently happens in a receivership process. Similarly, in the UK, the Enter-
prise Act 2002 inserted a new section into the Insolvency Act 1986 which severely restricted 
the use of administrative receivership and allows the floating charge holders the power to 
appoint an administrator.
246
 Arguably in this aspect, the Kenyan proposed law closely fol-
lows the UK approach. 
Further, under the Insolvency Bill Part VIII Division 7, a moratorium is provided for as an 
effect of an administration order. Section 558 (I) is categorical that an application for the 
liquidation of the company may not be made while the company is under administration. 
Equally section 560 freezes the steps of a creditor who intends to enforce a security over the 
property of a debtor in administration. It however permits such action if the consent of the 
administrator is granted or the approval of the court is obtained. Further, a person may not 
repossess the goods under credit purchase without the approval of the court or consent of the 
administrator. It is submitted that the Bill adequately provides a breathing space to a com-
pany while in administration. 
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Further, the introduction of company voluntary arrangements (CVA) that benefit from mora-
toria is also a positive effort to enhance the rescue culture.
247
 The proposed CVA has an in-
teresting aspect of having limited court supervision. This is achieved by permitting the di-
rectors or administrator when making a proposal (composition in satisfaction of its debts or 
a scheme for arranging its financial affairs) to provide for the appointment of a person to 
supervise the proposal. Besides, only an authorized insolvency practitioner may be ap-
pointed. This, it is submitted, is a good development on two aspects. One, the Kenyan courts 
have a backlog of cases and, coupled with their lack of confidence from public, such a de-
velopment will enhance efficiency. Second, the involvement of experts allows the CVA to 
be attractive and poised to hopefully realize better results. 
 
As far as the cross border corporate insolvencies are concerned, there are a lot of gaps that 
the current legal framework fails to address, as already alluded to. The new Bill is set to en-
hance cross border insolvency provisions, as found under s. 720 of the Insolvency Bill. This 
section specifically states that the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(Model law on cross-border insolvency) has the force of law in Kenya in the form set out in 
the Fifth Schedule. This is done to promote cooperation between the courts and other com-
petent authorities in Kenya and foreign states involved in cross-border insolvency and to en-
sure legal certainty for trade and investment. This section is compliant with Constitution of 
Kenya (2010), which recognizes and includes International Law as a source of law in the 
form and Spirit of Article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution. 
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It is a breakthrough to have such an inclusion considering that the market dynamics are 
changing and businesses are expanding beyond borders, even amongst Kenya’s immediate 
East African neighbours. Besides, the latest bill has addressed, partly, some reservations ex-
pressed in the 2010 Insolvency Bill. In particular, the USAID report had stated: 
 ‘Major legislation for a complete revamping of the bankruptcy process, including the 
 adoption of a reorganization statute [which] has been pending for several 
 years…..would be a complete revision of bankruptcy law in Kenya…..although a 
 less  ambitious revision (with a simple provision for the rehabilitation of a busi
 ness) would  be very likely to be easier for  the overworked court system to imple
 ment.’248 
As already mentioned above, there are deliberate efforts to limit court involvement in CVAs 
in particular.  
On the issues relating to insolvency practitioners, Part II of the Insolvency Bill 2015 is rele-
vant. The circumstances and the qualifications required for a person who may act as an In-
solvency Practitioner, and this includes a liquidator, a provisional liquidator, and supervisor 
of a voluntary arrangement or an administrator of the company, are elaborate.
249
 In addition, 
the Bill anticipates establishment or recognition of existing professional bodies by the cabi-
net secretary to play the role of a governing body of the insolvency practitioners. Such an 
organ has a crucial role of regulating the practice of a profession as well as maintaining and 
enforcing rules authorizing members to act as insolvency practitioners. This proposal is 
similar to the UK equivalent of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
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Wales, which is one of the largest regulators of IPs in the UK.
250
 This coupled with the re-
quirement of insolvency practitioners to the meet acceptable requirements relating to educa-
tion, practical training and experience, which will streamline the insolvency engagements. 
Besides, the Bill makes it a criminal offence for a person who does not meet the qualifica-
tions set, to act as an insolvency practitioner with a maximum fine of Kshs. 5 million as a 
penalty.
251
 The regulation of the profession and the institution of a code of conduct are also 
informed by the need to ensure that Insolvency Practitioners do not overcharge their fees for 
services against the debtors, and then leaving them for dead.
252
 Currently as structured in the 
Bill, the only sanction available to the oversight regulator who is the cabinet secretary is to 
de-recognize a regulator, meaning that it can withhold/suspend the regulatory body. It is ar-
gued that it is highly unlikely that such an approach will be effective considering the costs 
and disruption this would cause. This will limit the usage of such a step to only extreme 
cases. In contrast to Mauritius, the legislation as is tailored in such a manner that the equiva-
lent oversight regulator (Director) engages directly with the insolvency practitioners them-
selves rather than the professional bodies which also exists.
253
 In fact, the director has power 
to keep under review the conduct and performance of persons appointed to be Insolvency 
Practitioners and may require any document or information concerning an Insolvency Practi-
tioner.
254
 In essence, disciplinary measures whenever need be to undertake and director has 
reasonable ground to suspect that an Insolvency Practitioner has failed to comply the law in 
a manner which has or may materially affect creditors or contributories or persons dealing in 
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good faith with a debtor etc. may inquire into the conduct of the Insolvency Practitioner. Ar-
guably, the consequence of removing or suspending individuals is manageable compared to 
suspending an entire professional body. Nevertheless, it still remains uncertain whether the 
draft will become law and even if it does, whether the positive elements that it has will re-
main or whether it will be mutilated as it passes through the remaining procedural stages. 
Further, it will take the test of time to prove whether what this legislation introduced is what 
Kenya actually needs to remedy its situation. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The history of a jurisdiction leads to embedded approaches. Thus, the development of Ken-
yan insolvency law and its business culture has been enormously shaped by its colonial past. 
The analysis revealed that Kenyan insolvency law has profound weaknesses but it is not de-
void of strengths. To start with, there is no dedicated insolvency legislation. The legislative 
provisions governing insolvency form chapters of the Companies Act Cap 486, making it 
bulky, complicated and cumbersome to access. In addition, the legislative regime is frag-
mented, outmoded and incomplete. In fact, the sections of the statute governing insolvency 
procedures are not chronologically arranged. Besides, there is an interchange of key terms 
like ‘receivers’, ‘managers’ and ‘liquidators’, creating confusion. Besides, the impact of in-
stitutional and legal inadequacies has been felt and, therefore, there is a consensus that re-
forming it is mandatory. The quest, then, is how best this can be done to ensure that a practi-
cal and working solution is achieved. This challenge will be addressed further in the coming 
chapters. 
The rationale behind the evaluation of the Kenyan insolvency law using international 
benchmarks proceeded under the conception that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on In-
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solvency Law is a reflection of best practices of developed economies, who have been ac-
tively engaged in insolvency challenges in their respective jurisdictions. A good number 
have witnessed a vibrant and notable degree of success in transforming their economies as 
well as attracting and retaining international investors. This has proven a good platform 
from which to start engaging and calculating Kenya’s next move. It has served to expose the 
ills and benefits in the current framework, which are useful in developing a framework in 
the light of existing global initiatives and appreciating the specific local needs and values. 
Undoubtedly, these international bench marks provide precise and practical proposals to pol-
icy makers to consider improving their weak and ineffective laws. 
The on-going reforms are applauded as a positive sign that those in authority are pro-active. 
The current Kenyan insolvency framework is heavily court led, which has its merits as it 
forms a good check and balance of the procedures. It was also noted that there is no statu-
tory provision specifying the professional qualification required of a person who wishes to 
practice as insolvency practitioner, raising concerns whether the procedures benefit from the 
appropriate expertise. Equally the proposed procedures are very court dependent and the 
ability to enforce legislation and the expediency with which it may be done cannot be over 
emphasized. However, the judicial system suffers from its own inadequacies, encumbered 
by a lack of trust from the public, due to rampant corruption, inefficiency and incompetence 
and this is likely to present a hurdle.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 RESTRUCTURING OUTSIDE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
A corporate entity which is in financial distress can resolve its predicament in two broad ap-
proaches. The first is by engaging in a formal bankruptcy procedure, which commonly in-
volves a court, and enables the debtor to deal with creditors collectively. Alternatively, it can 
engage in an out of court restructuring (in this thesis also referred to as informal strategies), 
based around negotiations with individual creditors. This chapter focuses on the engage-
ments of corporate restructuring outside the formal statutory insolvency procedure and in 
particular pre-negotiated deals, private workouts and pre-packs. In essence, the chapter will 
concentrate on activities such as changing the composition of assets and liabilities of debtors 
in financial difficulty without resorting to a full judicial intervention. This is done with ob-
jective of promoting efficiency, restoring growth and minimizing the cost associated with 
the debtor’s financial difficulty.   
 
The first part explores how such procedures evolve by using game theory. It then discusses 
the relationship between informal mechanisms and formal insolvency processes. As it will 
be observed, informal rescues commonly involve negotiation with creditors on an individual 
basis although there are known models of collective informal procedures, such as the Lon-
don Approach, which has been widely recognized as having enabled notable informal work-
outs. The famous London Approach will be discussed because of its wide recognition glob-
ally with an intention to understand the tenets underpinning such workouts. Besides, infor-
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mal workouts, as proposed by international players such as the IMF, World Bank and IN-
SOL will also be explored.  
 
However, given the similarities in the principles underpinning the workout processes, as 
championed by the international players, it will arguably not serve any merit to focus on the 
proposals of each; rather the discussion will consider workouts generally. The term ‘work-
out’ will be used to refer to the collective negotiations between the debtor and its creditors 
and entails some contractual agreement. In addition, ‘enhanced restructuring’ will also be 
explored in this Chapter. The term ‘enhanced restructuring’ refers to mechanisms that com-
bine the benefits of both formal mechanisms and informal insolvency procedures and a good 
example of this type of restructuring is the London Approach. The last part explores how the 
Kenyan jurisdiction, with its lack of any notable informal approach to business restructuring, 
can apply the widely recognized informal principles. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE OUT OF COURT RESTRUCTURING. 
Informal restructuring has been around for long time, although many jurisdictions have not 
given them as much attention as the formal options. The significance of achieving business 
survival without recourse to courts has been linked to the broader social and governmental 
trends keen on adopting proactive risk management strategies.
1
 In US for instance, a signifi-
cant number of Chapter 11 cases start off as private workouts, with companies attempting to 
reorganize informally and whenever such efforts fail to achieve consensus, the debtor enters 
                                                          
1
 John Armour, and Simon Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Bankruptcy: The 'London Approach' to the Resolution of 
Financial Distress’ (September 2000). University of Cambridge ESRC Working Paper No. 173 available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258615 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.258615 
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Chapter 11.
2
 The UK’s informal rescue practices can be traced back to the 1970s,3 although 
the principles of the famous London Approach, which were developed in 1990s, and are op-
erational entirely on informal footing on the basis of a set of principles providing a frame-
work for bank support.
4
 
 
The World Bank’s Financial Crisis Survey done in 2009 in the EU, on the use of bankruptcy 
procedures revealed that the formal approaches were less frequent than the state aid and debt 
restructuring.
5
 On average, 8.3 percent of European firms applied for state aid in the previ-
ous 12 months (as of June – July 2009), whereas, only 2 percent of all surveyed companies 
filed for bankruptcy.
6
 Besides, there is substantial evidence that changes in business and fi-
nance in recent years have put strain on the legal mechanisms, prompting the development 
of alternative approaches to financial distress. For instance, the Asian crisis in 1997 
prompted the Asian nations, with the assistance of the IMF, to develop workout rules tar-
geted at enhancing business recovery. Besides, the extensive impact of corporate failure on 
the community and economy has necessitated an active and deliberate incorporation of the 
role played by social norms in business restructuring. The informal mechanisms in different 
jurisdictions have been acknowledged as being pivotal in contributing to solving financial 
distress in business entities. In essence, corporate insolvency is best addressed by a compre-
hensive and integrated system that has both formal and informal mechanisms. Admittedly, 
                                                          
2
 Gerard McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law-An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd ,  
2008) pg. 13 
3John Flood, ‘The Vultures Fly East: the Creation and Globalization of the Distressed Debt Market’ in Adapt-
ing Legal Cultures, D. Nelken, ed., ( Hart Publishing,, 2001) pp. 257-278, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=949581 
4
 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt’ (2008) 8 Journal of Business Law 756-777 
5
 Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper, Mahesh Uttamchandani ‘The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform’ available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org accessed on 29
th
 July 2015 
6
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solving a firm’s financial distress either through the formal or informal approaches, typically 
burdens a firm with direct costs, such as administrative expenses, or indirect costs, such as 
incentive distortion.  Thus, the efficient choice is one that minimizes the costs in addition to 
ensuring that the firm’s value is not eroded. Pursuant to this reality, evidence shows that a 
debtor and its creditors should generally use approaches that enable an agreement to be 
reached out-of-court; as such approaches enable a faster resolution, and minimize costs..  
On an international level, there has been significant recognition of out of court workouts (a 
widely recognized informal strategy) as useful tools to expedite corporate insolvency chal-
lenges.  Such workouts are regarded as an integral part of an efficient creditor-debtor regula-
tory system.This view of their importance was echoed by the IMF in its study of insolvency 
and debtor protection regimes that concluded that informal restructuring mechanisms play 
an important role in a holistic approach towards corporate insolvency.
7
 As a result, the IMF 
recommended using pre-packages and pre-negotiated plans in its ‘Orderly and Effective In-
solvency Procedures’ in 1999.8 The importance of informal workouts was also recognized in 
2000 by the publication of the INSOL Principles.
9
 In addition, the World Bank in 2001 de-
veloped ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems’,10 
later revised in 2005. These principles acknowledge the vital contribution of informal work-
outs and assert that a country’s financial sector should promote the development of a code of 
conduct on an informal out-of-court process for dealing with cases of corporate financial 
                                                          
7
 IMF, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedure: Key Issues (IMF, Washington,1999) pg.13 Available in 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm accessed on 22 November 2012 
8
 Ibid 
9
 INSOL, A statement of principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts, (INSOL International, 
London, 2000)  available on the INSOL website <http://www.insol.org/page/57/statementof-principles  ac-
cessed on 18 November 2012 
10
 World Bank Principles available in  http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf accessed on 20/6/2015  
see principles 24-26  
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difficulty in which banks and other financial institutions have a significant exposure, espe-
cially in markets where enterprise insolvency has reached systemic levels.
11
 
 
Further, the UNCITRAL through the ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ of 200512 
equally promotes informal mechanisms by encouraging voluntary restructuring negotiations 
and agreements. Much of these international initiatives consist of guidelines that do not give 
exact details and instead allow room in their recommendations to adjust to jurisdictional cir-
cumstances. Remarkably, they reflect the broad thrust that informal mechanisms are vital. In 
practice, informal approaches in many jurisdictions tend to be initiated by the company di-
rectors or a creditor, such as bank, who, because of its relation with the business can see 
overdraft limits being exceeded which is a typical red flag.
13
 Generally, informal restructur-
ing arrangements are purely contractual in nature and they are therefore not subject to any 
specific set of legal requirements but require affected creditors to agree to the proposed re-
structuring solution for it to be binding.
14
 
 
4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL STRATEGIES 
It is an undisputed fact that legislated rules are generated and drafted through the country’s 
legislature under its democratic mandate, and such rules are often intended to be used to 
solve disputes, commonly through the courts. However, the informal practices will come 
into existence in a rather unique way. For instance, INSOL International produced a ‘State-
                                                          
11
 Ibid  
12
 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency (United Nations, 2005)  
13
 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency  Law, Perspectives and Principals, (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
pg.213 
14
 USAID, Insolvency Systems in South Africa: Strengthening the Regulatory Framework ( December 2010) 
available in http://www.fsp.org.za/blog/wp-content/uploads/SOUTH-AFRICA-INSOLVENCY-
SYSTEMS1.pdf accessed on 16th November 2012 
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ment of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts, which was published 
in October 2000,which was stated as ‘a product of extremely painstaking work done over 
almost five years by a group of highly dedicated and skilled senior professionals comprised 
in the INSOL Lenders' Group’.15 In essence, it is resorting to expertise to develop ‘soft’ 
norms which are possible solutions or approaches to existing challenges. It was acknowl-
edged by Terry Bond, Vice-Chairman of the INSOL Lenders' Group, that the London Ap-
proach (see section 4.4.6.1) was a source of considerable inspiration to the INSOL Lenders' 
Group.
16
 
 
In essence, one of the most obvious sources of informal strategies is as a result the work of 
the several international financial standard-setting agencies who are actively engaged in co-
ordinating aspects of regulatory standards on a global basis.
17
 One of the primary objectives 
of many of these agencies is to co-ordinate action to ensure international financial stability 
through both crisis prevention and crisis management.
18
  It must be observed that informal 
strategies developed by the agencies are majorly guiding principles i.e. basically broad 
statements that apply to a range of acts and, in Common Law systems, tend to develop 
through a series of cases and experiences rather than being established in a single incident.
19
 
It must be appreciated that much as the informal strategies are championed by experts who 
have no direct democratic mandate to legislate, some of the international financial institu-
tions are intergovernmental organizations, others have been created as a result of intergov-
                                                          
15
 See Chief Editor, ‘International approach to workouts’ (2001) 17, IL&P 59 
16
 Ibid 
17
 See Pollack, ‘International Harmonization of regulation and supervision frameworks’ in Marion Giovanoli 
International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium, (Oxford University Press, 2000)  
18
 Anu Arora, ‘The global financial crisis: a new global regulatory order?’ (2010) 8 Journal of Business Law, 
670-699 
19
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ernmental initiatives; others still are sector-specific groupings of supervisors or regulators 
and hence are very influential stake holders.
20
 
 
Internally, jurisdictions can also develop solutions to the challenges they face. Sunstein 
points out that in a typical society, challenges occur and connectedness among neighbours 
will necessitate discussion on how to resolve issues.
21
 As such information will be shared 
among neighbours who share common values when making decisions; the rules they use 
generate norms, a clear example being that of a ‘norm entrepreneur’.22 Sugden argues that 
societies exhibit strong self-organizations in the presence of shared values about norms 
without necessarily engaging in formal rules.
23
 Hence, human action can evolve into norms 
without conscious human effort and as well the norms maintain themselves without any 
formal machinery for enforcing them.
24
The famous London Approach came forth through 
relations, information sharing among the banking society in England and actually changed 
over time.  
 
Besides, these mechanisms have been consciously borrowed by other jurisdiction such as 
Hong Kong
25
 and Thailand
26
 among others who are keen on developing their informal cor-
porate rescue mechanisms. Moreover workouts inevitably require guidelines on how these 
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arrangements are negotiated. Consequently, in conducting informal workouts, many juris-
dictions adopt methods similar to the London Approach or that of the INSOL Multi-Bank 
Workout Principles.
27
 Such, informal insolvency strategies, and in particular workouts, are 
much more than natural self- evolving norms, although this does not fully negate the possi-
bility that norms can genuinely be spawned naturally. In Kenya for example, the use of eld-
ers and traditional processes of resolving disputes or conflicts are common, especially in the 
rural areas. Neither the government nor does any external pressure plays a role in shaping 
how such a pattern emerges. Such a traditional process is a typical modern day informal 
mechanisms for addressing and resolving conflict. In fact, the relevance of these norms de-
pends on the legal set up such that decisions that are made in these systems can be over-
turned by courts if they are deemed to be repugnant to justice, morality or any written law.
28
 
 
4.3.3 Dynamics of Corporate Restructuring 
A firm is in distress at any given time when there is a mismatch between its liquid assets and 
current liabilities this can be rectified through debt restructuring.
29
 Corporate restructuring 
can take a variety of forms such as debt rescheduling, interest rate reductions, debt-for-
equity swaps and debt forgiveness.
30
 In essence, restructuring involves an adjustment of the 
assets side of a company’s balance sheet in order to generate cash to meet current liabilities 
or an agreement of a compromise with creditors. However, to enhance the long term viabil-
                                                          
27
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assist banks and their borrowers in reaching an agreement to restructure their bank debt. The basic tenets of the 
London Approach have bred many variant models used in the context of financial crises (e.g. Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and more recently Iceland and Latvia) or in use informally in other 
countries. 
28
 The Bench Bulletin (2010) 1 Kenya Law Reports 12 
29
 Robert Mooradian, Kose John, Edith Hotchtkiss, and Karin S Thornbun, ‘Bankruptcy and the Resolution of 
Financial Distress, in Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance ( 
Elsevier, 2008), 2: 235-287 
30
 Ibid 
162 
 
ity of a company, debt restructuring is often accompanied by operational restructuring 
geared to addressing the structure and efficiency of the firm’s business through closures and 
reorganization of productive capacity.
31
 There are several informal strategies that can be 
used, although the literature on firms in distress focuses on a few main types of response to 
distress. For example, firms can raise new capital through an assets sale; negotiate terms 
with creditors or they can address their difficulties by merging with another company or en-
gaging in a workout, amongst others.
32
 A debt for equity swap can be employed as part of an 
informal approach which is where a creditor agrees to exchange a debt for an equity share in 
the company with the hope that it will produce a greater return in future.
33
 It is an approach 
that can enable a suitable compromise to be reached with creditors and can be useful espe-
cially where the defaulted debt is a loan which was offered without security. Such a conver-
sion is advantageous to the company as it takes away the burden of interest repayment; it 
eases cash flow and working capital difficulties.
34
 However, such a swap can be time con-
suming and expensive to negotiate because the consent of the company shareholders, as well 
as the main creditors is usually required.
35
 Generally, leading lenders may be able to use 
their influence to force distressed companies to restructure by means of downsizing, man-
agement replacement or otherwise, 
36
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In some instances, more than one strategy can be used concurrently. Since restructuring does 
not take place in a vacuum and entails dealing with conflicting interests, there are there are 
many factors that influence the choice of restructuring strategy employed by a company. 
The main one is the structure of firm’s liabilities.37 A secured debt can easily be restructured 
through direct negotiation because their support during a corporate reorganization could be a 
request not to enforce their legal rights immediately or debt contract are modified.
38
  Se-
cured creditors may also be invited to inject new funds into the distressed company. It is 
worth noting that lending new funds to a business in financial distress is regarded by credi-
tors as a very risky activity, as they can be repaid in full only if the rescue attempt is suc-
cessful.
39
 Accordingly, the injection of new funds into the traumatized business may not 
prove to be an easy task,
40
 as reluctant creditors may seek to receive additional reassurances 
and incentives prior to granting their support.
41
 Unsecured debt tends to need to be dealt 
with using exchange offers such that a firm offers cash securities in-exchange for an out-
standing debt.
42
 Besides, the more the number of creditors with multiplicity of interests the 
more difficult it becomes to engage in negotiations. In essence, corporate businesses which 
typically have multiple creditors need to carefully consider and choose an appropriate strat-
egy. Generally, the approach that creditors take towards corporate rescue depends heavily on 
their philosophy and culture and also on ‘market forces’ and key lenders which are com-
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monly the banks, would not wish to link their reputations with a corporate collapse.
43
 There-
fore, it could be said that banks are cautious and seek to protect their reputation by offering 
their support to ailing businesses.
44
 
 
A good example is the London Approach, as used in companies with liabilities to multiple 
banks.
45
 Besides, a combination of secured private debts and numerous public debts tend to 
limits the usage out of court restructuring. This is because secured creditors such as banks 
are well protected in bankruptcy, hence have no incentive to offer relief such that those with 
many public creditors each can easily free ride even in the midst of problems.
46
 It is argued 
that if a restructuring strategy is to be successful it has to be tailored to the individual cir-
cumstance of a firm. A firm has to consider the number and size of debts, its internal poli-
cies, institutional framework, and its potential to facilitate a voluntary standstill, as well as 
coordination with its financiers. Such factors are essential as they are necessary in determin-
ing the feasible timing of restructuring and decisions on the firm’s viability. 
 
The choice of the strategy used to solve distress also depends on the relative costs and bene-
fits of each mechanism.
47
 Informal procedures are often more attractive than formal steps 
and participants hope that informality will avoid the negative repercussions associated with 
formal insolvency procedures.
48
 For example, if the cost of restructuring involves a sale of 
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assets through efficient mechanisms such as an auction, the overall cost of resolving finan-
cial distress may be lower, encouraging the use of such an approach.
49
 
 
Further, the choice of restructuring options depends largely on the degree of investor protec-
tion and labour laws of a jurisdiction.
50
 Labour enjoying a strong legal protection is shown 
to acquire enough power relative to other stakeholders such as investors and managers to be 
able to impact corporate decisions and outcomes.
51
 Positively, the likelihood of value-
reducing asset sales increases as collective bargaining and labour relations’ laws grant more 
power to labour unions, suggesting that these asset sales are countenanced by workers.
52
 
Negatively, strong protection of labour protects also underperforming managers hence re-
sulting in firm value enhancing objectives being easily compromised.
53
 For instance, restruc-
turing measures such as large scale employee layoffs, top management turnover, and major 
asset sales which could be the necessary remedies to a troubled business and can improve 
stock price and subsequent operating performance could be frustrated.
54
 The sacrificing 
stakeholders may seek to block these restructuring measures if labour laws grant sufficient 
power to workers to block such actions.
55
 
 
In practice, the incumbent management may form an alliance with workers to maintain the 
status quo by foregoing value-enhancing restructuring measures resisted by workers. In a 
                                                          
49
 Ibid 
50Julian Atanassov, and Han E Kim, ‘Labour and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from 
Restructuring Decisions’ Journal of Finance, Forthcoming; Ross School of Business Paper No. 1044. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=898702 
51Mohamed Belkhir, ‘Labor Protection and Corporate Debt Maturity: International Evidence’ A paper 
Presented in Financial Management Association International (FMA) 2014 Annual Meeting, held in October 
15-17, 2014 at Nashville, Tennessee, USA) 
52
 Atanassov and  Kim(n 50)  
53
Ibid 
54
 Ibid 
55
 Ibid 
166 
 
recent Kenyan case involving Kenya Airways, an attempt to downsize the number of em-
ployees, which was one of the intended restructuring strategies, triggered numerous court 
battles, frustrating restructuring efforts because the labour laws are arguably strong. The 
employees, through their union, filed a case and the issues arising included complains  that 
the redundancies were done unfairly, that there had been discrimination on grounds of gen-
der, there had been infringement of employees’ rights to employment, amongst others.56 The 
respondent adduced evidence of its firm experiencing financial distress. However, the court 
issued an order of reinstatement of the employees hence quashing the redundancy one off 
pay offered by the company to the employees in favour of the employee’s salaries, allow-
ances and damages. The case went on appeal and at the time of writing this thesis an appeal 
was pending. It is argued that such legal battles will inevitably delay restructuring and, 
unless the case is decided faster, the firm’s viability will deteriorate. 
 
 In addition, the law determines the allocation of control over distressed firms and the extent 
to which market mechanisms are used to resolve financial distress.
57
 The law can have in-
centives that can facilitate the out of court strategy.
58
 For instance, the existence of a rule 
that is reliably binding on hold-out creditors is critical to the success of restructuring. Fur-
ther, the existence of efficient bankruptcy laws discourages strategic behaviour by the credi-
tors and debtors, causing those engaging in out-of court restructuring mechanisms to take 
their engagement seriously. The presence of an efficient legal framework provides a credible 
means of credit enforcement by directly impacting on the willingness of debtors to come to a 
negotiating table.  In practice, the existence of an effective legal framework gives the credi-
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tors an avenue of filling an insolvency suit against the debtor, which comes with cost as well 
as the likelihood to taint the company image and its credit worthiness depending on the out-
come of the case.  
 
A further important aspect was noted by Mooradian and Ryan in their examination of out-of 
court restructuring, namely that banks can play a very important role in facilitating debt re-
structuring.
59
 This view is supported by the findings of Gilson, Kose and Lang that the like-
lihood of out of court restructuring is positively related to the firms’ reliance on bank debt.60 
The explanation for this is that action by large creditors, such as banks, allows small credi-
tors to coordinate more efficiently. This is linked to the fact that banks have superior infor-
mation, as a result of which their decision to participate in restructuring injects a degree of 
‘strategic solidity’ in credit markets. In addition, such asymmetric information enhances 
banks’ confidence to avail rescue funds necessary for restructuring. Besides, bank participa-
tion in restructuring helps to mitigate hold out problems among the public debts holders. 
4.3.4 Significance of informal/ out of court restructuring 
Informal and formal corporate insolvency mechanisms have similar underpinning in that 
they all address many and, at times, conflicting creditors’ interests in a situation of financial 
difficulty.  For this reason, it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between formal and 
informal operations. In reality numerous insolvency procedures tend to overlap and in some 
instances one procedure will be a continuance of another. In France for example, safeguard 
and conciliation proceedings are commenced by the commercial court but the negotiations 
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for a restructuring via a compromise between the creditors and debtors are done out of court, 
with the agreed plan then being approved by the court.
61
 In the US, a company will often 
have pre-arranged a Chapter 11 planning advance of filing for Chapter 11 and here the nego-
tiations between the debtor company and the main creditors are done prior to filing for for-
mal Chapter 11 proceedings. In the UK, much as their pre-pack is considered an informal 
procedure it is dependent on administration for implementation.
62
 
 
It evident that informal workouts  are negotiated in the ‘shadow of the law’ and therefore 
depend on the enabling legal environment having clear laws and procedures to facilitate  
disclosure or access to timely and accurate financial information regarding the distressed 
enterprise.
63
 In addition, formal proceedings complements the informal mechanisms, as they 
address issues such as investigating directors’ actions, and the enforcement of contractual 
agreements that can only be done using the formal frameworks.
64
 Further, even in a scenario 
where there are effective informal restructuring arrangements, formal insolvency procedures 
are important as a last option largely resorted to when the informal strategies have been ex-
hausted.
65
 This positions the informal approaches as crucial immediate mechanisms that en-
terprises commonly employ in their attempts to circumvent looming failure. It is argued 
therefore that in a scenario where informal approaches to insolvency are successful in re-
structuring; there will be no need for the formal mechanism. It has also been appreciated that 
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the existence of shortcomings in informal workouts and the inflexibilities of formal insol-
vency proceedings have generated efforts to combine the advantages of informal workouts 
with some of the effects of formal proceedings, resulting in the development of enhanced 
restructurings, or hybrid procedures, such as pre-packaging.
66
 Therefore, informal mecha-
nisms can generally reflect a variety of ‘calculated technologies’, disciplinary perspectives 
and even sets of negotiations.
67
 
 
In many jurisdictions, the evidence indicates that a legal system influences informal proce-
dures and to a certain extent determines the possibilities for out of court debt restructuring in 
any given jurisdiction.
68
 In essence, effective formal insolvency becomes a warning to those 
who will not willingly participate in out of court arrangements. In jurisdictions such as the 
UK, where corporate failure is perceived negatively, and as a result creditors tend to desert a 
business once it has entered formal proceedings and debtors may suffer a rapid loss of 
goodwill, informal alternatives is a welcome alternative.
69
 In addition, informal proceedings 
are known to provide cost-effective, efficient, flexible and contractually sustainable solu-
tions when resolving a debtor’s financial affairs. Much as the negotiation will not be cost-
less, the expected cost of negotiation is lower than the cost of insolvency proceedings, even 
more so when done in secrecy, as indirect costs such as a loss of good will are curtailed.
70
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In addition, workouts are frequently used because creditors retain a measure of control over 
negotiation, something that they would not enjoy when a company is put into formal insol-
vency proceedings.
71
 Directors also remain in control during the workouts and this has mer-
its over alternative formal procedures in which directors are deprived of control.
72
 Contrac-
tual workouts in contrast to formal procedures are considered flexible because the negotia-
tions can be initiated by the debtor or the creditors and does not require evidence of financial 
difficulties. 
4.3.5 Selected Informal Approaches 
There are many informal approaches that can be used by a distressed company although 
only a few are popular and others are strategies that are used as part of other informal ap-
proaches. The forms of restructuring featured in the literature are debt for equity swaps, 
workouts, pre-packaging, debt restructuring, etc. However, a selected few will be detailed to 
comprehend the contribution of out of court mechanisms to corporate responses to financial 
distress. 
4.3.6 Informal workout 
According to Stewart, ‘there is no formal definition or even a typical restructuring as all 
deals are different and when assessing the respective rights, remedies and options of the par-
ties, the devil is always in the detail’.73 In essence, workouts is a ‘loose’ term used to include 
a variety of approaches implemented differently in different jurisdictions and equally are 
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different in each restructuring circumstance (case). Nonetheless, in literature, an informal 
workout, also referred to as consensual out-of-court restructuring, is a non-judicial process 
through which a financially distressed business and its significant creditors reach an agree-
ment for adjusting the obligations of the business enterprise.
74
 Despite being termed as non-
judicial, other literature explains the informal workout as a mechanism to reorganize trou-
bled companies outside the bankruptcy court with minimal court intervention.
75
 Fundamen-
tally, the creditors agree on a ‘coordinated approach’ by seeking to work with each other to 
devise a collective response which is in their mutual self-interest. Notable divergences exist 
in so far as the implementation of the workout in different jurisdictions is concerned but not 
without similar main characteristics. An in-depth analysis of how a workout works and its 
principles are elaborated under the London Approach in 4.3.6.1 below.  
In the UK for example, popular informal workouts include the famous London Approach 
and other informal rescue arrangements such as pre-packs and debt for equity swaps. In the 
US, private workouts tend to be less expensive or less time consuming and because of this a 
significant number of companies attempt to reorganise through private workouts.
76
 The em-
pirical evidence indicates that the shareholders and creditors are better off when debt is re-
structured privately than through Chapter 11.
77
 In addition, private restructurings are more 
likely to accomplish something when a higher proportion of the company’s debts are owed 
to commercial banks and complex investors such as insurance companies.
78
 
                                                          
74
 Frome (n 45)   
75
Qi (n 71) 
76
 Ibid 
77
 Julian Franks, and Walter Torous, `A Comparison on Financial  in Distressed Exchanges and the Chapter 11 
Reorganizations’(1994) 35 Journal of Financial Economics 349 
78
 Ibid 
172 
 
Informal workouts have gained international recognition and regional groups such as the 
INSOL Lenders groups and international financial powers such as the World Bank have de-
veloped principles which they assert are non-binding guides and informal workouts gener-
ated from commentary of best practice.
79
 The INSOL principles trace their roots to England 
and in many ways can best be described as a London Approach in a modern context. In fact, 
the ever changing business dynamics generate complexity of the capital structures of corpo-
rations. Besides, the advancements of businesses to a global scale and their exposure to a 
diverse range of financial creditors have necessitated deliberation on possible solution in an 
international context. 
 
By comparison the workouts principles championed by all the international players are very 
similar. For instance, co-operation by the creditors is a notable requirement, since restructur-
ing involves collective actions of many groups. As well, the financial institutions are ex-
pected to keep the funds flowing as the firms are still depending on them. INSOL, in its 
eight principles, has a requirement of additional funding to be provided during restructuring 
and be accorded priority status as compared to other indebtedness or claims of relevant 
creditors.
80
 In the same spirit, the World Bank in principle 26 proposes that a country’s fi-
nancial sector should promote a code of conduct on an informal out-of-court process, essen-
tial in dealing with corporate financial difficulty.
81
 In addition, it proposes eight conditions 
that must be present for a workout to be attempted.
82
 It is evidently emphasised in these pro-
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visions that the presence of an effective formal insolvency is crucial for the workouts to 
work. 
 
4.3.6.1 London Approach 
The London Approach is a brilliant example of how informal strategies can be developed 
and effectively used effectively in helping corporations in distress.
83
 This approach to corpo-
rate financial distress emerged through the efforts of Bank of England to refine existing 
long-standing traditions to address corporate financial difficulties in the UK. It is by design 
that it has no formal code and relies on consensus, persuasion and banking collegiality to 
resolve the financial distress.
84
 There are four notable phases in this informal procedure. The 
first is that the creditors adopt a ‘standstill’, a consensual moratorium, where none are to en-
force individual rights and existing lines of credit are maintained. Meanwhile, a team of ac-
countants appointed by the banks will investigate the company’s financial condition and de-
velop an independent review of its long-term economic viability. If rescue is feasible, one 
bank will lead the restructuring negotiations.
85
 Negotiations were traditionally led by the 
bank which was the debtor firm’s principal lender, although, over time, some banks devel-
oped expertise at mediating workouts, enabling them to offer their services for an appropri-
ate fee. During the restructuring period, new finance is accorded priority and the losses and 
gains are shared pro-rota according to creditors’ seniority and exposures at the time of 
standstill.  A unanimity rule applies to voting. 
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The London Approach benefits from special form of consensual ‘moratorium’ in the form of 
the standstill. However, creditors are not obliged to engage in any part of the process leading 
up to the restructuring agreements and these agreements only become legally binding once 
done. A corporation (debtor) can negotiate with some creditors hence there is danger that the 
debtor remains open to attack from other creditors.
86
 Of particular importance, the trust and 
cooperation from the banks involved are vital components of a rescue under the London 
Approach.
87
 
 
The ability of the London Approach to become a normative force was founded on two as-
pects. First, there was a perceived threat of regulatory sanctions from the Bank of England 
as the financial institution played a supervisory role as a banking regulator. In view of this 
role, parties strived to maintain a good working relation with the Bank of England giving it a 
degree of authority. Besides, the Bank of England had the reputation of being an honest im-
partial broker. The other banks, too, contributed to the ability of the London Approach to 
impact through decentralized enforcement mechanisms, such that there was the threat of ex-
clusion from future business by other banks. The influence of the London Approach in 
multi-creditor workouts has however diminished, even in England, the country of its origin, 
because of a number of realities. First is the rise of  debt trading, and the rise of hedge funds 
or the influx of the US-based ‘Vulture fund’ investors, which are relatively recent phenome-
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non in the UK.
88
 Globalizations of financial markets have enabled borrowing from a variety 
of lenders such as insurance companies, bond holders and other specialist investors. This 
variety makes the positions of unanimity and standstill more difficult to reach. Besides, 
market practices and regulatory requirements which govern all those involved make the use 
of London Approach strategy harder. 
 
The principles that are core to the London approach, as already mentioned, have gained 
popularity and have influenced the modern workouts. In fact, the INSOL Principles
89
 repli-
cate some of the details of the London Approach type workout. However, principle six, 
which requires that arrangements between relevant creditors relating to any standstill to re-
flect the applicable law and the relative positions of relevant creditors at the Standstill 
Commencement Date, was not well articulated in the London Approach. Generally, the co-
ordinated response has-been applauded in particular for giving the parties’ time to help man-
age the impact of debtor defaults and most importantly such approaches create an opportu-
nity to explore and evaluate the options for consensual agreement outside a formal insol-
vency process.
90
 However, like the many other informal strategies, workouts will only be 
most successful in facilitating rescues if an appropriate legal, regulatory and governmental 
policy framework supports them.
91
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4.3.7 Pre-packaging 
A `pre-pack’ is a process in which a troubled company and its creditors reach an agreement 
before a statutory rescue procedure  starts and then implement the agreement during the pro-
cedure.
92
 This definition typically fits the US pre-pack where it is a rescue process; primarily 
a pre-negotiated plan. However in UK, it is essentially a strategy for business sale.
93
 Gener-
ally, a pre-pack may be regarded as a ‘hybrid’ procedure as it combines the features of in-
formal mechanisms, such as negotiation, and formal mechanisms’, such as involving the use 
of insolvency practitioners, as well as court involvement which varies in many jurisdictions. 
For instance, in the UK, pre-packs now commonly take place within out-of-court admini-
strations. Under this process, a pre-packaged sale of the company’s business is agreed prior 
to the opening of proceedings and an administrator is then appointed who will execute the 
sale on behalf of the company.
94
 In the US Ch 11, the process is always court-driven.
95
 
Much as pre-packaging may involve the selling of a business to new owners, this is not al-
ways the case because in certain circumstances it may be commercially justifiable to sell it 
back to the management if, for example, they seem to be the only potential buyer.
96
 There-
fore pre-pack takes the form not of reorganization and company rescue but a management 
buyout of the company’s business.97 
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Pre-pack has a number of advantages especially because it embraces negotiations which of-
ten can start early. It also offers speedy routes to recovery, as well as keeping legal and other 
professional costs low.
98
 In addition, it offers the prospects of a faultless transition to turn-
around that limits disruption, reduces the risks of market falling, and losses of reputations, 
assets or business partner relationships.
99
 It can be an appropriate action in a business with 
strong brand and intellectual property whose value would drastically reduce in the event of 
formal insolvency proceedings.
100
 It has also been argued that pre-packs are a useful device 
in countering hold out problems with the growth of ‘vulture funds’ which, in many ways, 
have been a main impediment to informal reorganizations.
101
 The pre-pack is also flexible 
because negotiation takes place outside the formal statutory framework and this gives room 
to a company to have a unique plan to suit its particular situation. As a hybrid, it considered 
cheaper, at least in theory as this reality is dependent on the company to adequately disclose 
its financial condition to creditors before filing.
102
 The pre-pack has been herald as a freshly 
effective procedure to further rescue objectives, although others see it as a means by which 
powerful creditors bypass carefully constructed protections.
103
 
 
Despite the long list of advantages, English pre-packs are not without fault. In practice, pre-
packaged negotiations are done in secret and this gives room for the debtor to hand-pick the 
potential buyers to negotiate the sale of business to; and this makes it susceptible to manipu-
lation as well as locking out other potential buyer who may have offered a better deal.
104
 Be-
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ing a predetermined sale of an ailing business, the pre-pack has raised concerns relating to 
the morality and effectiveness of insolvency practitioners in the pre-pack process and has 
become for many the subject of fierce criticism.
105
 Since the pre-pack entails a quick busi-
ness sale, often to an insider, practitioners are often criticized as failing to consult the wider 
market and it is contended that, as a result, they may not achieve the best possible price for 
the assets of a company in administration, and as a result they do not realize full value for 
creditors.
106
 The criticism was validated by the findings in 2011 which concluded that 25 per 
cent of the 2,808 companies that entered administration used the pre-pack procedure; and 
that nearly 80 per cent of pre-pack sales were to connected parties.
107
 In addition, the BIS 
Select Committee report of 2013 asserts similar sentiments and acknowledges the lack of 
transparency, resultant abuse of pre-pack administrations and their link to ‘phoenix compa-
nies’.108 
 
Importantly, in the summer of 2013 Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Inno-
vation and Skills, announced an independent review into pre-pack administration aimed to 
rectify as many of the problems and criticisms of the existing pre-pack procedure as possi-
ble. This culminated into Graham Review Report
109
 which was published together with a 
report on pre-pack empirical research, ‘Characteristic and Outcome Analysis of Pre-pack 
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Administration’.110 The finding on the aforementioned Graham’s report summarized the 
weaknesses on pre-packs in the following points: 
 ‘1. Pre-packs lack transparency 
 2. Marketing of pre-pack companies for sale is insufficient 
 3. More could be done to explain the valuation methodology  
 4. Insufficient attention is given to the potential viability of the new company 
 5. The regulation - and monitoring of that regulation – of pre-pack administration 
 could  be strengthened.’ 111 
The same report made a number of recommendations namely: Pre-pack Pool such that con-
nected parties approach a ‘pre-pack pool’ before the sale and disclose details of the deal, for 
the pool member to opine on; Viability Review such that on a voluntary basis, the connected 
party complete a ‘viability review’ on the new company; pre-pack comply with six princi-
ples of good marketing and that any deviation from these principles be brought to creditors’ 
attention; that valuations must be carried out by a valuer who holds professional indemnity 
insurance amongst others.
112
 
 
Generally, the finding corroborated criticisms previously echoed in pre-packs which as rec-
ommended can be improved on. In fact, the independent review endorsed pre-pack and ad-
mitted that as an insolvency procedure, it has a place in the insolvency field as it contributes 
in preserving jobs, cheaper than alternative upstream restructuring procedures as well as 
contributing to the economy. Noteworthy, the recommendations has found its way into law 
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with the enactment Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. Remarkable, 
Clause 126 is concerned with pre-packs to ‘connected persons’ and will hopefully enhance 
vitality of pre-packs as an efficient insolvency procedure. 
 
 
4.4 CHALLENGES OF INFORMAL RESTRUCTURING 
Informal mechanisms, just like formal mechanisms, do not guarantee the survival of a busi-
ness but they lay down a framework under which the stakeholders may engage to consider 
rescue potentials. However, much as an informal strategy of corporate restructuring plays a 
crucial role in contributing to enhancing economic efficiency, there are notable impediments 
that may face those intending to use the informal strategies. To start with, informal rescue 
generally is not a perfect solution for every economic challenge in respect of all compa-
nies.
113
 Besides, informal mechanisms cannot operate exclusively on their own as they rely 
on an enabling legal framework to facilitate investigate of corporate misbehaviour whenever 
necessary. Besides, a workout requires the unanimous consent of affected creditors, espe-
cially in a situation where a company has limited funds hence unable to pay hold-out in full 
a task which may often be too difficult to obtain.
114
 This is because corporations entail the 
involvements of many individuals and the presence of many creditors may lead to the form-
ing of coalitions and to conflicts of interests.
115
 The different classes of creditors have dif-
ferent preferences as to the outcome of negotiations and as a result, these creditors may en-
gage in opportunistic hold up behaviour so as to demand a larger share of overall returns as 
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the price for their agreements.
116
 This is majorly done by lower rank creditors who may feel 
that their hold out has little impact on the restructuring process but actually this behaviour 
may cause the negotiations to fail. Secondly, creditors often have heterogeneous priorities 
and as this could trigger differences of opinion about the appropriate course of action, mak-
ing it difficult resolve.
117
 The US data shows that out of court negotiations are more likely to 
be effective where businesses have relatively homogeneous capital structures.
118
 
 
Another impediment is the presence of asymmetric information.
119
 Individuals involved in 
the restructuring will have varying levels of information concerning the firm’s value, de-
pending on the level of engagement. For example managers will have better information 
about the firm’s assets and future cash flow than any other creditor. Armour and Deakin ar-
gue that creditors’ willingness to negotiate a compromise, rather than insisting on payment 
in full, is based on the convictions that prospective gains are greater under an informal strat-
egy than formal and they have to see the likely surplus gains from negotiations.
120
 As a re-
sult, poorly informed creditors may prefer a formal court –supervised restructuring and may 
be reluctant to negotiate.
121
 Furthermore, the lack of moratorium on creditor demands while 
the problems are being resolved is a challenge to workouts. The company lenders have to 
voluntarily agree to negotiate. However, in incidences where the lenders agree, trust is a 
delicate aspect, such that there is also the risk that the suppliers and other trade creditors 
could initiate legal proceeding should the confidentiality of the negotiations be lost. How-
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ever, despite the existence of real impediments to out of court restructuring, there are means 
by which they can be mitigated. Negotiation tends to succeed where the firms have closer 
relationships with their banks and deal with a smaller pool of creditors.
122
 Therefore, en-
hancing dissemination of information helps, since informed creditors are positive in their 
involvement and this impact on the outcome of negotiations.  
 
 
4.5 THE PLACE OF INFORMAL RESTRUCTURING IN KENYA 
As already discussed, informal restructuring mechanisms are common and of numerous va-
rieties and include all efforts, ranging from crisis management and turnaround to the use of 
consultancy services to improve management. Kenya cannot be said to be devoid of infor-
mal mechanisms of corporate restructuring but, from the surface, the methods of resolving 
disputes out of court are less developed. Nonetheless, consistent with practices in many 
countries, companies employ a wide range of approaches in their attempts to restructure 
their companies’ informally. Debt for equity swaps is common and the newspapers regularly 
have stories which are good evidence that this practice happens. For example, one institu-
tional investor with Kenya's infrastructure investment firm called Trans Century opted to 
switch its holding of the firm's convertible bonds into equity.
123
 The managers of the com-
panies involved were confident that this conversion was going to improve the profitability of 
the company.
124
 Besides such compromises, the usual managerial techniques that even sol-
vent companies might engage in may be included in the category of informal rescues, such 
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as cost cutting measures and downsizing the workforce, disposing of non-core assets or units 
of the business, and the taking of additional collateral to secure repayment. 
The practices are common and useful to large businesses, but may leave small debtors very 
much under the threat of inevitable insolvency, owing to inadequate resources. For instance, 
carrying out employee lay-offs will require some degree of financial strength to pay for the 
redundancies. In all of these practices, there is a glaring lack of any documented evidence on 
how they are undertaken. However, the media report efforts to solve many disputes out of 
court which are not necessarily business related. The use of informal approaches as a way of 
solving business financial distress has not been explored fully. Nonetheless, there is tangible 
evidence that shows how, in the context of resource-based conflicts, such as in respect of 
land, forests, water and even political conflicts, there are examples of informal approaches 
having played a central role in the lives of the Kenyan people. A most notable example was 
the post-election crisis that engulfed Kenya during the 1997 elections.
125
 
 
Besides, there is a general recognition in Kenya of the reality that taking every dispute to 
court burdens the judicial system and strains beneficial relations. The legal environment is 
conducive in nurturing out of court settlements of disputes. For instance the Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010, recognizes alternative dispute resolution and raises its status to a judicial prin-
ciple.
126
In addition, arbitration is probably the best-known out of court mechanism in Kenya 
and the rules of the game are laid out in the Arbitration Act. In addition, the existence of in-
                                                          
125
 John Ouch, ‘Undercurrents of Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Issues in the Long-term Agenda’ available 
in  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/crer/afrobrain/oucho/publications/john_oucho.pdf, accessed on 28 
January 2013 
126
 The Constitution of Kenya, Article 159 (2) (c) is clear that alternative forms of dispute resolution including 
reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall be promoted 
184 
 
stitutions such as Kenya's Dispute Resolution Centre (DRC),
127
 which are independent, non-
profit organisations that promote effective and economic resolutions of disputes through ar-
bitration and predominantly mediation and expert determination are evidence that Kenya’s 
multi-cultural business community can conduct business restructuring without the complex-
ity and expense of court proceedings, or even arbitration. 
 
The challenges facing a developing economy like Kenya make informal approaches a very 
attractive option. For instance, there are no specialist bankruptcy courts and it is notable as 
well that the physical location of general commercial courts and specialised bankruptcy 
lawyers is mostly in the capital city, which makes them beyond the reach of most Kenyans. 
Besides, the inevitable needs of financial resources to pay court fees and legal fees where 
they are represented, in addition to lengthy court processes that can run for years, are dis-
couraging. Much as the aforementioned realities are more pronounced in aspects not neces-
sarily related to business restructuring, they are a clear indication that informal approaches 
can serve to fill the gaps of the legal mechanisms. 
 
In addition, there is the problem that formal procedures are perceived negatively in Kenya. 
This was captured clearly by this quotation, as explained below,  
 ‘For the first time in my life I realized the power of culture, ‘Sopiato says. ‘It does 
 not matter what the laws say: neither is it significant that I am educated, understand 
 my rights and can argue my case. My contribution to the acquisition of some of the 
 property was not significant after all; it is men that acquire property, not women. My 
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 ability to hire the best lawyer in town and pursue the matter in the formal legal sys
 tem was not a welcome avenue even to my own family’.128 
It is acknowledged that, much as the quotation relates to a family dispute, it provides an il-
lustration of a negative perception of litigation harboured generally by Kenyans. This reality 
is equally faced by those in business ventures. The adversarial nature of the litigation proc-
ess makes many give up their rights to legal enforcement, something that can be tapped to 
promote informal mechanisms. It is argued that, unless mechanisms that promote alternative 
avenues to business restructuring are considered, the existing perception will equally en-
courage a business in financial distress to continue trading on, until it is inevitable that it 
must start a legal process. Failing to take necessary measures to restructure a distressed 
business early enough undermines the chances of successful rescue. 
 
Another important aspect that endears workouts to Kenya is the abundance of regional op-
portunity that will boost and nurture large as well as multi-national institutions. Kenya’s par-
ticipation in regional custom union is a good recognition that its economic growth will in-
evitably require greater integration with its neighbours. It is therefore imperative that its in-
solvency law, both through the local and informal mechanisms, operates efficiently. Central 
banks are already collaborating on supervision exercises across borders, stimulating learning 
and best practice,
129
 which should be tapped into, and possibly developing the necessary in-
formal workouts. 
 
                                                          
128
 Catherine M Mumma, ‘Accessing Justice and Protecting the Rights of the Vulnerable through Cultural 
Structures: A Tool on Working with Elders in Communities’ available in http://kelinkenya.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Working-with-Cultural-Structures-A4FINAL.pdf accessed on 20
th
 November 2012. 
129
 USAID, ‘Kenya’s Agenda for Action: Commercial Legal and Institutional Reform -Diagnostic of Kenya 
Business Environment’   (2009) available at http://www.bizclir.com/gallaries/county-assessment/Kenya.pdf 
accessed on 30th  November 2012 
186 
 
It can be gleaned from this analysis that Kenya has auspicious circumstances that could 
promote informal corporate restructuring. Much as the well-known informal approaches 
analysed previously, such as pre-packaged bankruptcy, are foreign concepts to Kenya, their 
absence provides an opportunity to consider their possibilities. In consideration of the fact 
that a pre-packaged insolvency is a structured business sale, which is negotiated and agreed 
with a proposed buyer who must have its own structures and funding in place before the deal 
is completed, it is argued that the practice can easily be done in Kenya. In fact, the chances 
of success in the days to come are high, provided that the necessary reforms to the formal 
insolvency mechanisms, as proposed by the pending insolvency bill, take effect. The advan-
tages that pre-packaged sales offer, such as parties being able to exercise greater control 
over the message being put across to suppliers, customers and others outside, reducing op-
portunities for such persons to disrupt the continuation of the business, is attractive. In addi-
tion, the merit of enabling a smooth hand-over of the business, both internally and in relation 
to third parties besides the employees retaining their jobs, agrees with the Kenyan vision 
2030 agenda.
130
 
A workout, as was detailed, has its vital role in restructuring. The mystery is whether the 
popular workout is a viable option in Kenya. A fundamental aspect to remember is that in 
Kenya, just like in most developing economies; bank lending is a prime source of credit to 
enterprises.
131
In addition, the credit relationships between banks and enterprises are inher-
ently risky and therefore banks use collaterals in order to mitigate these risks. This is a prac-
tice common in many jurisdictions. England, as an example through its judicial and legisla-
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tive policy, encourages financing through secured loans. Through this the UK firms’ major-
ity debts are financed through syndicated bank loans and are also bound by the terms of 
syndicate lenders.
132As a result, the banks’ behaviour is guided by the formal and informal 
authority of regulating agencies. Another similarity is the roles played by their central banks. 
The Kenyan central bank, just like the Bank of England, has existing relationships with 
lending institutions, such as commercial banks, and equally plays that vital role in coordinat-
ing the activities of these institutions. However, the Kenya Central bank does not have that 
historical role of orchestrating solutions to financial distress pronounced in the English 
equivalent; an extra role which is entirely separate from the Banks’ role as the UK’s banking 
supervisory authority.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that the central bank of Kenya can use its authority as a state institu-
tion to play that important role of generating norms which can guide the process of restruc-
turing in financial distress. Such a role will fit well with suggestions that the state institution 
may be able to influence parties by pure co-ordination.
133
 It could as well induce social or 
economic change by altering the environmental constraints on individual decision mak-
ing.
134
This was demonstrated clearly by the Bank of England through its early efforts to save 
businesses by developing a pattern which, over time, became self-enforcing. In Japan too, 
workouts involve a rescue package that is put in place by the company’s main banker. The 
effectiveness of this will also depend on the existing insolvency procedure and equally on 
the closeness of the relationship that exists between the company and its principal banker. It 
is acknowledged that, much as the changing market dynamics, especially in the UK, have 
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profoundly destabilized the efficiency of the London Approach, its principles can still offer 
guidance in devising solutions that are appropriate to Kenya’s circumstances. Besides, the 
changes, such as companies resorting less to bank loans in the UK and instead using disin-
ter-mediated debt finance, such as bonds issues,
135
 are not that common in Kenya.  
 
However, of significant concern is the evidence that the value of the London Approach, de-
veloped from an advanced economy, has been largely confined to very large rescue attempts 
and with extensive borrowing.
136
 It has been emphasized as appropriate for large companies 
because the cost of a successful workout can range up to £6million over its life time and can 
extend to ten years.
137
 On the contrary, the Kenyan economy is small and still relies on tradi-
tional credit instruments, such as bank loans, leasing and investment lending. Besides, banks 
are corporations, just like elsewhere in the world, although Kenyan banks tend to be self-
dealing, involving loans to shareholders, managers or politically important people. This is a 
serious impediment as it has been documented in other jurisdictions and in particular in 
Germany which once had similar bank dominating systems as poor at financing innovation 
and entrepreneurship.
138
 
 
It may also be observed that a large percentage of businesses in Kenya, which range from 
small to medium businesses, cannot be said to have extensive borrowing.
139
 Furthermore, 
the few large multinational firms with businesses in Kenya are increasingly concentrating 
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their efforts on branding and marketing, rather than production and so there is a developing 
trend towards out sourcing from the small local firms.
140
 Therefore the context in which the 
London Approach was able to operate may be very different from the realities in Kenya, 
raising concerns as to whether such an approach is appropriate. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that this divergence of realities does not necessarily mean that the ideologies behind the 
London Approach are irrelevant. On the contrary, it is arguable that Kenya can borrow the 
idea behind this workout and develop a functional equivalent. For instance, the fundamental 
tenets behind the London Approach can be borrowed and fashioned to the Kenyan realities. 
However, it is foreseen that informal workouts in Kenya might be impeded by a lack of 
trust. Trust or good faith, as was noted, is a crucial aspect which workouts require which is 
unseen and unknown and is purely grounded upon the actions of others. In fact, Kenya busi-
nesses have in the recent past been plagued by mismanagement, amongst other challenges, 
sometimes to an extent that they have collapsed. The devastating losses that many creditors 
incurred as a result of these failures are still fresh; and the public is reluctant to give these 
organizations a second chance. There is a general lack of trust in the business community 
when it comes to working together to improve efficiency.
141
 
 
It must however be noted that the current challenges facing the UK that are acknowledged as 
straining the operation of the London Approach in its home base will be faced in Kenya in 
the near future. This is because the sources of finances and commercial banking will have to 
grow in pace with economic expansion. It will therefore be necessary to factor those realities 
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into the reforms such that they do not become emergency measures but rather long lasting 
solutions. A functional equivalent of the London Approach or workout will be ideal as it 
would be unrealistic to expect an emerging-market’s insolvency regimes to both smoothly 
and effectively in corporate norms, legislative, regulatory, institutional and judicial practices 
that took decades to evolve in their the advanced economies that were their origin. Even the 
functional equivalent of the London Approach/pre-pack or workout would require time to be 
understood by policy makers, business leaders and practitioners before it could be assimi-
lated into the overall legal system. It might also need appropriate modification for it to be 
implemented in the Kenyan context and enforced by entirely new or radically re-designed 
agencies and courts, and to be accepted by the general business and governmental culture. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Informal restructuring, just like its formal counterpart is the product of deliberate efforts to 
avert or at least minimize the impact of market dynamics upon a struggling business. In 
practice, there are fundamental differences between the informal and formal, the main one 
being the extent of court involvement in the latter and the absence in the former. Besides, 
informal restructuring does not entail dealing with creditors collectively while the formal 
procedures tend to be collective. In addition, formal procedures often involve statutory 
moratoria, while moratoria under informal mechanisms require a consensual standstill. It 
was also noted that the possibility of having an effective workout is hugely dependent on the 
existence of reliable formal mechanisms to at least act as a threat of enforceable legal ap-
proach, and the absence of effective mechanisms may be an impediment in Kenya. Although 
there have been reforms in the Kenyan judiciary, it remains to be seen whether the reforms 
have boosted the image and reliability of the courts. The lack of a modern insolvency law in 
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Kenya makes informal mechanisms a good alternative. In addition, the fact that Kenya is 
used to informal approaches to dispute resolution is a good justification for advocating 
workouts. The test is whether the principles or approaches championed by international in-
stitutions suit Kenya. The external supply of best practices can facilitate radical changes but 
the danger is that they might not be feasible in the circumstances of a developing economy. 
Besides, some critics have argued that these standards do not hold what they promise.
142
 
These standards that are derived from abstract principles rather than consisting merely of a 
synthesis of existing legislation. The disadvantage is that the principles from which they are 
derived may have little to do with existing practice, and the remedies they offer could there-
fore be quite ineffective. Admittedly, there is gap between theory and practice, between 
rules and their implementation. 
 
It is argued that developing a functional equivalent of a workout is a realistic approach as 
this allows for the possibility of having mechanisms tailored on realities of a developing 
economy. These sentiments were echoed by Thomas, who proposed that tailoring a corpo-
rate debt restructuring strategy to individual country circumstances requires attention to a 
number of key factors, such as policy coordination, consideration of the reform of the legal 
and institutional framework for enforcement of credit, particularly the corporate insolvency 
law, government support to facilitate out-of-court restructurings and potential innovations to 
facilitate voluntary standstills amongst others.
143
 Therefore legal reforms, such as the Insol-
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vency Bill, are only one requirement for an effective insolvency system and reforms to the 
wider infrastructure are equally important. In addition, it is prudent as a prerequisite for the 
new laws to become part of the continuous process of legal change, without which the for-
mal legal system or informal approaches developed will remain largely irrelevant.
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    CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 DRIVERS OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY REFORMS IN THE UK 
 ‘Bankruptcy laws, like the economies they serve, are not static and need to be amended and 
altered to serve the commercial reality of a particular country.’1 
INTRODUCTION 
The reform of corporate insolvency laws has been a concern around the world for some 
years. For example the United Kingdom has witnessed a number of legal reforms, especially 
in the recent past. In the UK and in other jurisdictions of the world, different forces may 
have a powerful influence over the shape, as well as progression, of their respective bodies 
of relevant law.
2
 The increased activity in this regard is motivated by internal forces, as well 
as external, which in this thesis are referred to as drivers. This chapter discusses the devel-
opment of corporate insolvency law in the UK and looks at reform efforts in order to under-
stand what drives the reforms. This is considered necessary to the main objective of estab-
lishing whether Kenya can learn in its reform endeavour from the UK. As Finch articulates 
while proposing models of insolvency law reform, it is important to comprehend the factors 
that drive reforms and what ought to drive the reform agenda, because unless this is done, 
there is a danger of the law developing in an ill-coordinated and an incoherent manner.
3
 In 
addition, she proposes three important issues, namely movements in market conditions, 
needs for new strategies, and adjustments of overall objectives as factors that drive reforms. 
In fact, the issues mentioned arguably summarize the core reasons for legal change. How-
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ever, to actually understand, for example, how market changes drive insolvency law reform, 
it is necessary to delve further and comprehend what causes those market changes. Besides, 
it is argued that whenever a significant change occurs in the market dynamics, the objectives 
of the laws in a jurisdiction will have to be adjusted and so will the strategies. This chapter is 
organized into two main parts. The first part explores the historical development of insol-
vency laws. The English jurisdiction has a long history in insolvency matters and the histori-
cal evolution of corporate insolvency laws and procedures has been investigated in detail in 
a number of studies.
4
 Therefore the analysis offered here is limited to highlighting the most 
significant issues for the argument of this chapter. The second part explores the develop-
ments in recent times i.e. in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. It seeks to understand 
the forces instrumental in shaping corporate insolvency in the UK-the drivers of reforms. It 
is evident that the reform efforts that started in the twentieth century were actualized in the 
twenty first century. Therefore, the second part entails an exploration of each driver as it de-
veloped through the centuries. The drivers that are examined in the second part have been 
categorized into two main groups. The first group comprises contextual themes, namely the 
development of a rescue culture, globalization, crisis, regional integration, competition and 
efficiency. These factors may necessitate reforms but the implementation of reforms is de-
pendent on political will.  The second category is the actors or players, who are the govern-
ment, international institutions and interest groups. It is important to note that each of the 
drivers cannot be said to operate in isolation. For instance, changes in market conditions 
make the existing legal provisions inadequate, necessitating reform, but realizing this re-
quires the government’s deliberate efforts and political will to enact laws.5 
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5.1 THE EARLY HISTORY AND REFORMS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
 
5.1.1 The Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century 
The roots of the UK insolvency laws may be traced back to the 14th century, a time when it 
was common practice for banks to deal with the economic fallout of financial crises.
6
 A sig-
nificant moment was when a general crisis in banking occurred, that involved most of the 
leading houses in Florence facing financial distress as a result of an over-extension of 
credit.
7
 In particular, the failure of the Bardi Bank in 1345 shocked the financial stability of 
England and provided the ‘wake-up call’ for legislation in relation to those who caused such 
a crisis.
8
 However, no legislation was enacted but literature documents that creditors at-
tempted to collect their accounts using whatever means were available under the ordinary 
process of the courts.
9
 In essence, there was no collective procedure for administration of an 
insolvent’s estate and a disappointed creditor could seize the effects of his debtor and, later 
on, his person also.
10
 It was during the reign of Henry VIII in 1542 when the Bankruptcy 
Act was enacted. It was intended to govern proceedings against absconding or concealed 
debtors amongst the merchants.
11
 The Act enabled the aggrieved creditors to procure the 
seizure and sale and a rate able distribution of the debtor’s property amongst his creditors.12 
At that particular time, insolvency law was concerned with effective debt collection and pro-
tecting trade and punishing rogues. 
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It is notable that the character of this particular legislation reflected societal attitudes in Eng-
land that were inclined to punish risk takers when the risks went wrong and side with credi-
tors who lost out. Besides, the law has been said to be rooted in social institutions as well as 
in socio-economic networks and it plays an important role in the fulfilment of social needs. 
Social factors can influence the course of law or the direction of legal change,
13
 as is sup-
ported by historical realities. In particular, during the medieval days in the UK, insolvency 
was seen as a disgrace and when an individual became insolvent, the cause was usually pre-
sumed as having been due to the fault of the debtor. Goode describes the life of a medieval 
debtor as ‘likely to be nasty, brutish and short.14 Just as the charging of usury by money 
lenders was regarded as contrary to the laws of God and was punished accordingly both by 
the church and by the powers temporal, so also falling into debt was considered mortal 
sin’.15 Besides, credit and trade were largely personal processes and outstanding debt re-
garded as a breach of faith. Consequently, the English bankruptcy law remained exclusively 
an instrument of debt-collection with its final objective being to seize the debtor’s assets 
against the strong protections to private property offered by the Common law.
16
 
 However, problems arose with this narrow approach i.e. the lack of collectively in the early 
16th century, primarily as debtors discovered an increasing number of ways to avoid impris-
onment, such that bankruptcy was considered a means of stemming creditor frustration and 
restoring some order to the management of outstanding debt.
17
Nonetheless, despite the harsh 
treatment of entrepreneurs facing severe risks to their life and health if their businesses 
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failed, fraudulent bankruptcies increased. This reality necessitated reforms to make better 
provisions for suppressing them and to provide means for persons to be declared bankrupt.
18
 
The next legislation to be enacted was the Bankruptcy Act of 1571
19
 which is noteworthy for 
two main reasons. First, it explicitly limited the statute on bankruptcy to merchants and sec-
ond it created the position of commissioners of bankrupts, who were to be appointed by the 
chancellor to oversee each bankruptcy.  Such persons were often lawyers or merchants, who 
served in their private capacity and were paid out of the proceeds of the bankrupt’s estate.20 
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that, the legal advancement in that historic period 
was because of a need to develop a mechanism to assert the power and moral authority of 
the state through punishment; a solution to curb the evasive, delaying and often fraudulent 
practices of debtors. Generally the legislative reforms were attempts to deal with the prob-
lem of uncooperative bankrupts. In fact, the lawmakers intensified the threat of punishment 
of bankrupts, although some literature suggests that they had begun to realize the necessity 
of a debtor-friendly, ‘carrot’-like, rather than ‘stick’-like, discharge.21 
5.1.2   The Seventeenth Century Reforms 
The Seventeenth century is considered the era of credit, much as some literature contends 
that the use of credit started in the sixteenth century.
22
 It was at this point that the economy 
was maturing more quickly and becoming complex. The rapid commercial growth, as seen 
by the expansion of trade, especially overseas, brought in new challenges. It became clear 
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that there was a need to create effective insolvency measures because of the risk of failure 
and its effect on the delicate order developing in commerce.  
Appleby says:  
‘The seventeenth-century commercial order of England was exposed to a new battery 
of dislocating forces: international competition, monetary fluctuations, and disconti-
nuities in the levels of supply and demand’23 
The changes in the commercial order and the economy made the then existing legislative 
framework generally incomprehensible.
24
 In fact, it has been documented that this era was 
the beginning of the British primacy in world trade and, the commercial sector of the econ-
omy was the most innovative one.
25
  Importantly, three statutes were enacted namely: the 
Bankruptcy Act 1604, the Bankruptcy Act 1623 and the Bankruptcy Act 1662. Generally, 
the aforementioned legislations clarified aspects of the Bankruptcy Act 1571 and addressed 
particular issues, such as new acts of bankruptcy or the exclusion of certain categories of 
debtors from the legislation. These reforms were done in as a continuing effort to stem the 
tide of bankrupts. In this vein, the Parliament continued to increase the powers of the Com-
missioner to investigate fraud, under powers contained in the Bankruptcy Act of 1604. Gen-
erally, the notion that bankrupts were persons who practiced deceit led to bankruptcy re-
forms, which increased the rights and remedies of the creditors and the notion of punishing 
bankrupts remained a key characteristic of the enacted laws. However, the need to help 
creditors is demonstrated in the preamble of 1604 Act which states that ‘An Act for better 
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relief of creditors against such as shall become bankrupt’.26 Equally, the 1623 Act reflects 
similar sentiments as it was also described as an ‘Act for the Further Description of a Bank-
rupt and Relief of Creditors against Such as Shall Become Bankrupts and for Inflicting Cor-
poral Punishment upon the Bankrupts in Some Special Cases.’27 It is notable that under this 
Act, a debtor indicted for fraudulent transfers was also subject to punishment by Pillory and 
the loss of an ear.
28
 In essence, the legislators were dealing with a reality that the number of 
bankrupts had increased, as well as levels of fraud and deceit, as the debtors invented new 
practices to circumvent penalties entrenched in the laws. Many other statutes and bills came 
up in subsequent years.  It is worth noting that between 1678 and 1698, around at least thir-
teen separate bills were presented in parliament, many of which were designed to provide 
the unfortunate insolvent with an attractive alternative to the bankruptcy laws.
29
 
5.1.3    The Eighteen Century Reforms 
The journey of reforming insolvency law in this era can best be described as a move from 
debtor repression to debtor protection, in which there has been a redefinition of the roles and 
focus of insolvency.
30
 In contrast to the reforms of the preceding centuries, this era marked 
the start of a shift in focus from protection of creditors’ rights to greater reflection of the 
debtor’s interest.31 It was at this point that a general recognition emerged that financial fail-
ure is the price society must pay for the lifeblood of the modern economy, namely credit.
32
 
Therefore, reforming the laws was a journey shaped by socio-historical, political and eco-
                                                          
26
 Bankruptcy Act of 1604 1 Jac 1,c 15 
27
 Bankruptcy Act of 1623 21 Jac 1, c 19  
28
 Ibid 
29
 Kadens, (n 20) 
30
 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Insolvency – A Second Chance: Why Modern 
Insolvency Laws Seeks to Promote Business Rescue’ Law in Transition ( EBDR, 2013) 
31
 Griggs (n 22) 
32
 Ibid 
200 
 
nomic factors. In essence, the economic transformations, cultural change, and general insti-
tutional modifications had a massive impact on the structure and working of bankruptcy 
laws, procedures and enforcement mechanisms.
33
 Besides, the rise of industrialization, tech-
nological advancement and globalization made the medieval laws that were meant to deal 
with the pre-industrial economy and relatively undeveloped credit markets inadequate. 
 
A major reform was brought by the Bankruptcy Act of 1705, which introduced debt dis-
charge as a normal conclusion of a bankruptcy process. This legislation is a very significant 
realignment of debtor-creditor relations, as it actually changed the status of a bankrupt from 
a quasi-criminal to that of an unsuccessful defendant in a civil action.
34
 In essence, a bank-
rupt’s actions or omissions which were previously handled as if they were crimes hence 
punishable before the law were treated as civil actions. Varying reasons have been offered as 
the motivations behind the enactment of this legislation. Friedman and Niemira contend that, 
‘the introduction of discharge was both cause and effect of a new attitude toward the bank-
rupt. From a crime, bankruptcy evolves into what we might rather call a commercial cri-
sis’.35 In addition, Duffy has referred to the Bankruptcy Act of 1705 as the ‘initial meliorat-
ing statute’ from the bankrupt’s perspective.36 There was therefore a gradual realization that 
in many cases the bankrupt might be properly an object of pity and that the unlimited in-
ternment of the debtor did not tend to reimburse the creditors at all.
37
 However, a different 
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view was that the debtors’ prisons were at capacity and this incarceration was creating a na-
tional problem in England.
38
 
It is evident though that changing circumstances and the need for order had precipitated a 
change in the bankruptcy law. It is notable that discharge was not a universally accepted no-
tion, and bankrupts were still generally viewed as frauds.
39
 
Trieman maintains that the law experienced an important shift at this time:  
‘Instead of dealing primarily with the legal phenomenon involved in the debtor's 
conduct, it seeks to regulate the economic situation that arises out of the debtor's fi-
nancial condition.’40 
The legislation provided that honest insolvents be granted discharge if they complied with 
the requirements of the law, such as cooperating fully with their creditors by appearing be-
fore the bankruptcy commissioners and disclosing all of their assets after becoming bank-
rupts.
41
 Nonetheless, fraudulent bankruptcy was still a capital offence and statutorily defined 
as such. 
Later, the Bankruptcy Act of 1719 permitted the admissibility of bankruptcy examination as 
evidence in criminal trials.
42
 Further reforms were brought in with the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1732, which was substantively similar to the 1705 Act, although proce-
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durally much more detailed. The conditions precedent for a discharge was spelled out in de-
tail in the 1732 Act, as was the method for enforcing the discharge. Generally, the statute 
incorporated prior elements in laws, such discharge and the felony provisions, and thereafter 
capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy remained a part of English law until 1820. The 
subsequent circle of reforms in this century, starting from the 1732 Act, which codified the 
whole respective legal body revolved around the question of how the debtors should be 
treated.  
It is argued that the reforms in the eighteenth century were propelled by the dilemma of how 
to deal with the insolvent traders.  Whereas, some debtors had been found to be too secre-
tive, subtle and crafty, others were honest and deserving sympathy. One analyst gave an ex-
ample of a dishonourable scheme: 
 ‘Thomas Pitkin met with his business partner, Thomas Brerewood, in the Swan 
Tavern in Cornhill, in the heart of the mercantile district of London. The men met to 
pull the trigger on a fraud that had been at least nine months in the making.  After the 
meeting, Pitkin would leave London, absconding first to Scotland and later to Hol-
land, and setting in motion an economic panic, an international man hunt, and a re-
form of English bankruptcy law.’43 
5.1.4   The Nineteenth Century Reforms 
The series of reforms in this century laid the foundations of the modern law of bankruptcy as 
it is today. An initial statute of note is the Insolvent Debtors Act of 1813, whose main pur-
pose was to alleviate the plight of the non-traders and which established a specialist Court 
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for the relief of insolvent debtors.
44
 Further reforms were brought in by the Bankruptcy Act 
1824 and consolidated in Bankruptcy Act 1825. From this period, England entered a long 
series of reform which two main objects were to end prison for debt, and to reintroduce judi-
cially sanctioned arrangements marked by creation of bankruptcy courts and the shift to an 
involuntary and voluntary procedure.
45
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1825 permitted the debtor to 
initiate their own bankruptcy, in agreement with creditors. The pressure for depersonaliza-
tion of business led to the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, which estab-
lished a company as a distinct legal entity with unlimited liability for the shareholders and 
made it possible to make a company bankrupt just like an individual.
46
 In addition, corporate 
insolvency was dealt with by means of special statutory provisions such as the Joint Stock 
Companies Winding Up Acts 1848 and 1849. 
During the initial stages, corporate insolvency had aligned its identity with bankruptcy law 
but this later changed with the emergence of a limited liability company as a business vehi-
cle, as created in the Limited Liability Act 1855. It was then that the UK witnessed the 
growth of the large corporation and the need for large-scale investment.  Besides, there was 
a flow of outside finance and new and sometimes complicated capital structures emerged. 
As a result, the existing substantive legal rules and procedures gradually became inadequate. 
The stimuli to the insolvency reforms during that first half of the 19
th
 century were the mo-
mentum imparted to the national economy by Industrial Revolution, the adverse effects of 
Napoleonic wars and ordinary hazards afflicting all sectors of the society. It was inevitable 
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that the law was adjusted and amended in the light of these experiences in an attempt to find 
satisfactory solutions. 
It was also during this century that reforms grew from the dissatisfaction with the confine-
ment of bankruptcy to traders, coupled with the need for an attitude change towards risk and 
credit.
47
A noteworthy statute is the Bankruptcy Act of 1861 which declared its provisions to 
be applicable to all debtors whether traders or not. In fact, this legislation included the pos-
sibility of a judicially-confirmed arrangement. At this point reforms started to draw a dis-
tinction in the treatment of corporate and individual debtors, although both shared common 
jurisprudential objectives, premised on protecting property rights and closing businesses 
where necessary in an efficient, accountable and fair manner.
48
 This statute signified the 
shift in entrepreneurial structure, in the sense that a new business vehicle had been created 
whose character and abilities varied from the old personal way of commerce. This necessi-
tated enactment of new law cognizant to corporate existence. Such changes were prompted 
by the notions that credit could be available on an institutional basis as well as capital 
through stocks.
49
 The first modern company law statute was the Companies Act 1862 which 
contained detailed winding up provisions, including a provision for pari passu distribution.
50
 
The second half of the 19th century also saw the birth of a new wave of reforms which can 
be described as generally representing a validation of the change towards a positive outlook 
in respect of bankrupts with a focus on the rehabilitation of the debtor. The earliest discus-
sion on rescue was during the passage of the Bankruptcy Bill 1883, where the President of 
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the Board of Trade echoed that, in formulating the purpose of a good bankruptcy law sys-
tem, ‘Parliament had to endeavour, as far as possible, to protect the salvage and also to di-
minish the number of wrecks.’51 This change of attitude can arguably be said to have been 
negated by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 much as it was meant to deal with 
businessmen engaged in fraudulent deals and in particular those who had no funds to cover 
their investment. However, the Debtors Act 1869 reinstated the change of treatment of in-
solvent debtors by abolishing imprisonment for debt and the punishment of certain fraudu-
lent debtors. Besides, the policy addressed the need to break away from the traditional 
model of corporate insolvency laws of merely discharging the function of liquidation while 
neglecting to settle the difficulties and rejuvenate the corporate entity and its business.  
Noteworthy, the Bankruptcy Act 1914 which reinforced the harsh treatment of debtors is a 
product of the efforts a burning social issue. Most significantly, this act required the debtor 
to apply for bankruptcy in a public court, such that a debtor was embarrassed as the mem-
bers of the public got to learn that a particular debtor was applying for bankruptcy and ex-
posed details of the financial position. Corporate insolvency laws in the UK were further 
reformed with the enactment of the Companies Acts of 1929 and 1948 which were prompted 
by societal advancement and commercialization in the 20th century. At this point, no much 
change in bankruptcy law took place until much later, the oil crisis and economic recession 
in the 1970s would prompt the government to review the existing insolvency laws which 
had become unsatisfactory and ineffective. There are other modern statutes especially in the 
twenty first century which will be pointed out in the in-depth exploration of each driver be-
low. 
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It is evident that reforms in the nineteenth century, as already detailed, were propelled by a 
number of factors that led the government towards active involvement. In essence, change 
occurs into two phases where the first phase are variety of factors such as  challenges, cir-
cumstances etc which propels the second phase where the government drives reforms by en-
gaging in mechanism/activities to realize change. The increase in the number of bankrupt-
cies in the 19th century created unease about credit and debt. This reality made the law mak-
ers and businessmen realize that the consequences of commercial failure were impregnable 
barriers to economic development. Arguably, the increase in the number of bankruptcies 
was at that point a key driver that prompted the reforms. In essence, law and society exist in 
a relationship of action and reaction such that law constantly progresses as it adapts to the 
social realities. Basically, the bankruptcy and rescue law systems were weak and not capable 
of supporting t companies, enabling them to rehabilitate in the face of a high volume of en-
terprise distress and long term economic recession. As a result, a myriad of legal reforms 
were witnessed in the pursuit of new and coherent corporate insolvency laws, properly tai-
lored to shepherd corporations through the commercialized world. In fact, according to Les-
ter, substantial efforts to reform insolvency law happened between 1831 and 1914 as evi-
denced by the numerous reports of royal commission and parliamentary select committees 
and a government bureaucracy and budget.
52
 This approach illustrates the role of the gov-
ernment in driving reforms and in-depth analysis will be dealt with later in the chapter. 
The UK approach to corporate rescue has, however, only developed much more recently as 
influenced by several factors among them social realities and technological advancement 
resulting in the development of specialized statutory mechanisms for corporate rescue. A 
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survey of the reforms 1980s to present reveals that they were prompted by the limitations 
and deficiencies of reforms brought in the 19th century, which proved inadequate when 
scandalous malpractices and abuses such as phoenix companies emerged. This abuse occurs 
where a company is allowed to be run down to the point of winding up only for its business 
to metaphorically rise up from the ashes as a new company formed and managed by an al-
most identical group of persons and utilizing a company name similar to that of a former 
company.
53
 
 
5.2 REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN TIMES 
The corporate insolvency laws have gained significant attention in modern times for various 
reasons. First, corporate insolvency law is seen and understood as a safeguard and anchor 
for the stability of a country’s financial situation.54 According to the IMF, insolvency law 
strengthens a country’s economic and financial system.55 Besides, there is an increased per-
ception of insolvency law’s importance as a primary factor for any investment interest in 
any jurisdiction, provided that this law is effective and guarantees an orderly proceeding 
with a fair, transparent, and predictable treatment for the stakeholder.
56
 Orderly and effective 
insolvency laws wield a disciplining function on all actors on the stage. Insolvency law has 
also been said to influence the conditions for investment because banks tend to adjust their 
lending and reorganization practice in response to changes in insolvency law.
57
 Further, it is 
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generally accepted that it allows the market to do away with the inefficient businesses and 
reallocate capital to efficient businesses.  
 
5.2.1The Rescue Culture 
The major thrust of insolvency reform in many jurisdictions in the last three to four decades 
has been the development of legislation to facilitate business reorganizations. That is, the 
continuation of a business in the shadow of insolvency, which inevitably requires some ad-
ditional funding and at the very least some cooperation from existing creditors to postpone 
and/or compromise their claims in the interest of the rescue efforts. Arguably, the more the 
jurisdictions revise their corporate insolvency law, the more that rescue culture is pursued. 
This phenomenon drives reforms. Rescue can be described as a major intervention which is 
necessary to avert the looming failure of a company.
58
 As well, it can be seen as the drastic 
remedial action that is taken at a time of corporate crisis.
59
 These actions go beyond the 
normal managerial responses to corporate troubles and may operate through informal 
mechanisms as well as formal legal processes.
60
 
The Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558, 
commonly known as the ‘Cork Report’ was the basis for the reforms and modernization of 
insolvency laws in the UK. Ever since the publication of that report, the development of a 
rescue culture has been an endeavour in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. Its justifica-
tion lies in the fact that corporate failure can have devastating effects. This reality was well 
articulated by Sir Kenneth Cork who was of the view that the livelihood and well-being of 
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those dependent upon an enterprise could be the livelihood of a whole town or even a region 
and therefore a modern insolvency law must have regard to rescue culture.
61
 
The Cork Report acknowledged the change in attitudes towards business failure that had oc-
curred and sought to define the characteristics of a good modern insolvency law by looking 
at the existing procedures in place and seeing how they could be reformed to address the 
weaknesses in the law.
62
 In particular, the report pioneered significant ideologies that have 
driven and advanced reform. For instance, it proposed that one of the aims of a good modern 
insolvency law was ‘...to provide means for the preservation of viable commercial enter-
prises capable of making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country’.63 Essen-
tially, the government’s concern was with respect to the appointment of administrative re-
ceivers related to issues such as the extent to which the procedure provided adequate incen-
tives to maximize economic value. The Commission engaged in discussions on how to de-
velop a corporate insolvency system and came up with objectives which gave the English 
system a sense of direction as well as allowing the flexibility to add further if required.
64
 It is 
notable that the subsidiary (second) purpose of the administration procedure, after rescue of 
the company, was the achievement of ‘.....a better result for the company’s creditors as a 
whole than would be likely if the company were wound up’.65 
The proposals of the Cork Committee were partially implemented in the Insolvency Act 
1985, a piece of legislation which was consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986. It is notable 
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that the Cork Report was not only comprehensive and rational but also that it marked a his-
toric movement away from a punitive approach towards a more rehabilitative (rescue) based 
approach to dealing with business failure. The ideology of rescue became fundamental in the 
Insolvency Act 1986, as evidenced by the introduction of two rescue mechanisms namely 
the company voluntary arrangements
66
 and administration orders procedures. Intrinsically, 
the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986, with a variety of insolvency procedures, was to 
promote the rescue culture by facilitating reorganization with the hope of a better financial 
outcome than would be achieved through the immediate liquidation route. This culture was 
also apparent in other parts of the legislation but noteworthy among these are the constraints 
imposed by section 233 on actions of utility suppliers threatening to cut off essential sup-
plies to a company in distress already put under trusteeship of official receivers. 
The initial attempts to provide an effective rescue model were not very successful and in 
practice there were many technical problems not earlier anticipated. For instance, the ad-
ministration regime was hampered by the requirement of an application to court, in accor-
dance with Insolvency Rule 2.2, which proved to be expensive. In addition, the existence of 
the floating charge as a security gave the banks excessive privilege in the administration 
procedure. As a floating charge holder, the bank would appoint a receiver following a de-
fault by the corporate borrower. The appointment was purely contractual requiring the re-
ceiver to primarily realize the company asset to discharge the debt due to the secured credi-
tor.
67
 
Equally, the company voluntary arrangement has been documented as having been little util-
ized between 1987 and 1983 for the single most important reason that it lacked a statutory 
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moratorium, which may be regarded as a crucial aspect in rescue efforts. Similar sentiments 
were expressed in the 1993 Consultative Document entitled ‘Company Voluntary Arrange-
ments and Administrative Orders’.68 Chapter two of the consultative document describes the 
barriers to the use of the company voluntary arrangement. A further consultation was done 
in 1995,
69
 which is very significant since the proposals that were put forward in it were en-
acted in the Enterprise Act 2002. For instance, there was a perception that secured creditors, 
in particular banks, were too ready to put troubled companies into administrative receiver-
ship, a practice considered as hostile to enterprise and to the interests of unsecured credi-
tors.
70
 It has been documented that the Enterprise Act 2002 was passed in order to improve 
the insolvency procedures available to troubled corporations and to rejuvenate the broader 
rescue culture.
71
 This is largely true since the provision in the Act addressed some shortcom-
ings of the 1986 Act, such as making the insolvency procedure more accountable and trans-
parent by: removing receivership; abolishing the preference for Crown debts; and attempting 
to implement an insolvency regime that reflected the modern realities in the business and 
financial worlds. In this pursuit, the Blair Government encouraged a movement towards a 
more US-style philosophy of enterprise that was less censorious of business failures and 
more encouraging of rescue.
72
 
The need to prioritize rescue when dealing with companies in distress has been endorsed by 
a wide range of groups such as politicians, legislators as well as by the judiciary and bank-
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ers. Specifically, it is evident from a review of governmental statements leading up to the 
Enterprise Act 2002 that the desire to nurture a rescue culture was a significant driver of re-
forms. The 1998 White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven 
Economy,
73
 together with a joint DTI and Treasury initiative that was formed in order to fur-
ther the rescue culture and examines how it could be made to work more efficiently.
74
 Gen-
erally, the published views of the Insolvency Service reveal that the Government's central 
aim was to promote ‘a culture in which companies that can be rescued are rescued’.75 
In addition, during the second reading of the Enterprise Bill, Patricia Hewitt, the then Trade 
and Industry Secretary, expressed that the Bill  
 ‘Strengthens the foundations of an enterprise economy by … establishing an insol-
vency  regime that will encourage honest but unsuccessful entrepreneurs to try again.’76  
Further, Melanie Johnson, her successor, said that  
 ‘The insolvency reforms will help to address the fear of failure that is a significant 
 barrier  to enterprise and helps to prevent companies in difficulty from going under 
 unnecessarily.  Together, the reforms will help to make the UK become a better place 
 to do business  …’77 
                                                          
73
 DTI, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (DTI, December 1998, Cm.4176) 
paras 2.12 to 2.14. 
74
 DTI, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms, (DTI Interim Report , 
September 1999) 
75
 DTI, ‘An Update on the Corporate Insolvency Proposals’ January 14, 2002  
76
 HC Deb. April 10, 2002, col.44. Ms Hewitt was addressing the Parliament detailing the reasons why it was 
necessary to have reforms of corporate insolvency as was contained in the bill before parliament. 
77
 Vanessa Finch, ‘Re-invigorating corporate rescue’ [2003] J.B.L. 527-557 
213 
 
The judiciary has equally added its voice to the rescue debate. Of its own accord, it has on 
numerous occasions attempted to reinforce the importance of a rescue culture in English in-
solvency law. In Powdrill v Watson,
78
 Lord Brown-Wilkinson expressed that  
 ‘The Rescue Culture which seeks to preserve viable business was and is fundamental 
 to much of the Act of 1986. Its significance in the present case is that, given the im
 portance attached to receivers and administrators being able to continue to run a 
 business, it is unlikely that a parliament would have intended to produce a regime as 
 to employers’ right which renders any attempt at such rescue either extremely ha
 zardous or impossible.’79  
Likewise, in Farnborough-Aircraft.com Ltd Re,
80
 similar sentiments were echoed in the fol-
lowing words,  
 ‘….. (T)he purpose of administration (involves) the rescue culture which was rela
 tively  unknown in this country in relation to insolvency until the Insolvency Act 
 1986.’81 
It is worth noting that the pursuit of a rescue culture has resulted in anticipatory approaches 
to corporate troubles being institutionalized. For instance, the ideology in the Enterprise Act 
2002 is that of encouraging pre-emptive strategies to prevent the onset of financial distress; 
placing the obligation of ensuring that the financially distressed company seeks help at the 
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right time firmly on the shoulders of those in charge of the company.
82
 Besides, persistent 
audits and risk management have become key mechanisms to detect any potential problems 
with creditors keen to regularly monitor their investment to know the true financial position 
of the company.
83
 In addition, a company is expected to comply with best practice for fur-
thering the aim of rescue if any concerns are raised; seek intervention from outside of the 
company at the earliest opportunity if internal measures are insufficient in dealing with the 
matter.
84
 Generally, the shift from ‘debt collection’ to ‘risk management’ has encouraged 
those involved in the process to think about insolvency risks in advance of the final crisis.
85
 
In essence, the rescue culture has driven reforms, as encouraged by the government and de-
veloped by lenders, and the market has responded by providing the skills that are designed 
to prevent corporate disaster.
86
 
Noteworthy too is the role of banks in out of court restructuring. In fact, corporate restruc-
turing begins in earnest only when banks and market players are willing and able to partici-
pate.
87
 Besides, bank participation in the workout is important because it facilitates public 
debt exchange offers and in fact whenever such exchange offers are accompanied by bank 
concessions there is a higher likelihood of succeeding in restructuring.
88
 Literature reveals 
that financially distressed firms hire an investment bank to manage their exchange offers 
                                                          
82
 At the earliest sign of distress  early intervention should be sought, but of course this does not always work 
so the emphasis remains on the conduct of directors See Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue ( Sweet & Maxwell, 
2008), at 14  
83
 Anu Arora, ‘The Corporate Governance Failings in Financial institutions and Directors’ Legal Liability’ 
(2011) 3 Company Lawyer 5  
84
 Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: The Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’ (2010) 
502 Journal of Business Law 506 
85
 See generally Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (2nd edition 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapter 6   
86
  Ibid 
87
 Mark R Stone, ‘Corporate Sector Restructuring: The Role of Government in Times of Crisis’ (2002) 
Economic Issues 31 
88
 Christopher James ‘Bank Debt Restructurings and the Composition of Exchange Offers in Financial Dis-
tress’ (1996) 51 Journal of Finance 2:  711–727 
215 
 
when the debt structure is complex and there is a greater need for help in mitigating poten-
tial impediments to an out-of-court restructuring.
89
 In this capacity, banks offer critical lead-
ership skills and expertise, such as strategic, tactical and managerial skills needed in restruc-
turing. 
5.2.2 Globalization 
The literature on globalization gives varying accounts as to the precise time when it actually 
started. Some believe that the history stretches thousands of years, starting with Smith’s 
primitive hunter-gatherers trading with the next village, others contends that the world econ-
omy was fragmented and completely de-globalized before the 19th century.
90
 Specifically, it 
was not until the 1970s that the world witnessed the beginning of a new wave of financial 
integration. It may be noted that financial globalization is not a new phenomenon, but to-
day’s depth and breadth are unprecedented in the twenty first century. In particular, corpo-
rate bankruptcy law reform is no longer purely a national matter. This is because corpora-
tions and capital move around the world with increasing velocity. As a result, a global eco-
nomic order has emerged. The movement from the national to the international and global 
levels of goods, services etc is becoming of increasing importance and often the driving 
force for transnational regimes and institutions.
91
 In essence, there is an ever increasing de-
pendence of all economies on international trade and consequently the rise of global tides of 
economic depression. As a result, there is a developing trend and need for insolvency proc-
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esses that have international recognition as more insolvencies become cross-border in na-
ture.
92
 
In so many aspects, the momentum of reform, the content of reform, the trajectory of reform 
proceeds from, or responds to, the transnational and global context. In essence, the more the 
boundaries in international trade disappear, and ‘globalization’ becomes a reality, the greater 
the need to modernize the insolvency laws of countries to keep abreast of the times and pro-
vide efficient solutions from an economic standpoint.
93
 The globalization of trade and capi-
tal has a direct impact of opening up and connecting national markets across the globe. As a 
result, business entities are increasingly assuming more global outlooks. Inevitably, this 
consequently requires adjustment of domestic laws to facilitate trade and investment, espe-
cially to enhance the operations of multinational entities. An effective and efficient insol-
vency law that guarantees certainty, transparency and efficiency is considered a key factor 
that stimulates an efficient market exchange process, thus strengthening national and global 
economies.
94
 Basically, strategic reforms of insolvency laws have been undertaken so as to 
conform to the requirements of the global market and in particular to attract investment as 
well as support the operations of credit systems.
95
 
Globalization accelerates competition over ‘best practices’96 and as countries are exposed to 
competition in the global market they are compelled to adopt rules and approaches that are 
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seen as being of a global standard. For instance, for a country to enable its firms to access 
capital from another country it may have to reform its law to comply with the regulatory re-
quirements of that market, hence such external relations become a driving force. In addition, 
as firms get exposed to different institutional environments they are pressured to adopt prac-
tices that have institutional legitimacy for symbolic reasons.
97
 The UK, as a global competi-
tive economy, has benefited in the global wave in its reform. It is regarded as a significant 
trade partner and pace setter by many other jurisdictions, a reputation that has taken a long 
time to build and is constantly guarded. Therefore, whenever a development crops up in the 
global scene, the UK is either among the architects or first benefactors of it. For instance, the 
UK was influential in the design of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) and the World Bank recommendations in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis.
98
 
It is noteworthy that globalization has brought a lot benefits but nonetheless it carries impor-
tant risks. In essence, the more the financial systems become integrated and domestic mar-
kets are liberalized, the more a crisis in one jurisdiction will have impact in the other coun-
tries due to imperfections in financial markets or external factors. Crisis has driven insol-
vency reforms as policymakers attempt as to take advantage of the opportunities, while 
minimizing the risks. Crisis as a driver of reform in UK is explored in detail under subsec-
tion 5.2.4. 
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5.2.3 Emergence of Trading blocks 
The creation of economic blocs which resulted out of the desire to trade across national 
boundaries is one significant driver of reforms. In fact, legal history reveals that there is a 
tendency for integrated economic areas to develop common and harmonized laws.
99
 Such 
dynamic attempts have been undertaken in Europe in a bid to level the regulatory frame-
work. The EU initiatives were not focused on insolvency procedures initially but rather on 
subsidiary matters, such as employee protection as it engaged in promoting fair working 
conditions, for both economic and social reasons. The creation of a single market had merits 
and demerits as well which necessitated deliberations so that some countries did not suffer a 
disadvantage in offering better benefits to employees than other countries did. In essence, 
one of the EU influences on UK insolvency reforms is on the protection of employees in 
cases of insolvency. The reality is that in the field of employment and industrial relations, 
the European Union has created laws that have come to replace increasingly wide areas of 
national labour law. For instance the Council of the European Communities, in 1980 issued 
a Directive regarding the protection of employees in the event of their employer’s insol-
vency.
100
 This directive was later updated by the European Parliament in 2002
101
 and again 
on 22 October 2008.
102
 This directive requires guarantee institutions to secure claims related 
to employment.
103
 Besides, member states were authorized to set limits on employee out-
standing claims during insolvency as long as the commission was notified.
104
 Since the 
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member states were not issued with a specific method of setting employee claims, the UK 
Government addressed the question of employee entitlement on the basis of social welfare 
while appreciating importance of companies to the UK economy.
105
 The objective was to 
unite both corporate rescue and employment entitlements as prompted by the EU through 
the Collective Redundancies Directive (CRD)
106
 and the Acquired Rights Directive 
(ARD)
107
 and the Insolvency Directive.
108
 
In addition, the decision of the European Court in Commission v. United Kingdom
109
 was 
very significant. The Court held that, as a member state, the United Kingdom was required 
to create a system of worker representation where none existed. This was in accordance to 
the rights of workers under two directives ‘which require Member States to take all meas-
ures necessary to ensure that workers are informed, consulted and in a position to intervene 
through their representatives in the event of collective redundancies [or the transfer of an 
undertaking]’.110 Generally, such occurrences have inevitably propelled legal advancement 
and in fact the requirements of these directives were implemented by the Transfer of Under-
takings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE).In recent years, EU has fo-
cused on cross border insolvencies because of the differences in the insolvency procedures 
in the member states. 
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Undoubtedly, increasing integration of the European economic area has driven member 
states to, inter alia, develop corporate insolvency laws that are characterized by an ever in-
creasing European dimension. In particular, a major prompt for change in the UK’s corpo-
rate insolvency laws happened in 1972 with the accession of the UK to the, then, European 
Economic Community (EEC). The accession itself had an obvious implication that the UK 
had expressed its intention to make the necessary adjustments in its way of operations for 
mutual benefits within the trading block. The EU made its Regulation on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings that was adopted by the council in May 29 2000 and entered into force in accor-
dance with art.47 of the Regulation on May 31, 2002. 
 However, it is noteworthy that insolvency law for a long time was not considered a major 
part of the ‘harmonization agenda’. This changed when an agenda for economic and social 
renewal for Europe was initiated at the Lisbon Summit of the European Council, held in 
March 2000.
111
 The Summit was inspired by globalization and the new knowledge based 
economy and its main objective was to develop a strategy capable of enhancing Europe’s 
ability to match the growth rate of the United States economy while at the same time reduc-
ing unemployment and social exclusion. This strategy required consideration to be given to 
possible reforms to corporate insolvency laws as part of the infrastructure to support enter-
prise. 
Certainly, as a result of the UK involvement in the EU there has been a progressive reform 
to its market and legislation, geared to eliminating trade obstacles by the crafting of rules 
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that have an international element and nature.
112
 According to the European Union law, the 
Regulation entered into force within the national legal orders of the Member States without 
any need for implementation through a domestic legislation as a matter of principle.
113
 
Moreover, the doctrine of supremacy of the European law is categorical that the Regulations 
take precedence over any inconsistent provisions of the domestic laws of the Member 
States.
114
 Therefore, the UK, like every member state, had a legal obligation to ensure that 
its domestic system was in full compliance with the EU law which meant engaging in re-
forms necessary to minimize possible confusion where domestic law became explicitly in-
compatible with the EU regulation.  
5.2.4 Crisis 
English insolvency law, just like the laws of many other jurisdictions, has undergone many 
reforms prompted by recession. During an economic crisis, insolvency law inevitably ob-
tains a much more prominent place in the social consciousness than usual. The main reason 
is because of the rise in the number of insolvency incidences during such times and there is a 
resulting public outrage as the impact is felt. In essence, public outrage about corporate fail-
ures often becomes the stimulus for policy makers to begin to address issues that they previ-
ously avoided due to the reassurances that all was well, received from industry lobby 
groups.
115
 It seems that recession, whenever it occurs, is like a wakeup call to rethink the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms in place. This reality was captured in the following quota-
tions from a letter published in the Times newspaper, January 2009, 
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 ‘…as the recession gets into gear, we urgently need to look into administration 
 process. They are not pretty at the best of times, but they are disastrous in a recession 
 when  they destroy more than they recover’.116 
Financial crisis provides an impetus to study and reform insolvency regulations. Dahan and 
Kirk categorically state that a crisis is a reminder of the importance for secured creditors to 
have an insolvency legal regime in place, which will act as the baseline for parties’ private 
negotiations and debt restructuring.
117
 During a crisis, countries find that their insolvency 
frameworks are tested, revealing underlying weaknesses. In particular, the long history of 
both formal and informal insolvency systems in the UK reveals that crisis has contributed as 
a driver of its reforms. Originally, the UK insolvency regime was relatively simple until a 
significant change was prompted by the economic downturn in the 1970s.  Literature reveals 
that the principal stimulus for bankruptcy reforms in England, especially during the specific 
period was the increased rate of corporate failure.
118
 During that recession, there were high 
levels of individual and corporate insolvencies to an extent that had never been experienced 
before. This in itself made the government acutely aware of the damage to public confidence 
inflicted by a succession of major financial and industrial scandals. Even during the reces-
sion of the British economy between 1989 and 1993 company insolvencies were widely re-
garded as a demonstrative both of a systemic failure on the part of the new insolvency legis-
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lation and of corresponding failure of the will on the part of those responsible for adminis-
tering the law.
119
 
Crises create significant reform opportunities by disrupting the interests of groups that pre-
viously resisted reform. The impacts of corporate failure, which include redundancies, shak-
ing a nation’s economic stability, are magnified during times of recession and these are is-
sues that can be disquieting. Such reality prompts reaction in an effort to limit the magnitude 
of the impact of corporate failures. The failures of some notable companies, including a real 
property conglomerate, sent shockwaves through London’s real estate and financial commu-
nities. Besides, the DTI reviews acknowledged that changes to insolvency law were neces-
sary as an attempt to reduce the number of businesses and companies that were liquidated as 
well as to ameliorate the consequences of the unfettered operations of the market.
120
 
In the recent past, during the 2007/2008 recession, the financial crisis has been documented 
to have spurred ad hoc policy cooperation on the international stage and energized efforts to 
strengthen the financial framework.
121
 It actually led to dramatic changes in the national 
economic policies in the UK,
122
 for instance, the passage of the Banking Act 2009 which is a 
major landmark in the development of legal tools for the handling of banks in financial dif-
ficulties in the United Kingdom. These developments exemplify how rescue mechanisms are 
severely tested in situations where there is a general economic downturn. It can be that, just 
when rescue is needed the most, the practical reality may be that businesses will not be 
saved if there is insufficient support available either by way of additional credit or because 
other creditors are so financially stressed themselves that they are unable or unwilling to 
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support any potential rescue. The credit crisis of 2007 for instance stifled the access of dis-
tressed business to financial facilities that are so needed for successful restructuring, a real-
ity that happens in any legal system, continents or country.
123
 In essence financial crisis re-
trenches the access to financial facilities and, thus impacts negatively upon the prospects for 
preventing, or even ending, the bankruptcy procedure with reorganization instead of winding 
up of the estate assets.
124
 Therefore, the lawyers, insolvency professionals, policy makers 
and all the relevant stakeholders’ attention is drawn to the possible improvement of the in-
solvency legislative framework. 
The Banking Act 2009 focuses on  bank insolvency and not the insolvencies of general cor-
porate entities but it is worth noting for the for the reason that its enactment was chiefly be-
cause the pre-existing laws in regard to bank failure and rescue were found to be so inade-
quate.
125
 It is appreciated that this particular crisis threatened to bring about the total col-
lapses of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks and other businesses by national 
governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world.
126
  However, other corpo-
rate entities, most notably hedge funds but also pension and mutual funds and insurance 
companies, had causal primacy in the financial crisis.
127
 In particular certain activities of 
these institutions in the pre-2007 period, notably the creation of collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDO), were key and when the crisis occurred, there was a total collapse of the CDO 
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market raising the crisis onto a whole new level.
128
 Another view is that, the activities of 
these institutions under shadow banking forced the accelerated rate of production of collat-
eralized debt obligations to a scale of such sufficient proportions as to cause the money mar-
kets to go into financial meltdown.
129
 According to this view, the institutions are then the 
instigators of the crisis. These developments illustrate how crisis reveals the weaknesses in 
the existing framework, providing impetus fora change to occur. 
The financial crisis has also stirred vibrant debates which are significant in influencing re-
forms. For instance, in the wake of 2007-2008 crisis, there were suggestions that a new in-
solvency procedure was needed in order to deal with the new world of fragmented credit.
130
 
The proponents argued that the existing approaches failed to provide the rescue procedure 
that modern business restructuring really required and criticized the framework that was in 
place as addressing an out-dated set of challenges.
131
 The EHYA contended that administra-
tion would have limited use in future because resort to a formal procedure is perceived as an 
indication of corporate failure; the ability of customers to abandon contracts frustrates pur-
poses and destroys value and the lack of funding often impairs trading through the proceed-
ings.
132
 It was therefore contended that crisis brings a need to evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an existing mechanism. 
According to the European Bank for Construction and Development, financial crisis high-
lights the fact that credit automatically flows to places where creditors are fairly treated.
133
 
As a result of such credit flows, jurisdictions constantly compete to attract investment by 
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deliberately enhancing the efficiency of the legal regimes. Therefore, the leaders of these 
jurisdictions, in their attempts to forestall the impact of crisis on their economies, while ap-
preciating the fact that their policies inevitably influence investor decisions, often respond to 
crisis by legislative changes to the business culture. Besides, there is evidence to the effect 
that reducing credit risk benefits the economy as a whole.
134
 In fact, findings tend to suggest 
that the legal institution of secured credit is, on the whole, socially beneficial, and that such 
benefits are likely to outweigh any associated social costs.
135
 It is accordingly important to 
promote access to credit and the legal framework for credit should be enabling and facilita-
tive, while taking into account the specific contextual concerns. Achieving this would neces-
sitate multiple strategies key among them is ensuring that a modern insolvency systems and 
debtor-creditor regimes are effective as it has been widely accepted as the cornerstones of 
sustainable economic development, since they provide a safety valve for financial failures. 
5.2.5 Competition, effectiveness and efficiency 
The existence of corporate insolvency law in a market economy is justified as a response to 
certain market failures.
136
 However, its efficiency is fundamental in achieving any desired 
results. The efficiency of legal rules, in general terms, concerns the relationship between the 
aggregate benefit of a legal rule and the aggregate costs of a legal rule. In fact an efficient 
rule is one which is aimed at ‘achieving desired results with the minimal use of resources 
and costs and the minimal wastage of effort’.137 However, in the view of market develop-
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ments and innovation the same law in certain situations, may aggravate the problems it is 
meant to address.
138
 This reality has been appreciated in many quarters, both within the UK 
and at an international level. For instance, the World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Ef-
fective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems were intended to encourage law reforms that 
would stimulate investment by improving returns to investors in the event of insolvency. 
This focus on enhanced returns clearly shows that the guidelines were strongly influenced 
by an efficient approach to insolvency. On this basis therefore, it is arguable that efficiency 
and effectiveness are among the factors that drive reforms. In essence, whenever the law is 
considered or thought to be inefficient, suggestions of needed reforms start in an attempt to 
prompt market based solutions.  
Generally, reforming the law in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness has been 
done in many jurisdictions not only for the benefit of existing business but also for future 
businesses. In UK for instance, when  receivership were found to impact substantially on the 
interest of unsecured creditors and the fact that administrative receivership fitted badly with 
international law which generally emphasized on collective procedures, agitation for reform 
began.
139
  The government view was that on the grounds of both equity and efficiency time 
had come to: 
 ‘tip the balance firmly in favour of collective insolvency procedures-proceedings in 
 which  all creditors participate, under which a duty is owed to all creditors and in 
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 which all creditors may look to an office-holder for an account of his dealing with 
 the company’s assets.’140 
An important impetus for this reform driver has been the expansion of foreign direct invest-
ment rapidly throughout the world economy over the past two decades, helped by the re-
moval of many national barriers to capital movements. Admittedly, bankruptcy laws need to 
be considered within the wider cultural context as their effects on entrepreneurs’ decision 
making may be diminished if they are not consistent with cultural values and norms.
141
 In 
fact, if the law is inclined to excessively punish entrepreneurs for failure, they may let inher-
ently high-risk but potentially high-return opportunities pass.
142
 Laws are therefore reformed 
to ensure entrepreneur friendly bankruptcy law so as to encourage more active and vibrant 
entrepreneurship development.  
Undoubtedly, efficiency of insolvency laws boosts confidence and inward investment as 
capital flows are driven by the public perception of a market by the investors. This reality 
was captured by the World Bank
143
 in the following words,  
 ‘Transparency, accountability and predictability are fundamental to sound credit  re
 lations. Capital and credit are myriads forms of the life blood of modern commerce. 
 Investment and availability of credit are predicated on both the perception and reality 
 of risks.’  
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Equally, a bankruptcy law can generate ex post barriers to exit. For instance the cost of 
bankruptcy is positively correlated with the length of time spent on the bankruptcy proce-
dure such that the rating of how easy or difficult to resolve insolvency will influence inves-
tors’ decisions. Generally, efficient justice systems can greatly contribute to reducing risks 
and legal uncertainties hence encouraging trade and investment.
144
 Correspondingly, the law 
may escalate entrepreneurs’ commitment to a losing course of action, which both delays 
failure and increases its cost when it eventually occurs.
145
 In essence, there is a link between 
efficient insolvency laws and attracting foreign investment such that competing jurisdictions 
engage in reforms in an attempt to create and sustain a globally attractive and highly com-
petitive business environment. 
To achieve this, jurisdictions world over engage in building efficient insolvency systems as 
they are a fundamental part of supporting, restoring and reorganizing businesses. In the UK, 
the review of insolvency laws has been part of the many economic reforms meant to mod-
ernize the regulatory framework and make the UK more market friendly, as well as main-
taining its competitiveness as an investment destination. The, then, DTI’s press release after 
the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 indicated that competition drives reforms. In their 
statement, they were categorical that the reforms were intended to make UK the best place 
in the world to do business. In such circumstances, an assessment of efficiency serves a 
valuable role in determining what the law should be. 
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5.2.6 Agents/actors 
To develop an insolvency system or even reform an existing one, the efforts of the drivers 
referred in this thesis as agents is vital. For instance, the government is a unique driver with 
substantive authority over the national institutional capacities and political systems which 
are fundamental in realizing reforms.
146
 In fact, it has increasingly been recognized by law 
and finance scholars that the law is inherently ‘incomplete’ and reform efforts futile unless 
the government and local stakeholders are involved as the law is reliant heavily on the insti-
tutions of implementation.
147
 Equally, the international organizations participate in driving 
reforms and in fact confine themselves to ‘technical matters and avoid contentious policy 
issues because political matters lie outside their mandate or because policy conflicts would 
lead to international norm making a contentious stalemate.
148
 Further, through active partici-
pation in consultation amongst other activities, other agents’ drives such as bankers, insol-
vency practitioners through their respective organization contribute in the reform effort. To 
appreciate the efforts and level of influence of each of the agents, an elaborate discussion of 
each agent is undertaken below. 
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5.2.6.1 Government 
Law making is driven by the economic, political and social changes of capitalism itself.
149
 
The changes produce disturbance or trigger events that force leaders to find solutions and 
often their governments respond by reforming the law.
150
 It is widely acknowledged that 
governments must provide the institutional infrastructure that makes the competitive market 
work and insolvency frameworks is key element of that institutional infrastructure.
151
 An 
effective insolvency system, in terms of the overall legal and institutional framework, is 
known to support economic activity in a market economy.
152
 One of the key roles any gov-
ernment plays in a market economy is to guarantee the fluidity and complete functioning of 
the world of business by enacting and implementing laws/policies that could guarantee the 
rights of those who engage in business and strengthen the institutions involved. Therefore an 
effective government is a significant factor in showing leadership and commitment, which 
are some of the basics necessary for advancement of the legislation and the institutional 
framework. However, the existence of such an expectation on the government does not 
guarantee that an existing government will actually deliver on the same. The actuality of re-
forms taking place or not is also dependent on resources and legislative priorities. The gov-
ernment’s area of priority could therefore be reforms in other sectors. Besides, a government 
can become a hindrance. This is because politics can propel reforms only as long as such 
reforms promote the political legitimacy of the reigning authority. For example the Report 
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of the Blagden Committee on the working of the bankruptcy law and deeds of arrangement 
concluded that the practical experience from the law in force then was failing especially in 
its primary objects.
153
 Despite the committee’s conclusive work, no legislative initiatives 
were pursued in response to the recommendation of the Blagden Report, such that its many 
valuable proposals were never enacted.
154
 
Nonetheless, the British governments have in many aspects excelled in their mandate. As a 
driver of reforms, the government has actively participated in forming committees to review 
the law. Different committees have been established from time to time in respect of one or 
other branch of law which influenced insolvency law and other times committees were es-
tablished to consider specific aspects, such as credit and security
155
 or the enforcement of 
judgment debts,
156
 which are subjects closely inter-connected with insolvency law. Besides, 
there have also been commissions formed to specifically review insolvency law, such as the 
Cork Committee;
157
 the main inspiration for the reforms made by the Insolvency Act 1985, 
which has already been explored in details, and which was consolidated as the Insolvency 
Act 1986. 
In recent years, there has been a lot of positive will and commitment to insolvency law re-
view by governments. Throughout the 1990s, the government was actively engaging in con-
sultation, emanating from Insolvency Service, meant to give corporate rescue mechanisms a 
cutting edge.
158
 Noteworthy is the Labour government’s pledge made in 1997 where, as an 
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incoming government, it proclaimed that there was a need to reassess attitudes towards 
business and to reshape the law in order to encourage entrepreneurs to take risks in the fu-
ture.
159
 This declaration proved to be a prelude to consultative exercises that resulted in the 
publication by the, then, Department of Trade and Industry of a series of Consultation 
documents as part of extensive review.
160
 For instance, a review was undertaken upon an 
agreement between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry on company rescue and business reconstruction mechanisms and a report published 
in 2000.
161
 This review audited the development of a rescue culture in the UK and also con-
sidered how market failures are addressed in other countries. A White Paper on the general 
theme of promoting the competitiveness of the UK business
162
 was presented to parliament 
in the autumn of 2000 and the issues discussed were enacted in Insolvency Act 2000, which 
introduced a number of reforms affecting corporate insolvency. The most significant reform 
was the addition of a moratorium facility to support those attempting to agree company vol-
untary arrangements, limited to small companies in availability. The Government’s intention 
was to focus on enterprise and productivity as the cornerstones of its economic reforms in 
Parliament and this was done through the enactment of Enterprise Act 2002. Prior to the En-
terprise Act 2002 was the Insolvency Act 2002 which has been documented to represent the 
commitment of the Labour government towards business.
163
 
Another contributor to the reform debate, albeit on a more general scale, is the Justice 
Committee, which is one of the 19 Select Committees related to Government Departments 
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with a duty to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Ministry of Justice 
and associated public bodies amongst others things.
164
 The Committee chooses its own sub-
jects of inquiry and in the past it has engaged itself in matters of insolvency and it was re-
corded to have imparted a crucial momentum to the process of reform resulting in the Insol-
vency Act 1986.
165
 The Justice report was published in 1994 and some of its recommenda-
tion was to create a permanent committee with a mandate to devise and promote a national 
insolvency strategy, as well as ensuring that the law is kept constantly under review so that 
the law keeps pace with the ever evolving social needs.
166
 Such recommendations have been 
implemented through the creation of the Insolvency Service as an executive agency of the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
One scholar, Tribe, contends that the reforms that has been made and in particular the re-
form of CVAs can be traced back to the Conservative Party proposal in 2008.
167
 In fact, in 
July 2008, David Cameron,
168
 the (then) leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition and George 
Osbourne
169
 MP, the (then) Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer gave speeches in which 
they categorically stated that corporate insolvency reforms were necessary as part of the 
Conservative Economic Recovery Plan. The Labour government, too, was of the similar 
opinion, as reflected in the 2009 budget report. In particular the government promised to en-
sure that the regulations and procedures for dealing with troubled companies work to facili-
tate company rescues whenever they are appropriate, that the maximum economic value is 
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rescued from companies that get into difficulties, and that the knock-on effects of company 
insolvencies on their creditors are minimized.
170
 The specific issues ear-marked for consul-
tations were:  
 ‘providing for new funding lent to companies in Company Voluntary Arrangement 
 (CVA) or administration to have absolute priority status, to allow firms in difficulties 
 to access the funding they need to get back on track; and extending the moratorium 
 on creditor action against small companies trying to agree a Company Voluntary Ar-
 rangement to medium and large companies, so giving them breathing space to try to 
 reach agreement with creditors.’171 
Significant too is the existence of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
formerly the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which is regarded, and regards itself, 
as having some type of custodial rights over particular areas in the legal spectrum, and key 
among them is insolvency law.
172
 In essence, they have a standing responsibility to keep un-
der review such laws with a view to their systematic development and reform. It is submit-
ted therefore that the government drives insolvency law reform as a consequence of the 
aforementioned responsibility and in many instances reform initiatives come as a deliberate 
governmental decision to set in motion the requisite processes within BIS. In addition, the 
government has co-coordinated the various activities, as well as issuing consultation papers 
produced in-house then inviting both the professional and other members of the public to 
comment. Such engagements have borne fruit, as evidenced by the Enterprise Act 2002, 
which also came into being after a number of initiatives and consultations by the DTI and 
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the Treasury between 1999 and 2001. This initiative concluded in the publication of a White 
Paper, published by the Insolvency Service on July 31, 2001, entitled Productivity and En-
terprise: Insolvency—A Second Chance. Further, because of the impact of global recession 
that affected business everywhere, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills un-
dertook a consultation on how to help businesses negotiate that hard time.
173
 
Besides, the Insolvency Service has funded studies that evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the insolvency system and the reports that were compiled are of great value in ad-
vancing reforms.
174
 From the aforementioned, it is evident that the government is an influen-
tial driver of corporate insolvency reforms from its active involvement in the consultation 
and review processes. Notable too is that the existing insolvency framework has in many 
aspects actually reflected the inputs of the reports of the many reviews and consultation un-
dertaken. 
 
5.2.6.2 International organizations 
Over recent years, insolvency laws have been given significant attention in international 
fora. For instance, international organizations such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been actively engaged in championing reforms to domestic in-
solvency systems around the world.
175
 This happened especially during pre-recession times 
because of the view of ensuring that the legal framework facilitates restructuring so that the 
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void between commercial life and death could be filled with workable rehabilitation proc-
esses.
176
 Much as the focus of the international community is to ultimately strengthen the 
international financial architecture, their initiatives are designed and directed at institutions, 
markets and practices that governments and businesses use when they undertake economic 
and financial activities. In particular, the World Bank has worked together with the IMF in 
designing and disseminating international standards on insolvency and creditors’ rights sys-
tems which are aimed at strengthening a country’s domestic institutions and where neces-
sary spurring reforms.
177
 A good example is the development of Principles and Guidelines 
for Effective Insolvency and Creditors’ Rights Systems, which was produced in 1999 by the 
World Bank, and which is intended to be used as an assessment tool to assist countries in 
their efforts to evaluate and improve core aspects of their domestic insolvency law sys-
tems.
178
 The Principles cover a wide range of commercial law systems, including institu-
tional and regulatory aspects of those systems, and elaborate fundamental principles in-
tended to have flexible application to diverse country systems.
179
 Besides, the content of the 
Principles is comprehensive, as it contains recommendations as to specific elements that a 
modern credit-based economy should have in order to facilitate broad access to credit at af-
fordable rates, and a number of tabulated explanations. 
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In addition, UNCITRAL developed a Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in 1997
180
 
whose purpose was to assist States to equip their insolvency laws with a modern legal 
framework to more effectively address cross-border insolvency proceedings concerning 
debtors experiencing severe financial distress or insolvency.
181
 This Model Law focuses on 
authorizing and encouraging cooperation and coordination between jurisdictions, rather than 
attempting the unification of substantive insolvency law, and respects the differences among 
national procedural laws.
182
 Further, in 2004 UNCITRAL developed a Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law, with a clear aim of encouraging the establishment of an effective and effi-
cient framework for corporate insolvency, as well as providing detailed guidance and rec-
ommendations with regard to the substance of domestic insolvency laws.
183
 Their main pur-
pose, as stated in the UNCITRAL guide, is to inform and assist insolvency law reform 
around the world, by providing a reference tool for national authorities and legislative bod-
ies when preparing new laws.
184
 The Legislative Guide is a very detailed document that en-
tails an exposition of the structure and the key-objectives of an effective national insolvency 
law system. 
Besides, since the initial publication of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide in 2004, changes 
have occurred through the years and produced more helpful insights and recommendations 
which are crucially intended to ensure the establishment of a legislative framework for in-
solvency that is not only effective, but also reflects modern developments and trends in the 
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area of insolvency.
185
 In fact, by the end of 2013, the existing UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law had four parts, namely; Part one, that discusses the key objectives 
of an insolvency law, and structural issues, such as the relationship between insolvency law 
and other laws; Part two that deals with the core features of an effective insolvency law, fol-
lowing as closely as possible the various stages of an insolvency proceeding from their 
commencement to the discharge of the debtor and closure of the proceedings;
186
 Part three 
addresses the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, both nationally and internation-
ally;
187
 Part four focuses on the obligations that might be imposed upon those responsible 
for making decisions with respect to the management of an enterprise when that enterprise 
faces imminent insolvency or insolvency becomes unavoidable.
188
 It is evident that the pro-
visions of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide are wide ranging, however the same interna-
tional standards do not provide a single set of model solutions. In fact, by design they are 
flexible guidelines addressing the key elements of an effective insolvency law system, meant 
to reflect the complementary nature of insolvency law with the social and legal values of the 
society in which it is based. Their recommendations are fundamental because they reflect 
modern developments and trends in the area of insolvency, and have strong persuasive na-
ture, since they are recognized at an international level. Noteworthy too is the fact that the 
multilateral institutions have in recent years developed an ‘appetite’ for more, as evidenced 
by an acclaimed search for further fields of engagements in the insolvency area. In particu-
lar, UNCITRAL has gone further in giving attention to the details of such matters as the 
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treatment of insolvency groups in insolvency, court to court communications and arbitration 
in insolvency law.
189
 
Remarkable too is the contribution of other international bodies, such as the European Bank 
of Construction & Development (EBRD), INSOL International and the European Union. 
INSOL International works on a global scale, holding conferences, advising governments on 
legal reforms and training insolvency practitioners.
190
 EBRD are extensively involved in 
project financing to promote and foster the advancement of countries to market-orientated 
economies and this touches upon the reform of corporate insolvency law.
191
 Noteworthy too 
is that the global players do offer direct advice and technical assistance and condition lend-
ing on a country to country basis. International financial institutions have been involved in 
reform efforts and, in certain cases, have made financial assistance conditional upon insol-
vency law reform.  For instance, the IMF and World Bank have conditionality on the respec-
tive anticipated obedience of political leadership in their engagement as they assist jurisdic-
tions in the development of their legislation.
192
 Suffice to say that an advanced economy 
such as the UK would not be influenced to reform through conditional lending. Even if it 
was, the reform would be very limited. Nonetheless, such guidelines have been documented 
to have created a momentum of reforms which occurs through the force of IMF and World 
Bank conditionality or the anticipated obedience.
193
 Besides, the politics of cooperation and 
conflict among the global players follows an interactive process, both within the institutions 
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and across institutions and it would definitely play a role.
194
 These interactions follow a tra-
jectory of promoting reforms towards a particular common goal, such as harmonization of 
the laws.     
The work of these international players has impacted on some UK reforms. For instance, the 
UK in 2006 adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, which inevitably advanced its cross bor-
der insolvency law. Generally, the existence of such international rules that are known and 
considered reputable in a global market rife with competition can trigger the jurisdictions of 
the world to re-think their laws.  Also, the UK is an active participant in the international 
fora. In particular, the UK Government during its Presidency of the G20 was at the forefront 
of worldwide efforts to promote international financial regulatory reform which was consid-
ered necessary to stabilize the financial system and support economic recovery.
195
 Besides, 
the UK government believes in international cooperation being central to strengthening the 
financial system for the future, and has expressed its loyalty to continue to work closely with 
EU and international partners to implement the G20 commitments.
196
 Such platforms, as the 
G20 and the IMF employ peer review and benchmarking to stimulate the reform debate. In 
essence, change occurs through the national political leadership’s wish to connect its country 
with the modern stream of essential legislation or simply through the persuasive power and 
quality of these guidelines. So far, the international players have succeeded in creating a 
broad movement all over the world to comply with these standards. 
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5.2.6.3 Interest groups 
Insolvency reforms, whenever they are undertaken, impact on the rights of the different in-
terest groups of creditors and stakeholders. Much as the groups might hold similar views as 
to the purposes of insolvency proceedings, diverging views emerge in any attempt to read-
just the laws, as each interest group seeks to protect its own interest. Besides, interest 
groups, particularly those of finance professionals, may agitate for reforms and consequently 
achieve influence upon legislative matters, but their ability to exert influence is dependent 
on several factors.  For instance, the resource that the professional can bring on the agenda 
setting and decision making is vital.
197
 In addition, a well-organized group can easily mobi-
lize on a national scale and bring influence to bear on the political process.
198
 In the UK, the 
different interest groups in matters of insolvency are very organized and some actually have 
huge numbers of members, therefore giving the necessary muscle to influence reforms. In 
fact, the advancement of its corporate insolvency laws has benefited from, and in some in-
stances been derailed by, lobby groups of judges, banks,  lawyers and insolvency practitio-
ners from within the UK, as well as from the EU region. A good example was witnessed, 
during the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986, where the government, in its White Paper, 
announced its intentions to compel directors to be more vigilant about the financial situa-
tions in their companies through automatic disqualification in the event of their failure forc-
ing the companies into bankruptcy.
199
 However, the business community, with the help of 
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insolvency practitioners, prevailed upon the government to remove the provision of auto-
matic disqualification and to leave it to the discretion of the court.
200
 
 
The literature reveals that professionals have championed the reform by pressing the gov-
ernment forward and in other instances advising outside the parliament. In particular, during 
the Cork Committee consultations, the efforts of the different professional bodies were felt. 
Some small groups of professionals who were privileged to sit at the centre of the bank-
ruptcy reform committees, were integrally connected to major sustained initiatives by lead-
ing their respective groups who could be lawyers, accountants or insolvency practitioners.
201
 
The lawyers, for instance, through their Law Society have had a committee on insolvency 
since the mid 1970’s. Their contribution proved helpful during the Cork Committee consul-
tations, as they focused on the technical aspects of the law and actually produced sixty briefs 
for the Committee on recommended reforms.
202
 The accountants, using their Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies (CCAB), prepared an extensive set of submissions to the Cork Com-
mittee and the Department of Trade and Industry and actually actively participated through 
the entire process through the government White Paper and parliamentary debates.
203
 It 
ought to be remembered that the accountants in the UK have for a long time played an inte-
gral part in insolvency issues as they covered the specialties of receivership in corporate in-
solvency. During the twentieth century reform, when the ideas of regulating the insolvency 
profession were considered, the focus was on the professionalization of insolvency, which 
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gave practitioners a powerful incentive to actively participate as they attempted to ensure 
that they retained accesses to this work. 
Another significant interest group is the insolvency professionals, who are represented by 
two associations’ i.e the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA) and Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals (R3). The IPA was formed in 1961as a discussion group of 
accountants specializing in insolvency and subsequently became incorporated under its cur-
rent name in 1973. During its formation, the members’ interest was to register a voice in the 
series of reforms that were anticipated.
204
 However despite this group being recognized as a 
body involved in insolvency there is very little documented evidence as to its engagement in 
pushing for corporate insolvency reforms. Besides, the little engagement has, on occasion, 
slowed the reform process. For instance, in the 1970s, the majority of the insolvency practi-
tioners in the corporate insolvency field earned their fees through the staple diet of winding 
up and receivership. Consequently, even when the dominance of liquidation as an outcome 
was doing more harm than good to businesses and it was therefore very necessary to intro-
duce rescue approaches, the attitudes among the professionals were hard to change.
205
 This 
was however outweighed by the public climate which moved towards rescue amongst other 
factors.  
R3, which has 97 per cent of all IPs as members, has been actively engaged in campaigning 
to promote business rescue and reforming the insolvency framework. For instance in March 
2011 R3 launched a campaign at a roundtable event in Parliament where they called for an 
amendment to Section 233 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to ensure continuation of supplies in 
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insolvency.
206
 This pursuit was successfully realized through section 129 of the Small Busi-
ness, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 which gave the Secretary of State the power to 
amend by order section 233 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and a consequently  by publication 
of the Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies) Order 2015.  Generally, the changes in-
troduced are extension of the provisions of S233 such that list of list of supplier as well as 
supply is extended hence allowing a business to continue trading and therefore maximise its 
chances of rescue. 
The group acknowledges that they campaigned long and hard for action to be taken on ter-
mination clauses, winning support from the business and creditor communities and in early 
2013 the Government amended the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill.
207
 Besides initi-
ating reforms, the R3 have also actively responded to the government consultations and in-
quiries that affect the UK insolvency industry.
208
 Noteworthy too is that this organisation 
has expressed the view that rescue is not so much about laws and processes as the cultures 
prevalent within the body of creditors and the market.
209
 
Another interest group that is a very significant player is that of the banks. The influence of 
the banking ‘lobby’ in the area of corporate insolvency has been described as ‘phenome-
nal.’210 To this group, the initial response to the Cork inspired reform was that of caution.211 
This is purely because their preference was the tried and tested tool of receivership, which 
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gave them a lot of advantage.  However The British Bankers’ Association, later in 1997 pub-
licly endorsed a rescue culture and categorically stated that they had long supported it, since 
thousands of its customers were still in business because their banks supported them during 
difficult times.
212
 In recent years, the British Bankers’ Association, which currently has 
more than 250 member organizations with a worldwide presence in 180 countries
213
, has 
actively participated in consultations concerning the insolvency framework. As an associa-
tion, they acknowledge that the insolvency framework is a key element of the banks’ busi-
ness environment,
214
 and they have participated in consultations on reforms. A good exam-
ple is its involvement in the consultation exercise concerning the regulation of insolvency 
practitioners.
215
 
Besides, EHYA, a regional trade association, which represents banks and investors involved 
in the European high-yield bond markets, plays a role. In fact, they actively engage in evalu-
ating the EU member states’ regulatory regimes and advise accordingly. For instance, they 
have evaluated the Enterprise Act 2002 and concluded that the administration procedure 
does not provide a rescue process that modern restructurings really require but rather ad-
dresses an out-dated set of challenges.
216
 In EHYA’s view, it is crucial to move to a regime 
of cram-down and court supervision. The arguments are based on the huge growth in the 
leveraged lending market, as well as the prevalence of restructurings occurring outside for-
mal procedures. In fact, in 2007, EHYA submitted to the UK Treasury a paper outlining its 
views on the urgent need for insolvency reform in the UK. This was further advanced by 
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their correspondence with the UK Insolvency Service in 2008, where they advised on the 
urgent need for insolvency reform in the UK.
217
 Besides, EHYA together with the Institute 
of Bankruptcy, Restructuring and Insolvency Law, University College London, held an in-
solvency reform round table in 2009 which attracted government representatives, academics, 
professional bodies, company directors and investors.
218
 Such an event, as expressed by Gil-
bey Strub, the managing director of the EHYA, provides a very important platform for for-
mal consultation and presenting the official record to Labour MP Pat McFadden, Minister 
for Employment Relations and Postal Affairs at BERR is an important step toward meaning-
ful reform.
219
 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
English insolvency law is diverse and has evolved over a considerable period of time. Gen-
erally, the various developmental stages reveal that there was a concerted effort to reform 
law. On a philosophical level this has been attributed to movements including utilitarianism, 
social liberalism. On a practical level, reform is a result of both a gradual increase in bank-
ruptcies (itself due to the increasing use of credit and commercialization from industrializa-
tion) and also gradual awareness of the impact of horrors attendant upon debtors being liq-
uidated. On a more precise view; the development reflects the influence of the numerous 
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drivers, such as political and ideological struggles that have been part of the legislative and 
judicial context at various stages of its development.
220
 
A historical exploration of its reform over the centuries reveals that it has been involved in a 
series of experiments which at times have resulted in the enactment of new legislation and 
many re-adjustments of existing laws to the changing conditions and sentiments of the soci-
ety, and in particular the commercial community, in recent decades. In fact, Martin correctly 
argues that ‘insolvency systems profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural 
context of the countries that have developed them’.221 
The early reforms were driven by the challenge and dilemma of dealing with bankrupt debt-
ors. The legislation enacted during this period reflected the societal attitude of punishing the 
offenders. It is evident that the disgrace that accompanied being a bankrupt and the punitive 
laws pushed debtors to develop an increasing number of ways to avoid imprisonment. This 
reality drove reforms, as there was a need to develop a mechanism to assert the power and 
moral authority of the state through punishment. During 17th century the economic ad-
vancement, as seen by the expansion of trade, especially overseas, brought in new chal-
lenges. At that stage, reforms happened as a response of economic advancement which 
brought in more risk of failure and its effect on the delicate order developing in commerce. 
During the eighteenth century, much as there were an increased number of bankrupts, there 
was a gradual realization that in many cases the bankrupt might be properly an object of 
pity. The reforms therefore introduced the concept of a debtor’s discharge. At that point, the 
focus of the reforms then changed from dealing primarily with the debtor's conduct with a 
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punitive approach and rather sought to regulate the economic situation that arises out of the 
debtor's financial condition. 
From the nineteenth century henceforth, the institutions and legislations that developed in 
the UK are the result of the interplay between technological advancement, market globaliza-
tion, as well their fluctuation, and political institutions and preferences. Essentially, the law 
has been said to be always one step behind the market, which is ever evolving, and this 
means that the deficiencies in the law are inevitable, hence making reform a progressive and 
inescapable exercise.  In essence, changes in the economy have gradually rendered existing 
substantive rules and procedures inadequate, but reform activities are triggered by crisis. It is 
evident that drivers of reforms come as either agendas being pursued by government or be-
cause of the influence by interest groups of participants who play significant roles in ad-
vancing the law; action by participants prods legislatures in the direction of the development 
of the law. International organizations and agreements have played a very large role in driv-
ing policy change, often in response to a major crisis. Equally, the British governments have 
engaged in insolvency reforms often through consultation and engaging other stakeholders. 
It is noteworthy too that in the competition to remain an attractive investment destination, 
legal changes have been achieved.
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    CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 DRIVERS OF REFORMS IN KENYA 
INTRODUCTION 
Insolvency frameworks have increasingly become a subject of reform activities all over the 
world. In fundamental nature, the importance of reforming these regulations is generally 
recognized but opinions differ as to what the drivers for such reforms are, or ought to be, in 
a country. How can Kenya’s slow progress and rate of regulatory changes, or lack of them, 
be explained? Some scholars believe in internal factors, such as the importance of history, 
social norms or political factors, such as leadership, democracy and/or some form of state 
centralization.
1
 Others identify the relevance of external factors, in particular international 
trade or globalization,
2
 with some emphasizing the influence of reforms by neighbouring 
countries through regional integration.
3
 In essence, the reform drivers are arguably many 
and bear some similarity in all jurisdictions. The drivers that have influenced UK reforms 
were considered in the previous chapter.  However, the degree of influence of each of the 
drivers varies in different jurisdictions. Arguably, the policy reforms in Sub Saharan African 
(SSA) countries are commonly driven by the economic and political interest, especially the 
maintenance of close relations with key donors and advancing regional integration within 
the East African Community (EAC). 
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Kenya, like most developing economies, is characterized by inadequate insolvency reforms, 
despite many attempts in the past to change the laws. The latest effort is the development of 
a Kenyan insolvency Bill 2015 which has been on the Kenyan government website since 
2010. The Kenyan government, the official custodian of reforms in Kenya, has been ac-
knowledging the need to update the law since the 1990s.  It is also not lost to the many 
stakeholders that without effective procedures that are applied in a predictable manner, 
creditors may be unable to collect on their claims, which will adversely affect the future 
availability of credit.
4
 It is therefore essential, if attempting to understand the Kenyan reform 
pathways, to understand the reform drivers.  
One factor that must be borne in mind is that law reform may not be sufficient in itself.  
Laws can be dead letters if there are not sufficient means of enforcing these laws.  In fact, 
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer state that ‘The effectiveness of legal institutions has a much 
stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books.’5 Bankruptcy laws are 
no exception.  According to Halliday and Caruthers, effective bankruptcy law enables eco-
nomic Darwinism, a means of selecting out of the market those firms which are no longer 
able to compete within it, something that a socialist economy conventionally does not per-
mit.
6
 This partially explains why law reforms are sometimes met with a lot of resistance by 
those with interests in maintaining the status quo. The analysis in this chapter generally re-
veals that, whenever certain drivers in particular the government have a certain interest to 
protect, it influences their engagement in reforms. 
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This chapter identifies and investigates the reform drivers of corporate insolvency law 
within the wider area of business reforms in Kenya. The first category of reform driver is the 
government which is a distinctive player because of the position it occupies in a jurisdiction.  
The second can be broadly categorized as interest groups, who are the business community 
and insolvency profession. The third category is broadly referred to as the regional trends. 
As pointed out by Stallings, international influences can impact on domestic policies 
through a number of ways.
7
 For instance, financial support from bilateral and multilateral 
donors has been crucial for the implementation of insolvency reforms. Besides, multilateral 
donors, such as the World Bank are also known to give technical support. Further, the con-
sequences of global trends such as, regional integration and crisis will be given due atten-
tion. The last category is the domestic forces, such as competition to attract foreign invest-
ment, poverty reduction and unemployment and the bid to promote economic growth. The 
endeavour to eradicate poverty and create employment becomes that driving force as the 
country attempts to build a better climate in which firms can invest, generate jobs and a 
strategy for development.  
Despite the existence of a wide range of active drivers, quick assessments indicate, however, 
that outcomes have been far from satisfactory, as little law reform progress has been made, 
beckoning an inquiry as to what could be the real barrier to reforms in Kenya. Consequently, 
the discussion includes contrasting references to Mauritius, as a country which has recently 
implemented wide-ranging insolvency law reforms and to other relevant jurisdictions. This 
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is considered necessary in understanding how more less the same drivers are succeeding in 
one jurisdiction and almost totally failing in another.  
 
6.1 THE GOVERNMENT 
The desire to see reforms implemented in Kenya has been on-going for more than a decade 
now. It is largely accepted that the government is the ultimate driver of reforms. However, 
whether reforms take place will depend on political factors, including the level of influence 
of internal and external agents, in influencing the government. The intensity of external 
agents’ agitations for reform in Kenyan business circles are typified by the U.S. Ambassador 
Michael Ranneberger in the following quotation, 
 ‘Our efforts to press for implementation of reforms are both private and public.  Pri
 vately, we are maintaining intensive dialogue with the coalition leadership, parlia
 mentaryians, and actors across the political, social, and economic landscape.  That 
 dialogue is frank and constructive.  Publicly, we are continuing to encourage the Ke
 nyan  people  to press peacefully for implementation of reforms.  We are involved 
 in a number of other activities aimed at promoting implementation of reforms.’8 
The aforementioned quotation is a portion of a speech given during a Law Society of Kenya 
Conference in 2009. This is clear evidence that the external agents have been active in push-
ing for reforms. Despite such efforts to influence the government to implement reform, little 
has been achieved, beckoning an inquiry into the government’s role in reforms. 
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To understand how the government drives reforms, it is necessary to appreciate the political 
and legal aspects of any government. To start with, political factors are considered as crucial 
in determining the outcomes of such policies.
9
 In many instances, the ability of any govern-
ment to engage in reforms is largely dependent on their pre- election promises and the po-
litical games of trying to remain in power at the expiry of the ‘current’ term in office. A 
number of scholars argue that policy makers engage in reforming legislations on financial 
markets mainly to progress their own private gains namely: political survival and the genera-
tion of low cost financial resources.
10
 In essence, political factors affect objectives of formal 
and the extent of influence varies across countries and time. More importantly, insolvency 
touches on the very fundamentals of the economic system of the country and, as such, the 
reform, as well as enforcement of an insolvency law, can be problematic unless powerful 
domestic groups are convinced that the law does not threaten them. Political influences, for 
example on the banking system and through the concentrated ownership of corporations 
forming strong vested interests, can affect the allocation of credit and state subsidies in such 
a way that insolvency procedures are seriously undermined.
11
 Equally, the tempo of reforms 
will largely depend on the vested and ‘protected’ interest in a jurisdiction. Arguably, a gov-
ernment can deliberately fail to engage in particular reforms if they would interfere in any 
way with their vested interests.  
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As stated by Agimba, political impetus influences reform.
12
 This sentiment is true majorly 
because the government, which is inherently political, develops overarching policy objec-
tives, as well as the policy agenda, and is active in facilitating the reform. The scope of po-
litical influence on reform is prominent in Kenya. For instance, the 2002 elections and the 
installation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government with a strong reform 
mandate and high expectations of change provided an especially conducive environment for 
reforms. In fact, during the tenure of the NARC Government in Kenya, crucial government 
policies championing reforms were developed.
13
 The government enjoyed substantial public 
goodwill and a remarkable boost when the Bretton Woods institutions resumed lending for 
budgetary support to the country, which had been previously stopped for many reasons, 
some of them being concerned with a lack of reforms and with corruption.
14
 Generally, the 
former president Mwai Kibaki and his government were viewed as driving the pace of re-
forms. 
Much as political impetus has in the past driven reforms, in equal measure political instabil-
ity has been a major source of derailment of the progress of reforms. Noteworthy in Kenyan 
history is the 2007/2008 post-election violence and a consequential formation of the Grand 
Coalition Government. The occurrence of violence disrupted existing reform engagements. 
Besides, the Grand Coalition Government constantly engaged in wrangles debilitating legis-
lative engagements.
15
 Undoubtedly, the intentions of the leaders of the coalition faction were 
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to engage in necessary reforms as expressed by the Prime Minister, who stated that Kenya's 
bid to drive up its international competitiveness and position itself as an investor-friendly 
destination would be boosted once the state was done with enacting planned reforms.
16
 
However, little was achieved because there were a lot of high political maneuvers and in-
fighting among the political partners, leaving the important legislative agenda lacking in suf-
ficient attention. Nonetheless, post-election violence and the adoption of a new constitution 
during the tenure of the Grand Coalition Government were major political events that had a 
direct influence on the reforms. These upheavals slowed the pace of reform, but they have 
also helped donors to support a  business environment reform within a broader framework of 
democracy and governance.
17
 One direct outcome of these events has been the increased at-
tention given by the government, the business community and civil society to the impor-
tance of public private dialogue, which is arguably a necessary platform for pushing for re-
forms.
18
 Many donor and development agencies participate in these dialogues and have been 
stated as a valuable forum for the exchange of information and strategies.
19
 
An important factor that has a bearing on how politics can frustrate rather than drive reforms 
in Kenya is the inability of the political class to maintain the reform momentum. Poor out-
comes have been blamed on African bureaucracies that play a contradictory and conﬂict-
ridden role, being at once part of the problem and the cure.
20
 In particular, the first attempts 
to reforms to insolvency laws were in the 1990s when a task force was established to review 
the existing framework. Despite the task force’s report recommending extensive changes 
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being completed, nothing much was done. Another political effort came again 2009, which 
resulted in the Insolvency Bill 2010 being published by the government. For the whole year, 
its status did not change. . In 2011, when it looked like the reform momentum had died out, 
the finance minister proposed and introduced to table in Parliament three bills i.e. a Compa-
nies Bill, an insolvency bill and a partnership bill. In fact, during the budget statement for 
the Fiscal Year 2011/2012 the minister urged the Honourable Members of Parliament to pri-
oritize debates for some critical bills which were then before the parliament.
21
 To date, the 
insolvency bill has not been passed into law, despite several statements having been vocal-
ized which emphasised its importance, as well as support and commitment by high profile 
people in government. 
 
It is notable that during the time when little progress towards law reform was being made in 
Kenya, there were significant legislative developments in Mauritius, where there is a mark-
edly different political scene. Mauritius takes pride in being a mature democracy with strong 
institutions and the political scene that is remarkably stable.
22
 Besides, it has an open econ-
omy, with a modern legal framework, regulatory efficiency and a reliable system of state 
justice.
23
 This is despite Mauritius being similar to many African countries in its extreme 
cultural diversity. In particular, its inhabitants are politically and religiously divided. None-
theless, Mauritius is undoubtedly one of Africa’s rare consolidated democracies, having held 
several recent national elections and witnessed changes of successive governments peace-
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fully.
24
 Of significance is the boldness of the political class to implement reforms. For in-
stance, Paul, as Minister of Finance, implemented the neoliberal reform programme negoti-
ated by the previous government with the IMF and he categorically stated that he, ‘….was 
impressed by the force of the logic inherent in the IMF recipe and adopted it despite its un-
popularity’.25 In particular, since 2005, the government embarked on a bold economic re-
form programme aimed at opening the economy, facilitating business, improving the in-
vestment climate, and mobilizing foreign direct investment and expertise.
26
 Notable too are 
the government statements during the debates in Parliament over the Insolvency Bill. In par-
ticular, the Minister of Finance and Economic Empowerment was categorical that the Insol-
vency Bill was another example of the government’s commitment to adapt to the modern 
environment and to comply with international norms, standards and best practices.
27
 In es-
sence, the governments have guided reforms with sufficient autonomy from a capitalist class 
and sufficient bureaucratic capacity, together with sufficient incentive, to promote both 
growth and redistribution through selective engagement with market forces.
28
 
 
On the legal front, a government is a custodian of legal reforms. In Kenya the reform proc-
ess is facilitated by a government organ namely; the Kenya Law Reform Commission 
(KLRC), originally established under the Law Reform Commission Act of 1982 but cur-
rently embodied in Kenya Law Reform Commission Act, 2013. The KLRC has an obliga-
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tion to keep under review all of the laws of Kenya and to recommend their reform to ensure 
that the law conforms to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. That laws must be consis-
tent, harmonized, just, simple, accessible, modern and cost-effective in application.
29
 In per-
forming its mandate, the KLRC is supposed to work with the office of the Attorney General 
in formulating and implementing programmes, plans and actions for the effective reform of 
laws.
30
 Through this Commission, the government of Kenya has been able to drive reforms 
in the wider legal spectrum, albeit its performance in reforming insolvency laws has not yet 
met expectations. It is acknowledged that the KLRC has been unable to realize its full poten-
tial in this area and has not influenced the process and pace of insolvency law reform in 
Kenya to a noticeable degree.  
As noted, the insolvency laws have remained static for several decades in Kenya, despite the 
existence of the KLRC, an institution with a clear reform mandate. Arguably, insolvency 
law has either been subordinated in legislative priorities, or the KLRC has neglected its 
statutory obligation because, even where reforms have happened, they have been undertaken 
arbitrarily. For instance, the KLRC has a statutory role to advise departments and ministries 
with regard to amendments to any branch of the law relevant to them, but departments and 
ministries have routinely engaged consultants whenever they wish to reform the statutes 
relevant to them. A good example is where the Minister of Finance proposed to establish in 
the ministry a Business Regulatory Reform Unit (BRRU) which was subsequently set up 
through administrative order to ensure that new regulations, licences, fees, and charges did 
not create unnecessary burdens on businesses, and to liaise with regulators to ensure that all 
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future regulations conform to international best practices.
31
 In addition the Unit was to serve 
as the secretariat for the task force consultative bodies that might be set as part of the ‘Doing 
Business Indicators’ providing recommendations to decision-makers and promoting good 
regulatory processes across government.
32
 
Although ministry/department led efforts count in championing for reforms, it is arguably 
difficult for ministries to reform themselves, given countervailing pressures and deficient 
financial and human resources. Noteworthy too, contrary to the legal requirement that the 
Commission examine particular branches of the law and formulate draft Bills and proposals 
for reform, the Attorney General has commonly established task forces with a law reform 
mandate outside of the ambit of the Commission.
33
 The proliferating of this practice was 
openly acknowledged by Attorney General Amos Wako on an occasion he was moving a 
bill in the floor of Parliament. He categorically stated that the bill was a result of the work of 
a task force appointed by the Attorney General in the 1990s to review the laws relating to 
companies, investment and insolvency.
34
 
                                                          
31
 A Working Committee was formed by the Government through the Ministry of Finance Circular Ref. No. 
Conf.262/02/ (3) of 24 February 2005 as read with Kenya Gazette Notice No. 7521 published in the Kenya 
Gazette of 23
rd
 September, 2005.  The Government subsequently continued the Committee’s mandate until 31 
December, 2006 (subsequently extended to 28 February, 2007) The mandate of the Committee was to provide 
input to government decisions on the establishment of a Business Regulatory Reform Unit and A medium term 
regulatory reform strategy. Also see  The World Bank Group, ‘Regulatory Capacity Review of Kenya’ (2010) 
available in https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/Kenya.pdf accessed on 9th June 2012 
32
 Ibid 
33
 In 1992 the Attorney General established 15 reform task forces to review and update Kenya’s laws in various 
areas. However, in the political environment of Kenya in the 1990s, little progress could be registered. See 
http://www.gjlos.go.ke/default.asp for details of the programme accessed on 6
th
 June 2014 
34
 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) Tuesday 24 May 2011 pg 24. In particular Amos Wako 
who is a former AG but currently Bongoma Senator gave detailed information on how the Bill he was moving 
was a result of a task force he himself established. 
261 
 
One of the explanations offered as to the reasons for KLRC ineffectiveness has been the lack 
of operational independence as originally crafted in the founding legislation.
35
 To be spe-
cific, the office of the Attorney General has been responsible for approving the KLRC work 
programmes while a different body (the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs) was 
responsible for controlling the funding allocated from the national budget.
36
 In essence, 
mechanisms with explicit responsibilities and authorities for managing and tracking reform 
inside the administration are needed to keep reform on track and on schedule, and to ensure 
that regulatory quality standards continue to improve.
37
 Significant deficiencies inherent to 
the KLRC operations have been dealt with in the latest statute; the Kenya Law Reform 
Commission Act, 2013. Nevertheless, against the on and off impetus demonstrated by the 
government efforts and previous legal inadequacies, it is not in doubt that there is a consen-
sus that the regulatory environment is primarily out-dated and therefore not in tandem with 
the modern challenges. Besides, there have been calls since the enactment of the Constitu-
tion of Kenya 2010 to include Regulatory Impact Assessments in the legislative process to 
ensure regulatory rigour and consistency across national and county government, to avoid 
the laws resulting in a ‘Balkanization’ of business regulation across 47 counties.38 Neverthe-
less nothing much has changed five years later since a new constitution was enacted. 
Despite all the aforementioned challenges, the government has fairly engaged in numerous 
attempts to drive reforms. For instance, the government has established committee/task 
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forces which engage in extensive consultative processes with stakeholders from the public 
and private sectors. In fact, the task force established in 1999 by the Attorney General, 
which looked into insolvency laws amongst others, was composed of representatives of in-
stitutions such as the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, Federation of Kenya Employees, 
National Chamber of Commerce, accountants, chartered secretaries and lawyers, especially 
those who specialize in corporate practice.
39
 Generally, formation of a task force with such a 
wide representation provides a good platform to capture the views of a significant portion of 
the stakeholders in the business arena. In fact, jurisdictions such as Mauritius who have suc-
cessfully reformed their insolvency laws have used similar approaches. For instance in 2011 
the government of Mauritius, in a bid to accelerate business law reform, set up a Joint Pub-
lic-Private Sector Business Facilitation Task Force to identify and eliminate weaknesses en-
countered by businesses.
40
 
A closer look into the process of enacting the Mauritian Insolvency Act of 2009 reveals very 
intriguing facts. The Bill was developed in close cooperation with the World Bank. In fact, it 
has been openly acknowledged that the Mauritius reforms were possible mainly because of 
access to market financing and support from development partners.
41
 Besides, the reform 
deliberations involved the stakeholders in Mauritius. For instance, a banking committee 
chaired by the Governor was involved and one of the objectives of the committee is to pro-
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vide information and views on the functioning of the wider financial sector.
42
 The govern-
ment therefore appointed a Steering Committee on Insolvency and Creditor Rights to work 
with the World Bank in the development of its report.
43
 The World Bank, upon completing 
its work, submitted the ‘Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) of In-
solvency and Creditor Rights Systems for Mauritius’ in March 2004.44 This was a notewor-
thy document that shaped the reform process. In addition, a dissemination seminar was held 
in 2004, with the widest possible participation, including lawyers, accountants, bankers and 
other professionals.
45
 A further consultation paper was issued in August 2007 on the policy 
proposals and number of policy recommendations were discussed and incorporated in the 
final report.
46
 Most importantly, there is a conspicuous governmental political will and resil-
ient engagement, both of which are important in achieving substantial reforms  
Another noteworthy aspect in Mauritius is their Law Reform Commission, which is robust. 
The effectiveness and independence of this Commission is indicated in its 2013 report, 
which details several successful engagements that it has undertaken.
47
 In fact, Section 5(2) 
of the Law Reform Commission Act mandates the Commission the power to initiate propos-
als for the review, reform or development of any aspect of the law but the Attorney General 
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can also submit papers on aspects of the law to the Commission for review.
48
 Fundamen-
tally, a significant aspect is a duty of the Lord Chancellor to report annually to Parliament on 
the extent to which the Government has implemented the Law Commission’s recommenda-
tions. In essence, the law provides a supportive environment for its Reform Commission and 
accountability regarding implementation for the Parliament, a system which is laudable in 
ensuring effectiveness and efficiency in reform. 
 
6.2 INTEREST GROUPS 
6.2.1 The Private Sector/ Business Community 
The Kenyan private sector consists of a formal, large business sector which is relatively 
healthy, productive and influential and a massive informal small business sector that is 
poorly understood and supported, yet a significant player in the business industry.
49
 The 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance is of the view that a major impetus for trade reform is 
Kenya’s need to become globally competitive in business. A leading Kenyan lawyer ex-
pressed the following opinion  
 ‘the driving force for reform is being provided by Kenya’s powerful clearing and  for
 warding agents, as well as leading importers and exporters – those who most under
 stand  the problems caused by dealing with excessive documentation, border-re
 lated  costs,  lost business opportunities, etc’.50  
The business community has in a number of instances engaged the government of Kenya in 
discussions in a bid to reform insolvency laws. According to the former Attorney General, 
the stakeholders, who were largely members of the business community, had expressed dis-
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satisfaction with the law relating to investment; in particular company law and  the insol-
vency law which were stated as completely out dated hence  inadequate for  the modern 
needs of the modern Kenya.
51
 
Remarkable agitation for reform started when a number of established corporations faced 
the threat of liquidation. The discussion on the need for reforms started in the early 2000 
with a number of entrepreneurs voicing their concerns through the media. In 2006 when 
Uchumi supermarket, one of the few corporate entities to successfully undergo reorganiza-
tion, was being listed afresh on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), the government was re-
quested to speed up reforms on insolvency, bankruptcy regulations and the implementation 
of the new Companies Act.
52
 It was pointed out that reforms were necessary so as to spur the 
growth of the private sector, and in particular make it easier for firms under receivership to 
emerge out of insolvency. According to Agimba, there has been a continuous pressure for 
reform of business laws from the business community and a proactive response to the need 
for reform from the highest political leadership, key government ministries and agencies.
53
 
In essence, the government has been working closely with private actors in respect of vari-
ous structural reforms, such as public sector reforms, business and regulatory reforms, fi-
nancial services sector reforms, legal and judicial reforms and land reforms to improve the 
investment climate.
54
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It is noteworthy that the private sector has organized itself into a Kenya Private Sector alli-
ance (KEPSA), a forum that provides a unified voice for the private sector.
55
 The main man-
date of the alliance is to ensure development through advocacy, projects and partnerships, 
both local and international, as well as to influence public policy through policy formulation 
and implementation. In fact, KEPSA has in the past partnered with the government in pass-
ing various policies, strategies and Bills and increasing strategic interventions. Specifically, 
KEPSA has organized meetings where key government officials have been invited for dis-
cussions on reform.  
In 2008, the Prime Minister began holding quarterly meetings as part of a public-private 
‘National Business Agenda’ with the chairpersons of the Kenya Association of Manufactur-
ers (KAM) the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), and the East Africa Business 
Council (EABC), and other business leaders to learn what must be done to improve the 
country’s business climate.56 The discussions have been ongoing and influential, such that 
even in 2011, the 7th Prime Minister Round Table was organized by KEPSA as part of a 
continuous engagement with the government to create an enabling business environment. 
During that meeting, KEPSA outlined some urgent issues that needed to be addressed in-
cluding a faster pace of implementation of the Bills that would promote economic growth, 
some of which included the Companies Bill, Partnership Bill, Insolvency Bill and Limited 
Liability Bill among others that are all geared towards easing the burden of doing business. 
Besides, one of the 2012 advocacy achievements stated by KEPSA in their website is the 
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fast-tracking of the passing of stalled business-related policies and legislations which in-
cluded an Insolvency Bill among others. Admittedly, the existence of the aforementioned 
forums organized by KEPSA ensured that the debate on reforms was kept alive and that the 
momentum was not lost. In fact, the Chairman of the Private Sector Alliance during the 
signing of the Bill to law categorically stated that they had for a long time been pushing for 
the Insolvency Act amongst other legislations.
57
 
 
Members of the business community, whose role in driving reforms cannot be ignored, are 
Kenya’s most important trade partners. This does not imply that Kenya does not trade 
openly within the global village but there are particular countries who, in a number of ways, 
trade closely and frequently with Kenya. For instance, Denmark has, since 2002, been com-
mitted to supporting development of the business sector in Kenya. Previously this has been 
on a basis of partnerships between Kenyan and Danish companies to facilitate knowledge 
transference from Denmark to Kenya and to enable those Danish companies to gain access 
to new markets and cheap production methods and facilities. Through such close relations, a 
new dimension was entered in 2005 with the launching of the Business Sector Programmes 
Support (BSPS).
58
 This was a programme that was meant to support the business sector both 
on macro and micro- levels by assisting both the government and the private sector partners 
in creating an enabling environment for business. So far the BSPS has supported the final-
ization and implementation of a new Private Sector Development Strategy which includes 
among other things the implementation of new laws. 
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The business community, at both regional and international levels has been championing for 
reforms by conducting surveys and research, on the basis of which sound recommendations 
have been made. For instance, in 2004, much as the government had promised that several 
policy reforms were underway, the Africa Private Sector Group in their analysis of the in-
vestment climate engaged in policy discussions, which were intended to preserve the mo-
mentum of on-going reforms, while also making additional suggestions to raise productiv-
ity.
59
 Some of the specific recommendations they offered included the reform and moderni-
zation of the insolvency procedures contained in the Companies and Bankruptcy Acts. 
 
Similarly in 2005, the World Bank Private Sector Unit, Africa Region highlighted the key 
elements of commercial legislation impacting on the overall investment climate to be the 
Companies Act and the Bankruptcy Act, both of which in their view, are fundamentally 
sound, but extremely out-dated.
60
 In comparison with international best practice, they are 
found these Acts to be unduly technical, complex and bureaucratic. Besides, by international 
standards Kenya's insolvency procedures  vital to any market economy – were found to be 
lengthy and costly, even in comparison with other countries in SSA.
61
 Generally, these laws 
contain serious weaknesses, including a lack of a modern system for promotion of corporate 
rescue, limited ability of creditors to recover assets, and they therefore need a fundamental 
overhaul. 
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The engagement between the Kenyan businesses communities in insolvency reforms bears 
similarity to the approach that was used in Mauritius. Both jurisdictions have employed con-
sultation and discussion forums. The Mauritian authorities embarked on an ambitious pro-
gramme to transform the economy in partnership with the private sector.
62
 However, in 
Kenya the discussion tended to consist more of the business community pushing for an op-
portunity to express their views, whereas in Mauritius, it tended to be the government invit-
ing the views. 
6.2.2 The Pursuit of Professionalism in the Insolvency Profession 
A significant driver for insolvency law reforms is the apparent realization that the insol-
vency profession needs to tighten up its act.
63
 Generally, the members of the public in Kenya 
have low opinions of insolvency practitioners and a perception that they act merely as ‘cor-
porate undertakers’ and, exacerbating this, there have been an unfortunate number of re-
ported cases of unethical behaviour by some receivers and liquidators.
64
 For a long time, 
Kenya has operated without clarity as to the persons who are qualified and recognized to 
deal with insolvency matters within the legal framework. In fact, the many insolvency mat-
ters that have been dealt with so far are handled by lawyers and accountants with no clear 
regulatory body. The upshot of this is that their performance has not been satisfactory.  
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The challenge of appropriate regulation of insolvency practitioners is problematic in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as demonstrated by a survey by Research and Innovation (R&I) which re-
vealed that only three countries in this region: Mauritius, Rwanda and Senegal have a regu-
latory body that oversees insolvency practitioners and requires them to be licenced.
65
 In 
Kenya, the Insolvency Bill, although not yet in force, captures this endeavour and proposes 
an Insolvency Practitioners’ Board, insolvency practitioners and sets out requirements as to 
their qualifications.
66
 There is also a clearly outlined procedure to be followed by an appli-
cant seeking authority from the Insolvency Practitioners’ Board to act as an insolvency prac-
titioner. The regulation of insolvency practitioners is indispensable given that insolvency 
practitioners have a public interest role, in being officers of the court, and that they owe a 
broader duty to society as a whole, not just creditors.
67
 In essence, an insolvency regime, no 
matter how robust, remains reliant on the professionals who play crucial roles in advising on 
business restructuring, or liquidation.  
Another important aspect is the role of the court in insolvency proceedings. To start with, 
under section 219 of Companies Act Cap 486, if the company has by special resolution re-
solved that it may be wound up by the court, the court may pass a winding up order and the 
power of the court in such a case is discretionary. Equally the court when petitioned investi-
gates and makes a finding before admitting a petition for winding up.
68
 As far as voluntary 
winding up is concerned as governed by section 304, the court may order the continuation of 
voluntarily winding up subject to their supervision on any terms. In addition, section 222 
gives the court power to hear and make determination petitions and in section 223 the Power 
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to stay or restrain proceedings against company. Further, the section 234 gives the court 
power to appoint liquidators. Generally, the court will administer cases in the course of re-
solving insolvency and is involved at different stages. 
The court plays a role in the appointment of an official receiver (section 230) who becomes 
a  trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding and he/she assumes the position of a liquidator  is 
charged with the task of investigating  collecting, liquidating assets and using any proceeds 
to pay outstanding debts on behalf of the debtor. Generally, the court has a supervisory role 
over the liquidators and official receivers. By itself, an insolvency process gives a consider-
able position of trust to insolvency professionals over the affairs of insolvent companies, 
since the decisions and actions of these professionals can have a significant financial impact 
on those affected in very difficult circumstances. There is therefore a need for expertise and 
efficiency in insolvency matters on the receivers or liquidators as well as specialized insol-
vency judges.
69
  
One of the ways of improving the efficiency of the judges is to provide training to the com-
mercial court judges who currently have jurisdiction over insolvency matters amongst many 
matters. Similar sentiments were echoed by the IMF which while acknowledging the sub-
stantial reduction of backlog and speedier resolution of cases since the establishment of a 
Commercial Court emphasized the need to enhance its capacity as well as expansion of 
commercial courts to other regions of the country.
70
 However, equipping the relatively large 
number of judges as a way of enhancing efficiency will be challenging. It is therefore argued 
that consideration should be given to the desirability, as part of the reforms, of including 
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specialized insolvency judges, in order to enhance the efficiency of proceedings. There will 
however be a need for a feasibility study to establish its practicability. Jurisdictions such as 
Thailand, which have successfully established specialist Bankruptcy Courts that have juris-
diction over all insolvency proceedings and all civil cases pertaining to the same, provide a 
good example to learn from.
71
 
 
6.3 THE REGIONAL TRENDS 
The whole world has experienced a rapid pace of technological change, such that currencies 
float against one another and global exchange markets now account for sixty times the vol-
ume of trade and investment flows compared to the volume of world trade in goods.
72
 
Whereas business corporations have adapted to the new economic geography, and in most 
instances have encouraged its emergence, the national institutions have had considerable 
difficulty keeping up with the historic shift.
73
 In essence, commercial laws are required to 
meet the challenges presented by the borderless global economy. Literature
74
 reveals that the 
advanced economies simultaneously nurtured the norms and the complementary institutions 
needed to achieve harmonious connectivity to the global economy previously. In contrast, 
most of the lesser developed  countries did not adjust their laws, opting to retain weak gov-
ernance, limited skills, and fragile banking sectors, as a result suffered major set- backs.
75
 In 
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particular, much of Africa has tended to fall into the latter category due to civil strife, policy 
weaknesses, adverse terms of trade, a lack of domestic capacities, and excessive debt.  How-
ever this position has recently changed as globalization has taken place; more and more 
countries believe that creating a viable bankruptcy system will help to fuel a market econ-
omy.
76
 Besides, globalization has resulted in the emergence of international institutions that 
have in a number of ways played key roles in influencing reforms. The African jurisdictions 
have, over time, engaged in the adoption of international best practices, as well as building 
their own regional blocs. The East African Community, of which Kenya is a member, has 
formulated a development strategy in which they are open to be guided by developments in 
the world economy, the regional economy and in the national economies.
77
 In particular, the 
strategic interventions which encompass legal reforms are driven by globalization, which 
manifests itself through intensification of competition in the global markets and the emer-
gence of regional economic blocs. It is noteworthy too that the more the world becomes in-
tegrated, the more that a jurisdiction will become vulnerable to crisis, as will be detailed 
within this category of drivers. 
6.3.1 Influence of International Organizations 
Multilateral institutions have for a while been engaged in championing the institutionaliza-
tion of the rule of law and good governance in developing countries and among the areas of 
focus in this regard has been the improvement of insolvency laws. In fact, the collective will 
of the Group of Seven (G7) international organizations to create global insolvency standards 
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paid special attention to developing economies due to their weak insolvency systems.
78
 The 
existing international benchmarks on insolvency laws are a product of the efforts of interna-
tional institutions, particularly the World Bank, UNCITRAL and the IMF. Their efforts have 
resulted in a unified set of insolvency benchmarks, represented by the consolidation of the 
World Bank’s Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems and the UN-
CITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Laws. States all over the world are encouraged to 
employ the World Bank Principles and guidelines on insolvency laws in modifying and up-
dating their local insolvency laws. Such standards have been very central to reforms and it is 
commendable that they provide guidelines and recommendations in the form of a soft law 
approach, rather than legally binding treaties.
79
  The advantage of having them as ‘soft law’ 
is chiefly that such an approach allows the jurisdictions of the world to implement reforms at 
their own discretion, which is necessary for jurisdictions previously colonized and keen on 
avoiding any further de facto colonization.  
The international benchmarks have exerted a strong influence and have succeeded because 
the reforming countries rely heavily on aids and technical assistance from international insti-
tutions and the developed economies. Besides, the observance of international standards is 
encouraged by ‘market induced discipline’ and official incentives.80 Market induced disci-
pline is where the investors utilize information on a country’s compliance with the relevant 
international standards in making investment decisions while official incentives arise where 
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the use of peer pressure, naming and shaming, surveillance and financial incentives are em-
ployed by the international organizations.
81
 
 
A key approach used by international organizations in pushing for reforms in many develop-
ing economies is through the attachment of conditions to foreign aid. Virtually every Afri-
can country has received large amounts of aid aimed at stimulating policy reform, although 
the results have varied enormously.
82
 For instance foreign aid played a positive role in 
Ghana and Uganda but Kenya is amongst those considered as behind in its reform agendas, 
despite available aid.
83
 Technically, experts financed by the international institutions have 
been used to help with ideas in the initial phase but financial assistance grows as policies 
improve and increase the benefits of reform, helping to sustain local political support. In 
particular, the IMF and the World Bank have been known to push for the implementation of 
reforms as part of the preconditions for donor funding.  For instance, the IMF, alongside 
other donor agencies, such as the World Bank in 1991 suspended the donor aid to Kenya, 
due to what were described as rising levels of corruption, a failure to correct macro-
economic imbalances caused by fiscal indiscipline, slow reforms in the civil service, lapses 
in the privatization of public enterprises, and a slow pace of political reforms.
84
 This forced 
the Kenyan government to engage in several expediency measures in an attempt to regain 
the lost confidence.  
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A similar incident happened in 1997 due to a failure to fulfil a donor condition of good gov-
ernance. The suspension of funds exerted pressure which resulted in progress in the imple-
mentation of some economic reforms.
85
 When the government finally accepted the donors’ 
conditions and engaged in reforms, Kenya became the first Sub-Saharan African country to 
receive structural adjustment lending from the World Bank and later on the first to receive 
an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan from the IMF.
86
 Reforms are 
therefore generally not prioritized willingly by the government on account of the govern-
ment realizing the inadequacies in the law, or the increase of incidences of insolvency facing 
a jurisdiction. Rather, reforms assume a higher position in legislative priorities as a result of 
external pressure and primarily for the sake of the supposed economic advantage given by 
the donor communities for adopting a new insolvency system. 
 
Previously, literature documented that reforms championed by outside agents have not been 
productive in other situations. In particular where conditional loans have been used, there 
have been instances where a government has agreed to measures that it does not believe in, 
in order to get funding and then has eventually failed to carry these measures out.
87
 Burdette 
expressed similar sentiments that there can never be any meaningful reform without political 
will and proper consultation and involvements of local experts when designing new laws.
88
 
Admittedly, tangible and successful reforms require goodwill from the government and a 
political movement for change which donors cannot do very much to generate. However, the 
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recent trends show that the international institutions have taken deliberate efforts to involve 
the locals. 
A significant tactic used by international organizations to push for reforms is through the use 
of global partnerships. The government of Kenya, in collaboration with its development 
partners (who are basically international financial institutions and countries which trade 
closely with Kenya), have developed a platform called Development Partnership Forum 
(DPT). At the moment, its new aid effectiveness technical group meets monthly, and a min-
isterial level development partnership forum co-chaired by the World Bank and the Kenyan 
Finance Minister convenes twice a year.
89
 In particular, in 2010 using the aforementioned 
forum, a meeting was organized where the government was urged to take further and bolder 
measures to improve the business climate in Kenya, to strengthen and increase transparency 
in procurement and public financial management, and to improve the absorption of donor 
funds by dealing with key implementation challenges.
90
 To make progress in these areas, the 
Government and its partners agreed to work together to ensure that the budget would re-
spond to emerging priorities and that aid was aligned with the budget.
91
 The government has 
acknowledged that since the government started participating in the exercise, substantial 
progress has been made in terms of administration and legal reforms have been simplified.
92
 
 
Another approach used by international organizations such as World Bank to drive reforms 
is the funding and commissioning of research undertaken through both local and foreign 
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scholars, based on planned and prioritized activities.
93
 In most developing economies, the 
locals hardly engage on their own initiative in research, although such studies can be very 
significant in understanding the limitations in the existing systems and appreciating the need 
for reforms. This gap has been identified and explored by the international institutions. For 
instance, Japan in 1991, through a Japanese agreement grant, engaged an American law firm 
to work in partnership with Kenyan law firms and legal professionals to assist in identifying 
desirable reforms to the legal regulatory framework, which included the assessment of bank-
ruptcy laws.
94
 The aforementioned engagement concluded with a report proposing a com-
prehensive law reforms programme in the corporate area. It was revealed in the discussions 
that diagnostic studies have been invaluable, if not critical, to the success of any reform. A 
further noteworthy research project was done in March 2009 when an 11-member team of 
U.S. based government representatives and consultants travelled to Kenya and conducted 
interviews across the public and private sectors, including with national and local officials, 
business owners, business associations, chambers of commerce, non-governmental organiza-
tions, the banking and lending community, university representatives, labour unions, and 
many others.
95
 The investigation concluded in a round table presentation and discussion at-
tended by nearly 100 local stakeholders and donors, and a worthwhile report which details 
recommendations and explanations of how lessons learned from previous development ef-
forts might specifically apply in Kenya.
96
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Through such engagements, areas requiring reforms are earmarked and it is not uncommon 
for those areas now to include insolvency laws.  Such initiatives have proved very vital in 
other African jurisdictions. For instance, the World Bank engaged the expertise of Professor 
Burdette as part of a World Bank team that evaluated the insolvency systems in Malawi and 
the Seychelles and produced proposals to remedy shortcomings in the existing statutes deal-
ing with Malawian and Seychelles insolvency law.
97
 This culminated in the enactment of the 
Seychelles Insolvency Act and the Malawian Draft Insolvency Bill, which is awaiting ap-
proval by Parliament.
98
 Although the respective governments play a leading role in the re-
form processes, it is evident that the international organizations are better positioned to en-
sure that their agenda and recommendations are captured in the insolvency reform through 
technical and financial support.
99
 It is remarkable that research funded by these institutions 
is arguably credible, the analytical work is technically sound and their basis of arriving at 
conclusions is transparent and able to withstand public scrutiny.
100
 This was well articulated 
by Besley in his discussion of the importance of World Bank data that is publicly available 
and internationally recognized as a reliable source of evidence-based policymaking.
101
 It is 
argued that a reform-minded government can use such information to motivate and sustain 
reform efforts. 
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A further fundamental strategy that has also been employed by the international organiza-
tions is the organizing of conferences and round table meetings. In particular, INSOL Inter-
national has been organizing round table meetings which are a platform for a high level dia-
logue with both private practitioners and public policy makers on insolvency reform in Af-
rica.
102
 Through such endeavours, a forum is availed for a coordinated approach by interna-
tional bodies, countries and experts by sharing experience and knowledge, crucial in enhanc-
ing insolvency reform on the African policy agenda. They have held several meetings with 
cutting edge themes on insolvency. 
 
A momentous Round Table meeting for Kenya was the one organized in 2012 by the World 
Bank Group in partnership with the International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency 
& Bankruptcy Professionals (INSOL International) held in Nairobi.
103
 The event was docu-
mented as providing a rare opportunity for public-private dialogue in the region, where 
judges, regulators, policy makers, bankers, and insolvency experts discussed topics relating 
to non-performing loan resolution, loan workouts, restructuring and debt enforcement.
104
 
Besides, the event has been documented to have demonstrated a huge enthusiasm across the 
continent for pursuing law reform and for building the necessary capacity for successful re-
structurings and efficient insolvencies.
105
  The current Attorney General of Kenya who at-
tended the event, Professor Githu Muigai, was categorical on the need for African policy-
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makers to ‘learn from others and to reflect that learning in practice.’ 106 He underscored the 
significance of best practice standards on insolvency in helping the region to continue to re-
tain their productive value in the economy as well as stimulating entrepreneurship.
107
 Inher-
ently, such forums provide an opportunity to learn from reforms in other jurisdictions as 
well as stirring up reform debates which are necessary in maintaining the reform momen-
tum. 
 
Further, the World Bank has also been known to participate in reform processes by offering 
technical assistance.
108
 Jurisdictions with long and established legal traditions usually seek 
help only in relation to specialized areas of law, and in strengthening the judiciary and estab-
lishing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
109
 However, in states with lesser devel-
oped legal systems, the legal technical assistance that is sought may range from policy ad-
vice to assistance in drafting legislation, introducing, implementing, and enforcing new laws 
and regulations, devising procedures and institutions that carry out new laws, designing pub-
lic information campaigns, and training.
110
 In addition, support can include legislative re-
views, process mappings, reviews of reform proposals, and advice for investment that would 
help in the implementation of the reform agenda.
111
 It is evident that offering technical assis-
tance to any jurisdiction is a complex engagement. In essence, extra resources and numerous 
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experts from a broad range of financial, legal and judicial technical areas are utilized and 
without these resources the objectives may not be achieved and reform momentum can be 
wasted.
112
  Besides, technical assistance is provided to governments by World Bank Group 
units and sometimes in collaboration with other stakeholders. Therefore, given the wide 
range of stakeholders involved, there is need for considerable coordination of efforts. Con-
sequently, the stakeholders conduct an important assessment, considering the country’s laws 
or legal systems against the international benchmarks so as to maximize a given country’s 
ability to meaningfully participate as a trusted partner in international trade, while at the 
same time ensuring that the country’s laws protect its citizens and the capital invested in that 
country.
113
 However, much as the World Bank, through such involvement, is a significant 
driver of reforms, experience of reforms to date has revealed that the recipient governments 
must demonstrate a clear commitment to legal reform and take ownership of legal reform for 
legal technical assistance to bring about the desired results. 
The Mauritius insolvency reform is a good example of how technical support from multina-
tional institutions is helpful. During its insolvency reforms, it is documented that the World 
Bank provided technical assistance and support, to help develop a pipeline of financial and 
private sector development policy reforms.
114
 In fact, such support was recognized to have 
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been a very useful tool, as it helped provide technical expertise and enabled global best prac-
tice on policy and institutional issues to inform policy dialogue.
115
 
6.3.2 Crisis 
Financial crisis has been said to be a catalyst for legal reforms in many jurisdictions.
116
 This 
is mainly because times of crisis and uncertainty generate an energy which, if well har-
nessed, can help to build the foundations for a new and better order.
117
 There is plenty of 
evidence that supports this assertion. For instance, during past financial crises, jurisdictions 
such as Russia, those in East Asia, and Argentina, turned their attentions to the importance 
of bankruptcy laws that supported the efficient resolution of financial distress.
118
 The Asian 
financial crisis, which spread from Thailand to other countries in the region during the sec-
ond half of 1997, plunged the countries affected into deep recessions that brought rising un-
employment, poverty, and social dislocation and it eventually propelled massive reforms in 
that region.
119
 
The 2008 crisis inspired some of the legislative changes made in 2009 to2011 by many EU 
member states, including Romania and was a good opportunity for governments and poli-
cymakers to engage in significant reform of the bankruptcy process.
120
 A new insolvency 
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law was passed in Ukraine in December 2011.
121
 Greece and Portugal implemented meas-
ures under the Fund-supported programs to improve the efficiency of the judicial process, 
while some European countries such as Moldova and Serbia enhanced their insolvency ad-
ministrator regime.
122
 The Slovak Republic adopted a new amendment to its bankruptcy and 
restructuring law that clearly defines the roles and powers of creditors, secured creditors and 
trustees with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the insolvency process.
123
 Generally, 
several other European Union jurisdictions responded by reforming their laws. It is well ap-
preciated in these western jurisdictions that crisis puts even the strongest economies into 
disarray and therefore structural reforms are usually undertaken as a key feature of the coun-
tries' programs to address the root causes of the crisis and its consequences, as well as to set 
the stage for medium-term growth. 
 
In the past, however, crisis did not propel any reforms in emerging economies and Kenya 
was no exception. This was because the impact of financial crisis in these jurisdictions was 
limited, purely because countries in sub-Saharan Africa were barely integrated into the 
global financial system.
124
 The banks relied on domestic deposits and lending and did not 
have derivatives or asset-based securities among their portfolios and this insulated them 
from sources of financial vulnerability that had impacts elsewhere.
125
 According to Shanta 
Devarajan, ‘African banks retain loans they originate on their balance sheets, the interbank 
market is small, and the market for securitized or derivative instruments was either small or 
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non-existent.’126  However, in recent years, globalization has led to financial systems being 
more integrated, hence whenever a financial crisis occurs; its impacts are felt in almost all 
the jurisdictions of the world. In fact, Kenya's financial market is far more open now, though 
the extent is still not comparable to the openness of markets in the United States, Europe, or 
Asia.
127
 In essence, Kenya has increasingly become integrated in the global economy and 
the effects of turmoil in the financial systems in the United States and Europe are bound to 
have an effect, albeit a lagged one.
128
 
 
Similarly the Mauritius economy has evolved and grown in sophistication in the past two 
decades. There is a wider variety of businesses, the economy is more globally integrated and 
business risk is becoming more spread and more intense. Reform commenced in the early 
1980s when the government introduced a series of financial and fiscal policy measures to 
liberalize the economy and prepare the country for global integration.
129
 Besides, given the 
commitment and pace at which Mauritius has opened up its economy for integration, it is 
more vulnerable to financial crisis. For instance in 2005, a ‘triple trade shock’ caused by an 
erosion in textile and sugar preferences, and combined with rising energy prices, shaped a 
very difficult outlook for Mauritius.
130
 This prompted the newly-elected government in 2006 
to announce an ambitious and comprehensive plan for accelerating the implementation of 
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key reforms to realize the development vision from the previous decade.
131
 Further in 2008, 
the economic outlook for Mauritius turned dull as the world faced the worst economic con-
ditions in decades. This reinforced the government push for reforms, which resulted in the 
enactment of the Insolvency Act 2009, amongst other legislations necessary to forestall the 
impact of crisis.
132
 The quick implementation of the pre-emptive reform agenda since 2006-
2008 was at the core of Mauritius’s resilience during the last 2008-2009 crisis.133 
In the Kenyan jurisdiction, it is only the recent crisis of 2008 that has stirred reform debates 
and prompted a rethinking regarding the country’s ability to withstand the impact of crisis. 
In particular, the financial crisis of 2008, according to the Prime Minister, was anticipated to 
badly affect the Kenyan economy.
134
 In reality, the magnitude of the impact is not well 
documented and was according to a Ministry of Finance and Central Bank official indirect 
and most likely small.
135
  The explanation of the indirect effect were given in examples that 
include a slowdown of the tourism sector that relies heavily on foreign tourists, the construc-
tion industry and the stock market that benefit from remittances by Kenyans living abroad 
and foreign institutions e.g. hedge funds.
136
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Nevertheless, the global financial crisis left both short and long terms impacts; the most im-
mediate was the depreciation of the Kenya shilling relative to the US dollar.
137
 In addition 
there was reduction in Tourists from KSh49.3 billion to KSh34.5 billion over the same time 
caused by increased fuel prices and the Global financial crisis.
138
 Besides, there was the;  
 ‘Psychological effects e.g. lending institutions being more specific and shying away 
 from those who cannot show ability to pay. In a case of learning from others expe ri-
ence  lending institutions want to avoid any action that would bring them in the  same 
situation  that triggered the financial crisis. Firms with foreign lending had to  re-
think their lending  terms and priorities.’139 
The portfolio flows adversely affected the stock market, with foreign sales exceeding for-
eign buys in many counters, as foreign portfolio investors diversify from the market.
140
 
Equally the NSE-20 share index has been affected since mid-2008 and there have been re-
duced economic activities and capital inflows including a reversal/ reduction of portfolio 
capital which has aggravated the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy, amongst oth-
ers.  
 
Remarkably, there was a formation of a taskforce to inform the government on how to shield 
the economy from the adverse effects of the global financial crisis.
141
 Some of the recom-
mendations that were made highlighted a need to review the legal framework. Besides, a 
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number of financial specialists have reiterated the need for ensuring that the financial sectors 
are regulated in the interest of promoting their growth while at the same time insulating 
them from collapse instigated by global financial crisis.
142
 Such sentiments are inspired by 
observation of examples such as the Asian banks that are documented to have escaped, 
largely due to well capitalized banks, cautious regulation and huge forex reserves.
143
 This is 
significant given the fact that the previous crisis had badly affected the Asian jurisdictions, 
prompting them to engage in reforms whose rewards seems to have been reaped already. 
From the foregoing, it may be observed that the financial crisis contributes impetus to insol-
vency reforms by triggering the reform debates. In fact, much as the central focus of reforms 
has been on the policy interventions aimed at enhancing liquidity in the market, efforts were 
directed towards other measures that would arguably, enhance the depth, operation and effi-
ciency of the financial market and ultimately enhance monetary policy effectiveness.
144
 
6.3.3 Regional Integration 
For more than a decade now, the East African countries have engaged in deliberate efforts to 
establish a regional economic bloc. The ‘EAC treaty’ which establishes an East African 
Community was signed in 1999 and entered into force in 2000. According to article 5 (1) of 
this EAC Treaty, one of the objectives of the Community is to develop policies and pro-
grams aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among partner states in political, eco-
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nomic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security, legal and judi-
cial affairs, for their mutual benefit. In so far as business engagements are concerned, the 
signing of the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol (CMP) and its an-
nexes in 2009 was momentous as it reinforced the commitment by the member states to es-
tablish a common market.  
 
Primarily, the achievement of an integrated market necessitates the establishment of an insti-
tutional framework to develop, implement, and sustain the efficient, transparent, and market-
based regulatory systems in order to achieve the economic benefits of regional integra-
tion.
145
 Besides, an effective way of integrating member jurisdictions is through the har-
monization of laws. In essence, laws are tools for implementing economic integration be-
cause stable, clear and uniform legislation, once commonly implemented, will encourage 
investment and growth of markets.
146
 Therefore, national laws require review against com-
munity legislation/policy to assess whether changes in the national legal enactments are nec-
essary to facilitate the intended objectives of the cooperation. In fact, the partner states, ac-
cording to article 7(1) (b) of the EAC Treaty, committed themselves to provide an adequate 
and appropriate enabling environment to facilitate the integration process, including favour-
able policies and basic infrastructures. The adequate and appropriate enabling environment 
ultimately includes harmonization of all their national laws. As a member, Kenya inevitably 
has to engage in reforms necessary towards eliminating existing rules at domestic levels that 
violate the principles of the common market. 
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Since the inception of the East African Community, the prospects of huge economic benefits 
to the member states have triggered a debate on reforms. The EAC Development Strategy 
2006-2010 is one of the reform engagements which stipulates that harmonization of laws is 
considered a key strategic intervention.
147
 Besides, the EAC Secretariat commissioned a 
study to harmonize the commercial laws of the partner states in 2010, which recommended 
that the commercial laws to be harmonized should fall within nine broad clusters and one of 
them would be laws governing business transactions (covering legislation on bankruptcy, 
building societies, business organizations, capital market development, chattels transfer, the 
co-operative movement, export processing zones and transfer of businesses etc.).
148
 In addi-
tion, the Kenyan government pledged to move with speed to amend a number of its legisla-
tive enactments and among the targeted areas are commercial laws, especially those dealing 
with the registration of companies and other business entities, bankruptcy and insolvency, as 
well as investment laws.
149
 
 
Besides the EAC, Kenya is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
commitments to the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) exerts pres-
sure on the government of Kenya to engage in a wide range of reforms in its trade processes. 
Pressure for change specifically in Kenya’s trade processes is being felt due to Kenya’s po-
sition as a founding member of the World Trade Organization. Kenya’s commitment to par-
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ticipate in the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of the COMESA, the formation of the EAC 
Customs Union, and the private sector, form a formidable force propelling reforms neces-
sary for this jurisdiction to become globally competitive.
150
 For example, through CO-
MESA, Kenya is among six jurisdictions that are leading the way to put into place a regional 
customs bond guarantee programme designed to, among other things, streamline the process 
of doing business in the critical trade corridor that runs from Mombasa in Kenya to Uganda 
and on to Kigali, Rwanda.
151
 It is acknowledged that the prioritized areas of reform pro-
pelled by this grouping do not include insolvency laws but generally the wider business le-
gal spheres meant to improve its trading across borders and to enable the grouping to be-
come more globally competitive. However, it is argued that attracting investors and remain-
ing globally competitive will inevitably require insolvency reforms, given the pivotal role 
that insolvency law plays in directing the flow of credit. 
  
6.4 INTERNAL FORCES /REALITIES 
Most Sub-Saharan countries struggle with poverty, unemployment, and minimal economic 
growth etc. For a long time, laws in these emerging economies have been known to be unre-
sponsive to development needs. However, trends have recently changed as law reforms in 
areas such as business laws and in relation to commercial transactions have been docu-
mented to stimulate economic growth. In essence, the attempts to tackle the challenges have 
forced the jurisdictions to engage in legal reforms. Of particular interest is how foreign di-
rect investment, poverty reduction and economic growth have propelled insolvency reforms. 
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6.4.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment is generally understood as a direct investment into production or 
business in a country by an individual or company of another country. It includes equity 
capital, re-invested earnings and intra-company loans, with the first two dominating net FDI 
to Kenya.
152
  FDI is particularly important because it brings investable financial resources to 
host countries, provides new technologies and may enhance the efficiency of existing tech-
nologies.
153
 In addition, FDI may facilitate access into export markets, thereby playing an 
important role in strengthening the export capabilities of domestic economies; may enhance 
skills and management techniques; and may provide cleaner technologies and modern envi-
ronment management systems.
154
 Undoubtedly, FDI contributes to the growth and develop-
ment of a country by complementing its domestic investment, facilitating trade, and transfer 
of knowledge and technology.
155
 
 
However, foreign investors face considerable levels of risk where legal systems lack trans-
parency, predictability, and security, and as a result such investors will often avoid high-risk 
environments. In essence, foreign investors are attracted to legal systems which are predict-
able and efficient; and second, investors have the ability to easily identify a uniform set of 
characteristics which render any legal system predictable and efficient.
156
 An inefficient le-
gal system raises transaction costs by failing to provide affordable mechanisms for enforcing 
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legal rights and obligations.
157
 Low transaction costs are guaranteed where a host state's 
laws are of good quality i.e. modern and its courts and bureaucracies are provided with ade-
quate infrastructure, and with trained and properly compensated staff.
158
 Fundamentally, the 
availability of business opportunities alone is not sufficient but investment climate features 
such as strong institutions and investor-friendly regulations also matter and may even boost 
the development impact of the investment. The international community underscored the 
importance of an enabling business climate for private investment and job creation during 
the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Mexico.
159
 
 
Conversely, the business climates of many emerging economies are dominated by a few 
players and entry to such emerging markets is difficult and costly; laws and regulations dis-
tort market competition, ineffective enforcement of rules makes emerging economies less 
likely to compete globally.
160
 In particular, operating and regulatory environments in devel-
oping economies have been documented as challenging, as they remain relatively inefficient, 
uncompetitive and dominated by their informal economies.
161
 Nonetheless, given the sig-
nificance of foreign investment, developing countries are now giving new interest to the 
creation of the right environment for a country to attract foreign investment. In particular, it 
is widely acknowledged that business regulation reforms help a country to create an invest-
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ment climate that is conducive to starting and running a business, where complying with 
regulations brings more benefits than costs. The countries’ governments are therefore for-
mulating and implementing laws that will ensure that the country attracts foreign investors 
and ensure that they operate in a competitive environment.
162
 In particular, among the laws 
given attention are corporate insolvency laws, since well-functioning corporate governance 
and bankruptcy laws are generally believed to be critical to investment and growth. They are 
particularly important in emerging market economies where corporations often are hugely 
influential in the economy-at-large and in politics.
163
 
 
FDI has played an increasingly important role in the Kenyan economy, such that when there 
was a decline in the net FDI flows in the early 1980s and 1990s, economic reforms were un-
dertaken in an attempt to improve the business environment.
164
 However, since the 2000s 
FDI flows to Kenya have not only been highly volatile, they have generally declined.
165
 Be-
sides, there is evidence that investors are moving their interests to Kenya’s neighbours in the 
EAC (Uganda and Tanzania) due to low investor confidence, resulting from factors in 
Kenya like insecurity, poor infrastructure, high interest rates, and high operational costs, an 
unsupportive judicial system and insufficient legislation. In fact by 2004, there was a grow-
ing concern within the Kenyan Government as to the decline of Kenya’s competitiveness, 
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not only in the global economy but also in the region.
166
 Equally, there was a growing con-
sensus within the government as to the need for bolder and more aggressive reforms to cre-
ate a competitive and an enabling environment for enhanced private sector investments.
167
 A 
notable reforming effort resulted include the establishment of the Business Regulatory Re-
form Unit (BRRU) in the Ministry of Finance. This was a culmination of the Business Li-
censing Reform Project, a crucial move in reforming business laws generally. 
The limited reforms in the business laws have done little to improve Kenya’s competitive-
ness since, according to the World Bank Doing Business Report, Kenya was ranked 106 in 
2011, 109 in 2012 and further dropped to position 121 in the world’s global list of economic 
competitiveness in the year 2013.
168
 This is disturbing, given that Kenya compares so unfa-
vourably in relation to its neighbours Uganda and Rwanda which were ranked at 52 and 120 
respectively in the same index.
169
 These reports highlight a number of issues touching upon 
a country’s business environment, namely: ease of starting business, dealing with construc-
tion permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, 
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. Given 
the variety of issues that they address, these reports are very informative and arguably con-
tribute in influencing the investors’ choice of investment destination. 
The desire to improve Kenya’s competitiveness to attract FDI has driven a number of re-
forms; insolvency reforms being one of them. The pressures of globalization of capital 
movement and the threat that companies will relocate to countries with more favourable 
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business environments have pushed the Kenyan government to respond.
170
 In fact the former 
president of Kenya, Hon. Mwai Kibaki is on record as having said that the Insolvency Bill 
2010 was one amongst many government engagements that are pursuing an enabling envi-
ronment that will make Kenya more competitive in terms of business and investment.
171
 The 
efforts have been on-going for almost two decades with the aim to review, modernize and 
generally simplify the laws.
172
 A notable impetus was in 2003-2007 when a policy strategy 
was adopted that was anchored on the new government overarching policy objectives of its 
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation.
173
 Much as this particu-
lar policy did not directly discuss insolvency reforms, it is one of the significant engage-
ments by the government in the reform of business laws. A further impetus came in 2008 
with the launching of Kenya’s ‘Vision2030’, a government driven agenda which seeks to 
transform Kenya into a competitive and prosperous middle income economy.
174
 It is note-
worthy that the reform initiative is carried out within the wider context of facilitating growth 
of trade and investment and foreign direct investment, all aimed at reducing poverty.
175
 
6.4.2 Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 
There is also a general consensus that entrepreneurship is very important for supporting the 
dynamism of the modern market economy, and that a greater entry rate of new businesses 
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can encourage competition and economic growth.
176
 This reality has pushed jurisdictions all 
over the world to engage in legal reforms necessary for encouraging such entrepreneurial 
activities. In particular, jurisdictions are reforming their laws to make it possible for firms to 
enter into the market and secondly to ensure that business exit process are quick and effi-
cient, to allow creditors to recover their assets and entrepreneurs to pursue new opportuni-
ties.
177
 Growing the economy inevitably reduces poverty. 
Besides, many books and influential reports have outlined the role of business activities in 
helping to reduce poverty and unemployment. This, coupled with the underlying proposition 
that efficient regulatory frameworks are vital preconditions for a greater role for the private 
sector in development, drives reform. Besides, poverty reduction is the overarching global 
policy challenge today.
178
 This is primarily because poverty breeds despair, social unrest, 
aggravated ethnic tensions and engenders political instability.
179
 In addressing this chal-
lenge, development assistance is moving away from the fulfilment of resource transfer tar-
gets toward the nurturing of new policy ideas, the sharing of development knowledge across 
countries, and the promotion of domestic capacity.
180
 In essence, greater selectivity is being 
practiced to ensure that assistance flows are directed to countries committed to policy reform 
and poverty reduction. In fact, the international players who have partnered for a while with 
poorer countries in fighting poverty acknowledge that facilitation of commercial activities is 
important. A general observation of the World Bank Doing Business cross-country surveys 
suggests that poorer countries tend to have faulty commercial law systems. 
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In Kenya, a serious challenge facing the country today is to create employment opportunities 
for its continuously growing labour force, notably the youth, and another key challenge is 
poverty reduction.
181
 As a result, reform has been undertaken in the wider legal spectrum as 
part of Kenya’s strategies towards overcoming the challenges. Such engagements are con-
sidered worthwhile since there is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates that entre-
preneurial activity plays a direct and important role in poverty reduction.
182
 In fact, studies 
in a number of countries show that entrepreneurial activity is a primary determinant of up-
ward income mobility of poor people.
183
 Generally, entrepreneurship is, or can be, the cen-
tral creative economic force in all countries. Arguably, the realization that one of the ways 
of dealing with poverty challenges is by encouraging entrepreneurship is a force that drives 
policy change that creates conditions where entrepreneurship is constructive and dynamic. 
Generally, one of the objectives of an insolvency law is to protect and maximize value for 
the benefit of all interested parties and the economy in general.
184
 This is an objective that is 
most obviously pursued during rehabilitation, where value is maximized by continuing a vi-
able enterprise. In particular, rescue mechanisms can be viewed as economically beneficial 
in the long run, since they encourage debtors to restructure before their financial difficulties 
become too severe. Moreover, rescuing a viable enterprise serves a broader societal interest, 
by giving debtors a second chance; hence it encourages the growth of the private sector and 
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an entrepreneurial class. In fact, one of the primary drivers of corporate insolvency law has 
been the recognition that Kenya should move to embrace the so-called ‘rescue culture’.185 
An embedded and intrinsic objective of the on-going insolvency reforms is therefore to 
strengthen poverty reduction strategies through rehabilitation and the use of rescue proce-
dures whose effective implementation would save jobs and revenue in the long term.
186
 
There is a close relationship between the establishment of a strong investment climate and 
poverty reduction in the sense that an enabling investment climate facilitates investments 
and exports and it improves productivity which, in turn, spurs economic growth, which posi-
tively affects poor people through improvements to their income.
187
 It is not in doubt that 
sustained economic growth is the most critical factor in alleviating poverty.
188
 Consequently, 
economic growth requires an enabling investment climate and one of the ways of achieving 
this is by establishing efficient legal frameworks. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter has revealed that a number of drivers are involved in prompting 
insolvency reforms.  Similar drivers exist in both Mauritius and Kenya but the influence of 
the drivers has differed in impact because of various reasons. Each of the drivers has influ-
enced reforms to varying degrees and some drivers are complementary. For instance much 
as reforms are driven by changes in market dynamics, an effective government is a critical 
complement. The markets need government and government needs markets because gov-
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ernment action is crucial to the ability of people to participate effectively in economic op-
portunity.
189
 In essence, an active government that fosters an environment where markets 
can function, contracts are enforced, and the basic infrastructure works will always prioritise 
a reform agenda. Policy formation is primarily driven by domestic political economy. Ac-
cordingly, it is prudent to appreciate that the government’s political and legal responsibilities 
are complimentary in their effectiveness to propel reforms. On the legal front, the Kenyan 
government has not influenced the process and pace of insolvency reforms to a noticeable 
degree. In contrast, the Mauritian reforms are by and large a result of an efficient govern-
ment initiative. 
From 1990 to date, the business community in Kenya has constantly maintained its call to 
prioritize the reforming of some vital business legislation e.g. through the Companies Bill, 
Insolvency Bill and Partnerships Bill that seeks to coordinate and reduce the cost of doing 
business, which is necessary to improve the investment climate in Kenya. As noted, KEPSA 
has partnered with the government in passing various policies and Bills and increasing stra-
tegic interventions. The meetings that KEPSA has organized with key government officials 
have been significant in maintaining the momentum of reforms. 
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank play the role of repositories of credible, ac-
cessible, and up-to-date information that serves as an international benchmark for progress. 
Access to information is the basis for evidence-based policymaking and can serve as a cata-
lyst for necessary reforms. Besides, the multilateral institutions drive reforms through or-
ganization of Round Table Meetings which are platforms for peer reviewing amongst juris-
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dictions. In addition, the use of conditional funds and aids are employed to ensure that gov-
ernments implement reforms. 
Internal challenges such as poverty, unemployment and the competition to attract investment 
have contributed to the driving of reforms. In Kenya in particular, law reforms in the wider 
spectrum of business laws have so far been documented to stimulate economic growth. In 
essence, the attempts to tackle the challenges have forced the jurisdictions to engage in legal 
reforms. As regards global trends, integration, both at regional and international levels has 
necessitated the harmonization of laws. Besides, it is notable that major reforms have often 
been preceded by economic and political crises.
190
 
The biggest answer to what drives reforms was captured in a nutshell by the following quo-
tation: 
 ‘When are reforms likely to be successfully implemented? They tend to be success-
ful when certain conditions, or combinations of them, are present. These include, 
demand from strong lobbyists in the private sector, the World Bank and other donor 
agencies, the media or the existence of specific crisis situations. These trigger re-
sponse from the highest level of government…….which then force through the de-
manded changes’191  
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In essence, reforming the legal framework is a long process which requires stimulus from 
the drivers considered in this Chapter, leading to a commitment from the government and a 
continuous sustained effort over time.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.1 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters we have considered the drivers for insolvency law reform and seen 
how their influence differs significantly in particular countries. We have also explored the 
historical evolution of corporate insolvency laws in specific jurisdictions with an aim of es-
tablishing whether Kenya can benefit from their experiences in its reform engagements.  The 
exploration of the wellspring of legal traditions and fundamental principles that underpin 
corporate insolvency laws is vital in appreciating the need for reform. The momentous de-
velopments provide great insights in understanding how reforms are realized.  Besides, it 
was considered prudent to appreciate how insolvency laws impact upon investment deci-
sions, as well as the relevance of business turnaround in the currently volatile economic cli-
mate, where businesses are struggling for credit and in many cases simply struggling to sur-
vive. 
This last chapter is divided into four main parts. It starts with a summary of the main in-
sights that have emerged in the study. The second part deals with the contribution to knowl-
edge by this study. The third part focuses on the legal and policy implications of the contri-
bution made. It then expounds on the limitations of the study as well as pointing out the pos-
sible direction of further research.  
The aims, as stated in Chapter One, shaped a platform, setting out the boundaries of the re-
search and how this was to develop throughout the thesis. One of the aims was to evaluate 
whether Kenyan insolvency laws supports modern businesses and to consider what, if any, 
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legal reforms might be desirable to better achieve this end. This was important given the 
slow pace of reforms to the Kenyan corporate insolvency laws. The study also undertook a 
comparative analysis between Kenya, the U.K and Mauritius with an aim of reflecting upon 
the experiences and lessons in each jurisdiction. This necessitated an in-depth investigation 
of how the reforms have been carried out in the respective jurisdiction and the drivers of re-
form in each case. 
 
7.2 MAIN INSIGHTS 
The context of the study was elaborated in Chapter One with a justification as to why it is 
prudent to undertake a research of this nature. The fundamental concepts in insolvency law 
were explored and it was demonstrated that company failures do happen and can be trig-
gered by internal deficiencies, such as poor management, or external, such as a natural disas-
ter.
1
 Where these deficiencies trigger company failure, there is a need for an efficient insol-
vency framework.
2
 It was also argued and subsequently proved, mainly in Chapter Three 
that Kenyan insolvency law has lagged behind, despite an overwhelming recognition that an 
effective and efficient insolvency framework is necessary for the health of an economy, not 
least because it specifically influences investment decisions.
3
 Besides, insolvency laws of 
many jurisdictions all over the world have undergone reforms, especially in recent years, as 
the impact of financial meltdown has left daunting negative effects. For instance, in Europe, 
crisis in the credit market triggered a large number of corporate failures, and consequently 
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dramatic losses of jobs.
4
 Such realities underscore the importance of an effective insolvency 
framework whose main aim is to provide mechanisms to keep viable businesses operating, 
rather than entering a premature liquidation.
5
 Besides, it was argued that a legal framework 
should also discourage lenders from issuing high-risk loans and the managers from making 
other reckless financial decisions.
6
 The preoccupation of this thesis was therefore to under-
stand the extent of the inadequacies of the insolvency framework in Kenya, to understand 
how other jurisdictions have been able to reform their laws and possibly to make helpful 
suggestions as to the way forward. 
Chapter Two of this study explored the theories that have been developed in an attempt to 
understand the justification for the existence and roles of insolvency law. It was established 
that the normative debates on insolvency philosophy and policy have been dominated by 
two groups, originally named the social and economic but characterized in literature as ‘Pro-
ceduralists’ and ‘Traditionalists’.7 The former group comprises of those whose main focus in 
an insolvency process is the creditors’ interest.8 The latter are theorists and policy makers 
who hold the view that insolvency law should do more than to facilitate the protection of 
creditors but should as well seek to protect other stakeholders and wider community inter-
ests.
9
 It became evident that different theories that explain the usage of insolvency law exist 
at different levels of generality and have varying applications and uses as explanatory tools. 
Besides, the debates and theories that ensued have almost exclusively been developed from 
the viewpoint of developed economies and hence they cannot adequately reflect the reality 
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of an emerging economy. In addition, the pressure towards globalization through the usage 
of international benchmarks arguably developed with a skewed focus that was based on the 
experiences of developed systems without giving due attention to the circumstances of de-
veloping economies, a focus which can arguably result in unsuitable legislative reforms in 
those jurisdictions. However, the theoretical debate served to reveal the extent of the con-
flicting interests that insolvency laws deal with as it balances the many and sometimes in-
compatible goals. Nonetheless, it became apparent in the study that if an efficient insolvency 
framework is in place in particular with business rescue carefully pursued, it can help in ad-
dressing some of the challenges faced in developing nations such as job preservation for 
employees and the promotion of economic growth. It was argued that in Kenya, as it reforms 
its insolvency laws, attempts must be made to develop a realistic law which will inevitably 
require a lot of trade-offs in the many interests to be balanced. In essence, it is essential that 
the legislation must not be a hindrance to credit flow for investment and so it should be en-
trepreneur-friendly yet at the same time it is important that it should preserve financial sta-
bility and jobs. 
Chapter Three addresses the first aim of assessing current Kenyan insolvency law from the 
standpoint of encouragement of external and internal investment. It analyses and evaluates 
the Kenyan legislative insolvency framework using international benchmarks. Specifically, 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency
10
 was extensively used to establish how 
Kenya’s current framework compares to international benchmarks. It was argued that a 
number of reasons influenced the choice of using the international benchmarks as an evalua-
tive tool. One, the global insolvency norms which emanate from the efforts of multilateral 
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institutions, particularly, UNCITRAL, the World Bank and the IMF are reputable and 
widely accepted, given the number of jurisdictions that have in the recent past considered 
them in their reforms.
11
 Second, the benchmarks are meant to assist the national authorities 
in their efforts to strengthen domestic economic and financial sector policy frameworks.
12
 
Besides, the World Bank considers countries’ investment climates and ranks them according 
to their performances and their reports influence investors’ confidence and improve capital 
access.
13
 
In addition, the character of the global scripts may be regarded as very favourable, since 
they embody high order objectives and many substantive & procedural recommendations yet 
still permit considerable discretion to the national policy makers to indigenize the global 
norms because they are ‘soft law’.14 The investigation revealed that the Kenyan legislative 
framework is ill-equipped to support modern businesses, or even encourage external and in-
ternal investment. The first weakness is that the law is archaic, dating back to the colonial 
period. The insolvency provisions are contained in Kenya's Companies Act (1962). The lack 
of a statute singularly dedicated to insolvency makes the legislation embodying it bulky, 
complicated and cumbersome to access. It is also notable that relevant sections are not 
chronologically arranged. The law’s application, too, has been unsatisfactory with virtually 
every business that faces financial distress having been liquidated. 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency sets out nine key objectives and each of 
the objectives was applied to the Kenyan insolvency framework in order to establish how 
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the Kenyan laws measure up against the international benchmarks. It was argued that, much 
as the Kenyan insolvency laws are predisposed towards liquidation, they have the advantage 
of certainty. In particular, the provisions in respect of the winding-up of companies have 
been applied consistently over a long period of time, making the system recognizable and 
potentially functional for all the stakeholders.  However, not all businesses that face finan-
cial distress are worthy or liquidation. In fact, the expectation of an efficient insolvency sys-
tem is to strike a balance between liquidation and reorganization,
15
 the latter of which is 
visibly lacking in the Kenyan insolvency law. In addition, although the laws permit an 
automatic stay, a critical feature for the maximization of the value for assets, this is negated 
by the length of time that insolvency disputes take to be resolved, given that the laws do not 
stipulate the expected time frame.  A World Bank report documented that in 2009 a formal 
insolvency process in Kenya took an average of 4.5 years to resolve.
16
 This was however a 
conclusion arrived at from observing the cases that had so far been dealt with but no details 
was offered as to whether this referred to winding up or receivership. 
The Kenyan law also lacks clear mechanisms or incentives for managers to initiate the in-
solvency process at a sufficiently early stage. For instance, good contrasting examples can 
be drawn from the US, where filing early is encouraged by the ‘carrot’ of being a debtor in 
possession.
17
 Generally, the evaluation revealed a lot of inadequacies but it was argued that 
the existing reform efforts of the Insolvency Bill 2010 would hopefully address them. How-
ever, given that this Bill still has to go through debates in Parliament and it may be the sub-
ject of amendments, the extent to which this Bill will lead to changes is undoubtedly unde-
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terminable at present. It was also underscored that, since the legislation in respect of insol-
vency procedures in Kenya is heavily reliant on the courts for supervision, the reputation of 
the Kenyan court system of being inefficient and hampered by corruption is a cause for con-
cern. Nonetheless, the on-going reforms to the judiciary are commendable, however it re-
mains to be seen whether the reforms will improve the reputation of, and confidence in, the 
laws and whether the law actually becomes efficient and dependable.  
Chapter Four addresses the third objective of the study, which is establishing whether there 
are any informal approaches to corporate rescue in Kenya that may enable present weak-
nesses in the formal laws to be overcome. It was established that informal restructuring ef-
forts come in a variety of forms and different modes of actions which may entail firms rais-
ing new capital such as through assets sales; negotiating terms with creditors; merging with 
another company; workouts, including pre-packaged reconstructions, amongst others. Al-
though a variety of informal mechanisms are employed in Kenya, they are relatively under-
developed. Mechanisms such as debt for equity swaps, managerial techniques and cost cut-
ting measures, such as downsizing the workforce, are constantly used, although there is a 
glaring lack of any documented evidence on how they are undertaken. However more ap-
propriate mechanisms for corporate restructuring that are popular in developed economies, 
such as workouts and pre-packs have not been developed. It was argued that, since the Ken-
yan judiciary suffers from a lack of public confidence, as well as having a significant back-
log of cases and shortage of Judges with expertise on insolvency matters, out of court re-
structuring can be a good alternative. It was submitted that an opportune time to nurture the 
informal mechanisms is now since there is a general recognition in Kenya that taking every 
dispute to court burdens the judicial system and even strains beneficial relations.  
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It was noted that informal mechanisms are difficult to implement without an effective formal 
framework. Literature documents that informal procedure workouts are negotiated in the 
‘shadow of the law’ and therefore depend on the enabling legal environment that has clear 
laws and procedures to facilitate disclosure or access to timely and accurate financial infor-
mation regarding the distressed enterprise.
18
 Therefore, Kenya’s insolvency framework will 
need to nurture recognizable informal mechanisms while, at the same time, improving the 
efficiency of the judicial systems. It was established clearly that a legal system influences 
informal procedures and to a certain extent determines the possibilities for out of court debt 
restructuring in any given jurisdiction. In essence, effective formal insolvency procedures 
serve as a warning to those who would not otherwise easily participate in out of court ar-
rangements.
19
 The workouts and pre-packaged models offered by the international bench-
marks form a good start when considering what sort of mechanisms to nurture. It was argued 
that developing a functional equivalent is a realistic approach as this allows for a possibility 
of having mechanisms hinged on the realities of a developing economy, such as macroeco-
nomic conditions, the composition of debt and the legal/institutional framework.  
Chapter Five addresses the fourth objective by investigating how other jurisdictions have 
successfully reformed their laws.  This was done in order to inform the discussion of 
Kenya’s prospects for reform. The chapter explored the historical evolution of the UK cor-
porate insolvency laws. This study revealed that the evolutions of the UK insolvency system 
span over several decades and were significantly shaped by the Cork Report,
20
 which above 
all aimed to define the characteristics of what made a good modern insolvency system. The 
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report was so influential that it remains a valuable resource for anyone wishing to gain a full 
understanding of the UK’s insolvency regime and, in particular, its historical reform drivers. 
In addition, an identification and examination of corporate insolvency drivers in the UK was 
undertaken in the context of the quest to understand how insolvency reforms in this jurisdic-
tion have been successfully championed. A number of drivers emerged which influences the 
will of the government to engage in reforms hence the government can best be described as 
the ultimate driver of reforms. Many market regulations take place within the confines of the 
national state and accordingly a government is very influential in its structure and reforms. 
A government’s vital role in a market economy is to guarantee the fluidity and complete 
functioning of the world of business by enacting and implementing laws/policies that could 
guarantee the rights of those who engage in business and strengthen the institutions in-
volved.
21
 It was argued that the existence of such an expectation on the government does not 
guarantee that an existing government will actually deliver on the same. In fact a govern-
ment can become a hindrance. However, the British governments have been effective in 
driving reforms through as they have actively participated in forming the committees to re-
view the law and the government department (known now as) the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) has pursued an agenda of regular review and reform, and gov-
ernments have also engaged in mature constructive politics, evidenced through parliamen-
tary debates. 
Valuable lessons were drawn from the UK reform process, key among which was the impor-
tance of government commitment and consistency. It was argued that other reform drivers 
can easily be negated unless the government, using its legal mandate, translates the energy 
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and ideas into legislation. In addition, the existence of efficient institutions, in particular the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is very fundamental.  Besides, the ad-
verse effect of the financial crisis, coupled with globalization, which increased the vulner-
ability of all jurisdictions of the world, has underscored the need to nurture a rescue culture.  
International organizations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have 
successfully championed reforms through designing and disseminating international stan-
dards on insolvency and creditors’ rights systems which are aimed at strengthening a coun-
try’s domestic institutions and where necessary spurring reforms.22 Besides, the contribu-
tions of international bodies, such as the European Bank of Construction & Development 
(EBRD) and INSOL International have also been significant. INSOL International works on 
a global scale, holding conferences, advising governments on legal reforms and training in-
solvency practitioners.
23
 It was argued that the existences of such international rules that are 
known and considered reputable in a global market rife with competition, prompt the juris-
dictions of the world to re-think their laws. Also, the UK is an active participant in the inter-
national forums. Such platforms enhance peer review and benchmarking and stimulate re-
form debates. 
Interest groups such as R3 (a UK insolvency trade body) actively engage in campaigning to 
promote business rescue and reforming the insolvency framework. In fact, the role of pro-
fessionals in setting the agenda and decision was found out to be very vital.
24
  However, the 
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ability of the interest groups to have influence on reforms depends on its ability to be organ-
ized and its resources.
25
 Financial crisis was elaborated as propelling reforms and specifi-
cally, insolvency law inevitably obtains a much more prominent place in the social con-
sciousness than usual during such times.
26
 It was observed that major reforms in the UK 
were always preceded by major crisis.  
Another unique driver that was ascertained was the pursuit of the rescue culture, an endeav-
our pursued within the British jurisdiction since the time of the publication of the Cork Re-
port in 1982. Further globalization has driven reforms in the UK as the momentum of re-
form; the content of reform, and the trajectory of reform has proceeded from, or responded 
to, the transnational and global context. This has further been enhanced by the integration of 
the British economy into the EU as this has necessitated the development of common and 
harmonized laws. 
The sixth chapter identified and explored the reform drivers in Kenya and made compari-
sons to how specific similar drivers in Mauritius operate. It was established that the two ju-
risdictions are very similar in many aspects. Besides the same drivers, in particular the gov-
ernments, international institutions, business groups and the challenges of growing the econ-
omy through attracting investments are active in driving reforms. It is evident that the two 
jurisdictions acknowledge that effective insolvency laws play a significant role in the 
strength of an economy, and predominantly upon the framework that influences investment 
decisions. However, significant differences exist in the reforms, primarily because Mauritius 
has deliberately turned the challenges into great reform opportunities. Besides, this jurisdic-
                                                          
25
 Ibid   
26
 Fredrick Dahan and Elizabeth  Kirk, ‘Debt enforcement in Insolvency: What We Know and What We Do 
Not (yet) Know’ available in http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/legal/insolvency.shtml accessed on 9th July 
2013 
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tion has willingly cooperated with the international players and utilized donor aid and tech-
nical support. It was argued that the greatest impediments to the reforms in Kenya were dis-
ruptive politics and a lack of consistency on reform engagements by the government. It was 
considered that the fundamental lessons that the Kenyan jurisdiction can learn from Mauri-
tius were that it is vital that there should be an effective government with a strong political 
will to implement reforms. In addition, it was noted that independent and efficient institu-
tions, particularly the reform commission whenever it is robust, enhance realization of re-
form. It was also argued that a duty created on the Lord Chancellor to report annually to Par-
liament on the extent to which the Government has implemented Law Commission recom-
mendations is a brilliant approach for accountability purposes. In essence, the law should 
provide a supportive environment for its reform commission and accountability regarding 
the implementation should be imposed on the parliament, a structure which is laudable in 
ensuring effectiveness and efficiency in reforms. 
 
7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE BY THIS STUDY 
This study contributes to the limited scholarship in insolvency law and legal reforms in 
Kenya and the entire Sub-Saharan African region. First, it contributes to the literature in in-
solvency law by pioneering an insolvency law study in Kenya. As pointed out in chapter 
one, Kenya as a jurisdiction lacks documented information on how insolvency issues are 
dealt with. For instance, insolvency cases and informal restructuring have been reported in 
the newspapers as having taken place but there has been a glaring lack of scholarly evidence 
of the same. One possible reason could be the fact that this particular area of law has hith-
erto been neglected in Kenya but globalization and its impact necessitates awakening. 
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Secondly, the study contributes to knowledge by generating in-depth theoretical insights and 
understanding of the challenges that Kenya as a country faces in the endeavour to reform the 
insolvency laws that will be appropriate to this jurisdiction. The experiences of the other ju-
risdictions considered in the thesis were very informative in understanding what the real 
hurdles to reform are, given that the drivers exist and are evidently active but with limited 
results. 
This study also contributes to knowledge by generating an original doctrinal legal scholar-
ship on insolvency law in Kenya. First is the exploration of the existing theories on insol-
vency law, then an evaluative exploration of the existing legal framework. An elaboration of 
the English jurisdiction’s reforms and its drivers serves to prove how the existing legal 
framework left to Kenya as a colonial legacy is out of touch with the expectations of modern 
businesses. Given that the English jurisdiction which developed the law upon which Kenyan 
law is based has changed its own beyond recognition there is a compelling need for reforms 
in Kenya. 
The study has also contributed to knowledge by providing an insight into how the interna-
tional insolvency benchmarks and the international institutions, as drivers of reforms, can be 
very helpful to Kenya as a jurisdiction, as they have been in Mauritius, an equally emerging 
economy. Besides, the study provides a framework for determining the local policy context 
that might be useful in understanding why the reform processes have been too slow.  Con-
sidering that there is no evidence that even a single study has previously been done to iden-
tify the challenges and to compare them with experiences in other jurisdictions, as well as 
compliance with international benchmarks, this study is very informative. 
 
316 
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES AND LEGIS-
LATION 
 
The insights from the findings of this research have important implications for policy and 
legislation in Kenya. In particular, the study underscores that meaningful reform not only 
needs legislative changes but also effective institutions, resulting from a conjunction of 
pragmatic concerns in the minds of practitioners, policy makers and extensive evidence-
based researches which open up explanations of legal change, markets and globalization. In 
addition, for Kenya to realize an effective insolvency framework, political will and com-
mitment by the government is fundamental. Besides, the increasing integration of the Ken-
yan economy into the global economy makes Kenya more vulnerable to the effects of a 
global financial crisis and therefore reforming the existing framework is necessary as part of 
preventive measures. However, careful considerations are necessary in order to make re-
forms which take account of both the local realities as well international insolvency bench-
marks. This is mandatory in ensuring that Kenya does not just enact unsuitable insolvency 
laws. Another crucial focus of the reforms should be on their implementation. As already 
demonstrated Kenya has for a long time acknowledged the need for reforms and engaged in 
drafting insolvency bills which have failed to come into force. Besides, commitments at the 
highest levels of government have been made on several occasions, such that many other 
reform participants have come to see such efforts as ‘mere talk’. In essence, opportunities 
for reform are widely understood in Kenya, and many have been underway for some time, 
even in other legal spectrums. However, removing obstacles to their implementation should 
be a key priority. This study has clearly demonstrated that the biggest problem is political 
sabotaging. It was observed that developing countries that are still struggling with judicial 
corruption, political instability and inadequate rule of law generally fail to realize meaning-
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ful reforms and are likely to be disadvantaged in competing to attracting investment.  How-
ever, once effective and efficient insolvency law is in place, it inspires confidence from in-
vestors both local and foreign, which boost the economy as well as help address some chal-
lenges such as unemployment and fighting poverty. To the Kenyan jurisdiction, the Mau-
ritian approach of having the parliament held accountable for its legislative engagement is 
highly recommended as a reform model. This will not only increase the chances that Bills 
are actually passed into law but also improve the existing pace of reform initiatives which 
are too slow. 
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several limitations in this study.  The main one was the limited relevant materials 
on the jurisdictions of Kenya and Mauritius. There is a notable lack of scholarly work in this 
area. Besides, the primary sources that are the foundation of any study of this nature were 
not readily available and accessible. The case law reporting in Kenya is inadequate and in 
some instances non-existent, despite the local newspapers constantly carrying relevant head-
lines, and there were hardly any details available as to cases that could be very helpful in 
developing scholarship in the area of insolvency. The analysis of the reports by the World 
Bank, IMF, and EBRD was conducted on the basis of only the very few such reports that 
were relevant to the jurisdictions under study. Such reports were however very insightful. 
Further reliance had to be made on secondary sources which included textbooks, journals 
articles, and newspapers. 
A second limitation is the extent to which insolvency theories could be applied in this study. 
As was explained, the existing theories originate from western and developed jurisdictions 
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which are characterized by advanced technology, multinational corporations and sophisti-
cated legal and financial systems. Much as the theories can be adapted and refined, such an 
adaptation is challenging. In essence, what sort of objectives should an insolvency frame-
work for a developing economy prioritize, what sort of procedures should the law embody? 
What sort of practical implementation provisions should the law personify? Therefore, it is 
recommended that a theory should be developed that is cognizant to the challenges and cir-
cumstances of an emerging economy. It is appreciated that it is difficult to have a perfect 
system hence no perfect theory; an ideal theory should balance the interest of creditors as 
well as those of other stakeholders. The theory should modify the Traditionalist views. It 
should be a theory that sees insolvency as collective loss sharing device which should allow 
for revision of original contractual entitlements of the parties in light of current facts when-
ever necessary. Such a theory should also visualize an insolvency law not excessively reliant 
on the courts. Besides, it should have regard to the existing international benchmarks on in-
solvency. This is because the insolvency benchmarks have the capacity of being tailored in a 
manner to reflect the existing realities in emerging economies.  
A third limitation was a consequence of the scope of the study, which meant that all relevant 
and topical contextual issues could not be pursued in detail. In particular, it was established 
that efficient reforms need to go beyond legislative reform and be extended to implementa-
tion. Legal scholars have acknowledged that the difficulties in implementation are majorly 
caused by the lack of political will of the government,
27
 which was partly explored in this 
study. A crucial area recommended for further research is the Kenyan judicial system and in 
particular the commercial courts and their role in ensuring efficiency in insolvency matters. 
                                                          
27
 OCED, Asian Insolvency Systems : Closing the Implementation Gap (2007, USA) available in 
http://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm accessed on 17th June 2014 
319 
 
It is submitted that it is crucial to establish the courts’ capabilities and inadequacies as they 
are very vital in achieving the desired enabling environment, in so far as insolvency disputes 
are concerned. Much as the study proposed the establishment of a bankruptcy court as a po-
tential aspect to consider as part of reform, the study did not explore the practicalities of this. 
Therefore, a recommended area of further research is to investigate the possibilities of creat-
ing a bankruptcy court in Kenya. A study of how other jurisdictions, such as Thailand, have 
done this will be very insightful. 
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